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Abstract 
The central goal of the current thesis was to increase our understanding of how 
representations of individual faces are built from instances that vary.  The prototype 
effect was used as a tool to probe the nature of our internal face representations.  In 
face recognition, the prototype effect refers to the tendency to recognize, or find 
familiar, the average image of a face after having studied a series of similar face 
images.  The experiments presented in this thesis investigated the modulating role of 
different variables on the prototype effect in face recognition.  In the study phase, two 
or more different exemplars based on the same identity were presented.  In the test 
phase, one of the seen exemplars, the unseen prototype, and an unseen exemplar of 
each studied identity were presented one at a time, and participants were asked to 
make a recognition judgement about the prior occurrence of either the exact image or 
the person‟s face.  Variants of each face identity were either unaltered images of real 
people‟s faces, or they were created artificially by manipulating images of faces using 
several different techniques.  All experiments using artificial variants produced strong 
prototype effects.  The unseen prototype image was recognized more confidently than 
the actually studied images.  This was true even when the variants were so similar that 
they were barely perceptually discriminable.  Importantly, even when participants 
were given additional exposure to the studied exemplars, no weakening of the 
prototype effect was observed.  Surprisingly, in the experiments using natural images 
of real people‟s faces, no clear recognition advantage for the prototype image was 
observed.  Results suggest that the prototype effect in face recognition might not be 
tapping an averaging mechanism that operates solely on variations within the same 
identity.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 4 
The overall aim of the present work is to elucidate how representations of faces are 
built from varying instances.  Specifically, I am interested in how identity is internally 
represented as we learn new faces.  To investigate this, the prototype effect will be 
used as a tool to probe the nature of the underlying face representations.  Although the 
effect has been studied in other areas of cognition, in regard to face recognition the 
prototype effect “refers to the tendency to recognize the face corresponding to the 
central value of a series of seen faces…” (Cabeza, Bruce, Kato, & Oda, 1999; p. 139).  
A better understanding of the prototype effect will lead to a better understanding of 
memory for faces or at least promote cautious and thoughtful interpretation of 
theoretical and experimental work concerning the nature of face representation. 
 
In this review of the literature, material on the recognition of familiar and unfamiliar 
faces, the prototype effect, and the implications of different models of memory will be 
covered.  Following this, the current study will be introduced and the structure of the 
thesis will be outlined.  Finally, a general methods section is provided at the end of 
this chapter. 
Literature Review 
Recognizing Familiar and Unfamiliar Faces 
Unless one is familiar with a face, it can be difficult to recognize it across changes in 
viewing conditions or appearance (Bruck, Cavanagh, & Ceci, 1991; Burton, Bruce, & 
Hancock, 1999; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000; O‟Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin, 
& Abdi, 1994).  Even matching identity from images of unfamiliar faces can be 
difficult (Bruce, Henderson, Newman, & Burton, 2001; Henderson, Bruce, & Burton, 
2001).  This is true even when images in the matching task are presented 
simultaneously rather than having to be retrieved from memory.  However, 
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recognition of familiar faces is quite resistant to image degradation (Burton, Wilson, 
Cowan, & Bruce, 1999; Harmon & Julesz, 1973; James, Humphrey, Gati, Menon, & 
Goodale, 2000; Liu, Seetzen, Burton, & Chaudhuri, 2003).  Megreya and Burton 
(2006a) suggested that this difficulty is due to poor initial encoding of unfamiliar 
faces.  They suggest that an unfamiliar face does not automatically engage the same 
perceptual processes as familiar faces.  In agreement, Buttle and Raymond (2003) 
assert that the perceptual processing of familiar faces proceeds in a more efficient 
manner and requires less attentional resources than unfamiliar faces 
 
Internal/External Shift 
One of the most well known effects of familiarity on face processing is the shift of the 
relative importance of internal and external features in face recognition.  The 
importance of the internal features relative to the external features is higher for 
familiar faces compared to less familiar faces (Bonner, Burton, & Bruce, 2003; Bruce, 
Henderson, Greenwood, Hancock, Burton, & Miller, 1999; Clutterbuck, & Johnston, 
2002; Ellis, Shepherd, & Davies, 1979; Haig, 1986; Nachson, Moscovitch, & Umiltà, 
1995; Young, Hay, McWeeny, Flude, & Ellis, 1985).  For example, Ellis et al. found 
that unfamiliar faces studied from full face photographs were recognized equally well 
at test from either their internal or external features alone.  In contrast, they also found 
that famous faces were both identified and recognized better from internal features 
only compared to external features only.  Bonner et al. (2003) found that in a face 
matching task, unfamiliar faces were matched more accurately from their external 
features compared to their internal features, but after these same faces were made 
more familiar, matches were made from internal and external features with equal 
accuracy.  Does this suggest that familiar faces are processed differently to unfamiliar 
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faces in some fundamental way?  Some believe this to be the case (see Ellis et al., 
1979; Hancock et al., 2000; Megreya & Burton, 2006a; Megreya & Burton, 2006b; 
Ryu & Chaudhuri, 2006). In fact, the shift toward an advantage for internal features 
has been proposed for use as an empirical indicator of familiarity (Clutterbuck, & 
Johnston, 2002). 
 
Inversion is a manipulation commonly believed to disrupt configural processing with 
little effect on featural processing of faces (this issue is reviewed in more detail later 
on in this chapter).  Additionally, the detrimental effect of inversion is increased when 
only internal features of a face are visible (Leder & Bruce, 1998; Moscovitch & 
Moscovitch, 2000).  Therefore, it is possible that a major difference between familiar 
and unfamiliar faces is how much their processing relies on precise configural 
information (Buttle & Raymond, 2003).   
 
The Correlation Between Familiar and Unfamiliar Face Processing 
Further evidence of different processing for familiar and unfamiliar faces comes from 
studies analyzing the correlations between recognition of familiar and unfamiliar 
faces.  If recognition of these two types of faces uses the same process, one might 
expect to find a positive correlation between a participant‟s ability to recognize 
familiar and unfamiliar faces.  Conversely, recognition deficits of brain injured 
patients reveal no such correlation suggesting a dissociation between the underlying 
processes (Warrington & James, 1967; see also Benton, 1980).  Moreover, Megreya 
and Burton (2006a) found that while face matching performance on upright and 
inverted faces does show a positive correlation when using unfamiliar faces, no 
correlation across orientation exists when identifying or matching familiar faces.  
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However, results from other studies conflict with those of Megreya and Burton.  Yin 
(1969) found the opposite relationship in a recognition task using unfamiliar faces.  
Participants were split into two groups based on their performance on inverted faces.  
Yin found that the group that was “worse” on inverted faces was more accurate at 
recognizing upright faces than the “better” group was.  Still different results were 
found by Phillips and Rawles (1979).  Phillips and Rawles found no correlation 
between the recognition of upright and inverted unfamiliar faces, but a positive 
correlation between upright and inverted familiar faces in an identification task.  The 
inconsistencies among findings may partially be due to differing task demands.  For 
example, Megreya and Burton only used test of simultaneous matching or immediate 
memory.  In contrast, both Yin and Phillips and Rawles‟ studies were divided into 
separate study and test phases (when using unfamiliar face stimuli) so faces would 
have to be retained in memory for a much longer amount of time.  Also most of 
Megreya and Burton‟s experiments used a line up task where participants tried to 
match the target out of an array of ten images of different peoples‟ faces.  In half the 
trials, the target was present in the array, and in half the trials the target was absent.  In 
Yin and Phillips and Rawles‟ experiments, participants were presented with two test 
faces and were asked to select the one from the study phase.  The target was always 
presented in each test pair.  Finally, the experiments of Yin and Phillips and Rawles 
used the same images in both the study and test phases. 
 
Viewpoint and Image Dependency in Face Recognition 
Changing viewpoint is another manipulation used in experimental tasks that 
distinguishes recognition of familiar faces from unfamiliar faces.  Once made familiar 
with a face, one can recognize it with ease from any viewpoint.  However, if a face is 
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unfamiliar, recognizing it from a novel viewpoint may be difficult or unlikely (Bruce, 
1982).  If asked to decide whether two images taken from different viewpoints depict 
the same person or not, participants perform more accurately if images are of familiar 
rather than unfamiliar faces (Hill & Bruce, 1996, experiment 1).  One possible 
explanation is that the unfamiliar faces have representations that are relatively 
unformed compared to familiar faces.  Especially in an experimental context where 
unfamiliar faces are only presented as a single still image, the representation formed 
may be largely image based since the studied image is really all one has to go on (see 
Bruce & Young, 1986).  If the representation of an unfamiliar face only consists of 
memory for a small number (possibly only one) of images, then the representation 
must be heavily viewpoint dependent by necessity (Ryu & Chaudhuri, 2006).  
Consistent with this hypothesis, Kemp, Pike, White, and Musselman (1996) found that 
recognition of familiar faces was not affected by manipulations to the colour of 
images, but this did affect recognition of unfamiliar faces.  Thus, if memory for an 
unfamiliar face is, in some cases, akin to picture memory, then colour information may 
be important in image recognition but less so for face recognition in general.  On the 
other hand, even pictures of familiar faces are still stored as separate memories, and in 
certain experimental tasks, may influence recognition decisions or response times 
(Bruce, 1982; Bruce & Valentine, 1985). 
 
A viewpoint/image-based representation differs from what some researchers have 
proposed for familiar faces (e.g. Bruce & Young, 1986).  The representation of a 
familiar face differs from that of an unfamiliar face mainly in that it is more abstract 
and more interconnected to other representations in memory.  A familiar face 
representation is thought to be view-point invariant (Ryu & Chaudhuri, 2006).  
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Another similar possibility is that a familiar face representation may include a small 
number of examples of or rules for transformations such as viewpoint (Ellis et al., 
1979).  Representations of the appearance of a familiar person‟s face are also thought 
to be linked to “semantic” information about the person including their name (e.g. 
Bruce & Young, 1986). 
 
Megreya and Burton (2006a) warn against trying to explain identity processing of 
familiar and unfamiliar faces under a single theory.  They acknowledge, of course, that 
unfamiliar faces sometimes do become familiar through experience.  Thus, a major 
challenge for future theoretical work will be modelling the process by which newly 
familiarized faces are added into memory. 
 
Stevenage, Lee, and Donnelly (2005) have gone a step further by arguing that even the 
initial perception of a face is altered once it is made familiar.  Familiarity with a face 
can affect processing prior to activation of its representation in memory.  They 
contend that the differential effects of familiarity found in studies of caricature and 
categorical perception are evidence of this. 
 
Caricature Effects 
Caricaturing images of faces was a popular technique used in the 1980‟s and 90‟s in 
studies of facial distinctiveness.  A caricature exaggerates the distinctive aspects of a 
person‟s face.  Caricatures can be made using computer software programs, but of 
course the term “caricature” comes from the portrait style used by some artists.  
Computer-based image transformations let experimenters produce their own 
caricatured images in a more controlled manner than artists could achieve.   
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The technique developed by Benson and Perrett (1991) will be used as an example to 
illustrate how a caricature transform works.  To produce a caricature, first, a large 
number of images of different peoples‟ faces are averaged together.  This will involve 
manually plotting reference points on each face and the use of morphing software to 
determine the average face shape and texture.  The image selected for caricaturing has 
also had the same reference points plotted on it.  Next, the software calculates the 
difference between the selected image and the average face and applies this difference 
to the selected image.  The result is an image that has been morphed such that any 
deviations from normal in the original image are now made even more deviant.  The 
degree of caricature can also be controlled, so experimenters can choose how much 
exaggeration they want to apply to a face.  It is also possible to make anti-caricatures 
by reducing rather than exaggerating the differences from the average face (see Figure 
1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Example of an anti-caricature (left) and caricature (right) of the actor, 
Harrison Ford.  The middle image is a reproduction of the original photograph (taken 
from Lee & Perrett, 2000). 
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In experiments, caricature effects are usually studied using tasks of identification, 
recognition, or judgements of best likeness.  Performance on caricatures can be 
compared to performance on the original, or veridical, images.  For example, if the 
task is identifying famous faces, half of the images would be caricatures and half 
would be veridical images of the famous faces.  If faces are named faster or more 
accurately when they were presented as caricatures compared to veridical, a caricature 
effect is said to be observed.  To study caricature effects of unfamiliar faces, one 
would need to give participants some amount of minimal exposure to a set of faces 
before the test phase. 
 
Of interest is the finding that recognition of unfamiliar faces shows little or no benefit 
from caricaturing whereas familiar faces often do benefit from caricaturing.  Rhodes, 
Brennan, and Carey (1987) found veridical line drawing of unfamiliar faces were rated 
as better likenesses of the people they depicted compared to both caricatures and anti-
caricatured line drawings of those same people.  This was true when participants were 
recalling an earlier presentation of the unfamiliar face from memory or when a 
photograph of the same person was presented on the screen for comparison.  Rhodes 
and Moody (1990) also reported a failure to find caricature effects in a recognition 
task using unfamiliar faces presented in an earlier study phase.  Likewise, 
Deffenbacher, Vetter, Johanson, and O‟Toole (1998) reported that pilot tests could not 
produce a caricature effect in a recognition task unless participants had a minimum of 
about one minute prior exposure to the face. 
 
Benson and Perrett (1991, experiment 1) investigated the effects of caricaturing 
photographs of famous faces on judgements of best likeness.  On each trial, 
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participants were presented with four morphed images of the same face.  The range of 
caricaturing across the four images went from anti-caricature to caricature and also 
included a veridical image of the face.  Participants were asked to rate the familiarity 
of the person depicted as well as select one image as being the best likeness of that 
person.  Benson and Perrett found that the degree of caricature selected as best 
likeness correlated positively with how familiar the participant was with the depicted 
person.  Thus, the more familiar a face, the more likely a caricature of it would 
produce an image of better likeness.  Stevenage et al. (2005) interpret these results as 
indicating “that caricaturing only comes to play a role in face processing when the 
faces are familiar” (p. 1105).  Their interpretation is more of a summary of past 
findings than an illuminating discussion of their implications.   
 
However, Stevenage et al. (2005) do make an important point about the lack of 
explanatory power of Valentine‟s (1991) face space model.  A slight caricature should 
improve recognition a small amount by reducing the competition of other nearby face 
representations in the space.  This should hold true for both familiar and unfamiliar 
faces.  I can only speculate that perhaps the trade off between encoding specificity (i.e. 
the closeness in match between the internal representations of the test and study 
images) and reduced competition from other nearby faces is affected by familiarity 
because an unfamiliar face may rely more on picture-to-picture matching compared to 
familiar faces.  Recognition of familiar faces should be able to draw on a number of 
varying stored representations of previous encounters with that face.  Therefore, 
recognition of familiar faces may tolerate a larger degree of transformation before the 
lack of encoding specificity outweighs the improvement due to reduction of competing 
similar looking faces. 
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Categorical Perception 
Categorical Perception is the perception of a categorical structure imposed onto 
stimuli that vary along a continuum.  It is the opposite of continuous perception.  The 
classic example used to illustrate categorical perception is colour.  Our perception of a 
rainbow is not a smooth continuum of colour.  We see bands of colour when in fact, 
physically, the light frequencies change steadily across the span of the rainbow.  Thus, 
categorical perception seems to stretch out the psychological similarity space in some 
regions and/or compress it in others to make stimuli of the same category appear more 
similar and stimuli of different categories appear more distinct. 
 
In operational terms, categorical perception is said to occur whenever perceived 
differences are more difficult to detect within-category and/or more easily detected 
between-category, compared to a baseline.  For established categories, the baseline is 
usually the physical size of the differences.  In studies of categorical learning, 
categorical perception is usually assessed after learning and compared to a baseline 
taken before learning.  The standard methodology, as applied to faces, for testing 
categorical perception was used by Beale and Keil (1995) and will be described next 
in more detail. 
 
Beale and Keil (1995) sought to determine whether familiar faces are perceived 
categorically.  To do this, they paired up photographs of famous faces and created a 
morphed continuum of blended faces between the two faces in a pair.  The continuum 
consisted of 11 faces morphed at 10% increments (exception: the two original faces 
were blended by 1% to ensure all stimuli had undergone the morphing process).  For 
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example, in the Kennedy/Clinton continuum, the first face would be 99% Kennedy/1% 
Clinton; the second face would be 90% Kennedy/10% Clinton; the third face would be 
80% Kennedy/20% Clinton, and so on.  The procedure had two parts: a discrimination 
task and a categorization task.  In the discrimination task, three face images were 
presented consecutively.  The third image was the target face and was identical to one 
of the two previous images.  The first two images always differed by 20% (two steps 
on the continuum).  The task was to indicate whether it was the first or the second 
image that matched the third image.  In the categorization task, all images in the 
continuum were presented one at a time and participants were asked to classify each 
one as either more like Kennedy or more like Clinton. 
 
To test for categorical effects using artificial categories, one must determine where the 
categorical boundary lies along the continuum and compare discrimination at this 
point with performance along the rest of the continuum.  If categorical perception is 
present, then discrimination performance should peak on the two-step pair that 
straddles the categorical boundary.  The categorization task is used to determine the 
categorical boundary.  Beale and Keil (1995) chose 33% and 66% as the cut-off points 
for the categorical boundary.  This meant, for example, that images judged Kennedy 
on more than 66% of trials could be considered members of the Kennedy category.  
Images judged to be Kennedy on less than 33% of trials could be considered members 
of the Clinton category.  Any other images were, on average, not consistently judged 
as belonging to either category, so they would be right on the categorical boundary.  
According to Beale and Keil‟s results, images four, five, and six were judged as 
Kennedy approximately 90%, 45%, and 15% respectively.  Therefore, the two-step 
pair that straddles the categorical boundary would be pair 4/6.  Discrimination 
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performance on pair 4/6 was higher than the average performance on all other pairs 
combined.  Thus, the hallmark of categorical perception was observed since the 
discrimination of differences was poorer within a category than between categories. 
 
Beale and Keil (1995) did indeed find categorical effects for famous faces of different 
identities.  They also found some support for an effect of familiarity on categorical 
perception.  The effect of familiarity was investigated by collecting familiarity ratings 
on a set of famous faces and then creating morphed continua between pairs of faces of 
different levels of familiarity (faces belonging to the same pair were matched for 
familiarity).  The level of familiarity of a face pair correlated positively with the 
strength of categorical perception.  However, more compelling evidence would have 
been obtained by using the same stimuli in both the familiar and unfamiliar conditions 
and manipulating the degree of learning.  This would at least rule out the possibility 
that the differences in the categorical perception task were being driven by some 
systematic difference between the faces rated as most familiar and the faces that were 
rated as less familiar. 
 
Since Beale and Keil (1995) first demonstrated categorical perception of facial 
identity, several studies have attempted to examine the same phenomenon throughout 
the course of learning within an experiment.  However, results have been inconsistent.  
Angeli, Davidoff, and Valentine (2001) and Campanella, Chrysochoos, and Bruyer 
(2001) both concluded that the identity of unfamiliar faces are not perceived 
categorically (unless the identities are highly distinctive).  In contrast, other studies 
have reported categorical perception using unfamiliar faces (Campanella, Hanoteau, 
Seron, Joassin, & Bruyer, 2003; Levin & Beale, 2000; Viviani, Binda, & Borsato, 
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2007).  McKone, Martini, and Nakayama (2001) and Stevenage (1998) have 
demonstrated the emergence of categorical perception after extensive familiarity 
training on previously unfamiliar faces.  It should be noted that the standard 
methodology of testing for categorical perception requires at least a low level of 
familiarity with the stimulus.  In fact, learning from the test phase alone is enough to 
produce a categorical perception effect (Viviani et al., 2007).  Therefore, the important 
finding consistent across studies is that familiarity with the stimuli modulates 
categorical perception of faces.  Categorical perception effects are stronger for more 
familiar faces than less familiar ones, and this is expected since a face, when seen for 
the first time, will have no categorical representation of its identity already established 
in memory.  Trying to make all or none statements about the presence or absence of 
categorical perception will likely lead to confusion since the literature uses the term 
“unfamiliar” to refer to the familiarity status of a face before the start of an 
experiment, but learning of the face takes place throughout the experiment. 
 
Face Classification: Evidence from Thatcher Faces 
Stevenage et al. (2005) present their own experimental findings regarding the effect of 
familiarity on perceptual or structural encoding processes.  They make use of 
Thatcherized faces in which the eyes and mouth of a face are inverted while the rest of 
the face remains in place (see Figure 1.2).  This Thatcher task basically serves as an 
alternate version to the face/no face task which uses faces with scrambled features as 
distractors.  The Thatcher task is more difficult though, particularly when the stimuli 
are inverted.  In experiment 1, a two alternative forced choice task was used that pitted 
a Thatcherized version of a face against a normal photograph of that same person‟s 
face.  Half of the trials used famous faces, and half used unfamiliar faces.  Also, half 
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of the trials were upright, and half were inverted.  In experiment 2, the same stimuli 
were presented one at a time, and participants judged whether the face was normal or 
odd.  Stevenage et al. expected an advantage for familiar faces to be revealed within 
the inverted condition due to the increased difficulty of the task.  Indeed, in both 
experiments, results showed similar performance at both levels of familiarity when 
faces were upright, but when faces were inverted, performance was higher on familiar 
faces than unfamiliar faces.  The problem with their argument is that they assume 
detecting whether the face is intact is a perceptual process that does not require 
accessing a stored memory (at least a memory of that particular face or a similar face).  
They assume that this is an early perceptual process performed during structural 
encoding and, according to the Bruce and Young (1986) model, should be completed 
before the familiarity of the face is signalled.  Stevenage et al. then explain how their 
results could be explained if one assumes “First, the decisions of familiarity and face-
ness must proceed in parallel.  Second, the familiarity decision must be achieved 
earlier than the face classification decision.  Third, completion of the familiarity 
decision must facilitate the face classification decision” (p. 1110).  If one makes these 
assumptions, then by necessity accessing stored representations of familiar faces is not 
a later process; if anything, it is the earlier process.  In a sense, their argument seems 
to be that familiarity can affect earlier face processing if those earlier face processes 
are not really earlier after all. 
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Figure 1.2.  Examples of normal and Thatcherized faces.  Bottom shows an unfamiliar 
familiar face and top shows the famous face of the actress Jamie Lee Curtis (taken 
from Stevenage et al., 2005). 
Levels of Familiarity with Faces 
How much experience is needed with a face for it to become familiar?  O‟Donnell 
(2003) claimed that 18 minutes of exposure can produce familiarization equal to that 
of personally known familiar faces. Tong and Nakayama (1999) assert that thousands 
of exposures (rather than hundreds) is needed to make a face as familiar as a face of a 
close friend or relative.  Results from experiments reported by Buttle and Raymond 
(2003) support this assertion since famous faces were found to produced better 
performance on a change detection task than newly familiarized faces even after 
hundreds of exposures.  Ryu and Chaudhuri (2006) emphasise the importance of 
encoding across variable viewing conditions and also the accumulation of semantic 
information in attaining familiarity with a person‟s face.  
 
For familiar faces, the distinction is often drawn between personally familiar faces 
(friends, family) and familiar famous faces.  There may be differences between these 
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groups if familiarity has been induced in different ways (e.g. TV, photos, vs. real life 
interaction).  O‟Donnell (2003) found evidence that newly familiarized faces (in a lab 
setting) yielded different patterns of manipulation detection than personally familiar 
ones.  Buttle and Raymond (2003) found that with newly familiarized faces, 
participants were slower to detect changes than with famous faces using a task similar 
to those used in attentional blink studies.  This held true despite participants being 
given ample opportunity to learn semantic information about the newly familiarized 
faces.  Therefore, it is likely that the information stored and/or retrieved for very 
familiar faces is slightly different than newly familiarized faces. 
 
Effects of Familiarity on Other Face Perception Tasks 
Familiarity with a face has been shown to improve performance on perceptual 
classification tasks such as gender (Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2002; Rossion, 2002; 
Rossion, Schiltz, Robaye, Pirenne, & Crommelinck, 2001), age (Bruyer, Lafalize, & 
Distefano, 1991; Bruyer, Mejias, & Doublet, 2007), ethnicity (Bruyer, Leclere, & 
Quinet, 2004), emotional expression (Ganel, Valyear, Goshen-Gottstein, & Goodale, 
2005; Schweinberger, Burton, & Kelly, 1999; Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998; ), and 
lip reading (Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998). 
 
Other factors, besides our past experience with that face, may affect how familiar a 
face is perceived to be.  While smiling faces are judged as more familiar than faces 
with a neutral expression (Baudouin, Gilibert, Sansone, & Tiberghien, 2000), faces 
with a negative expression are judged as less familiar (Lander & Metcalfe, 2007).  
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Representing Faces as Parts and Wholes 
Researchers have reached a general consensus that information about the individual 
features of a face and their configuration are both important in recognizing faces.  A 
more contentious issue is whether face representations are feature based or holistic, 
that is, not decomposed into discrete features or parts.  Part of the difficulty of settling 
this debate is the lack of precise, consistent definitions of the terms feature, 
configuration, and holistic (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). 
 
In the context of this debate, the terms feature, part, and component can usually be 
used interchangeably and most commonly refer to the most obvious, intuitive, and 
nameable features of the face including eyes, nose, mouth, etc.  Configuration usually 
refers to the spatial relationships or positioning of features within the face.  Use of the 
term holistic is notably inconsistent.  Holistic and configural processing often refer to 
the same thing; however, the distinction is sometimes made (McKone, Kanwisher, & 
Duchaine, 2007).  When the distinction is made, it is usually to emphasize the lack of 
parts in an undifferentiated holistic representation whereas representing the 
configuration implies that there are discrete features that vary subtly in their spatial 
arrangements.  What configural and holistic processing both emphasize is the 
importance of relational (i.e. spatial) information that integrates so called features. 
 
A lot of the confusion surrounding configural and holistic processing stems from the 
intuitive assumption that faces can be thought of as a set of discrete features which can 
be arranged spatially into different configurations (Bruce & Burton, 2002).  So if faces 
are assumed to be composed of parts and part relations what alternative hypotheses 
have been put forth?  The main alternative view is the holistic face hypothesis (Farah, 
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Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka & Farah, 1993) which assumes the opposite.  
According to this view, faces are not processed in terms of their component features, 
so by necessity, the feature relations cannot be processed either (because spatial 
relationships are among specified component features).  Bruce (1979) expressed this 
debate as being a question of “whether faces are processed analytically (feature-by-
feature) or globally, as Gestalten.” (p. 374). 
 
Early research on the relative importance of feature processing focused on whether 
facial features were processed serially or in parallel.  Bradshaw and Wallace (1971) 
reasoned that serial processing of features is consistent with the idea that faces are 
represented by their component features, and parallel processing is consistent with the 
proposal of a more holistic representation of faces.  They used Identikit faces in a 
sequential matching task and measured the time it took participants to make a “same” 
or “different” decision.  Reaction times varied according to the number of features that 
differed between the two faces being compared, with faster responses being associated 
with a higher number of differing features.  Bradshaw and Wallace interpreted this 
result as evidence of serial self-terminating search for differing face features and, 
therefore, feature-based processing. 
 
Using the same approach as Bradshaw and Wallace (1971), Matthews (1978) used a 
simultaneous matching task again using Identikit faces.  He found that the pattern of 
results depended on which features differed between the two faces of a pair.  
Specifically, Matthews found that changes to the eyes, chin, and hair were spotted 
faster and processed in parallel; whereas changes to the eyebrows, nose, and mouth 
were spotted slower and were processed serially, feature-by-feature.  The overall 
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conclusion Matthews came to was that some features of a face are processed serially 
and others, in parallel (possibly holistically).  However, Sergent (1984) pointed out 
that the finding of equal reaction times across changes in eyes, chin, and hair may 
have been an artefact of analyzing data averaged across participants.  If participants 
used different serial scanning strategies, this would have been hidden by averaging the 
data; and thus, equal response times across feature changes does not rule out serial 
processing of features as the sole underlying process driving all of the results. 
 
Smith and Nielsen (1970) found evidence that matching faces from short term memory 
involves more than one style of processing.  They used a sequential matching task 
which varied the length of delay (1, 4, or 10 sec) between presentation of the first and 
second face of each pair.  In addition to manipulating the number of differing features 
within each pair, they also manipulated the number of task relevant features in each 
block of trials.  Reaction times for correct “different” and “same” responses produced 
slightly different patterns of results.  As the number of differing features in a pair 
increased, reaction times decreased.  This pattern is consistent with the use of some 
type of self-terminating, feature-by-feature comparison (either serial or parallel), and 
this pattern held true regardless of the length of the delay interval.  For “same” 
responses, reaction times increased as the number of relevant features increased.  This 
pattern was also interpreted as having involved self-terminating, feature-by-feature 
comparisons.  However, this pattern was only true for “same” responses at long lags 
(10 sec).  In contrast, after a 1sec delay, reaction times of “same” responses were not 
affected by the number of task relevant features.  Smith and Nielsen argued that this 
pattern of results was evidence that participants were treating the faces as unitary 
wholes when making comparisons on “same” trials with short delay intervals 
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Sergent (1984) tested the related hypothesis that facial features are processed 
independently of one another.  She used Photofit faces in a simultaneous matching 
task.  Her rationale was that if features are processed independently, then change 
detection should not be faster to a pair of faces differing by two features than a pair 
differing only on the most salient feature.  She used three features: eyes (plus 
eyebrows), chin contour, and a feature Sergent termed “internal space” (the closeness 
of the internal face features), and each feature could take one of two values.  Results 
indicated that chin contour was the most salient feature while eyes and internal space 
were less salient than the chin but equally salient compared to one another.  Contrary 
to the prediction made when assuming independence of feature processing, face pairs 
differing by both the chin and the internal spacing were more quickly judged as 
“different” than pairs differing by the chin alone.  This interactive pattern was not 
found for the eyes.  Thus, Sergent concluded that some features may interact with one 
another and be processed holistically, but other features may be processed 
independently of one another.  This could be achieved by separate featural and 
configural processes operating simultaneously on different properties of the facial 
stimuli.  The obvious problem with this study is that the feature “internal spacing” 
may not be treated in the same way as the more conventional features (eyes, nose, 
mouth etc.), and since it was the only feature that interacted with other features, 
conclusions are severely limited in that respect. 
 
The main problem with the four studies just described is that they based their 
hypotheses on inappropriate assumptions about the models they are testing.  For 
example, Smith and Nielsen (1970), Bradshaw and Wallace (1971), and Matthews 
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(1978) all assume that the number of features in a face or the number of differing 
features between two faces should have no effect on reaction times in a matching task 
if faces are processed and represented as holistic Gestalts.  This is not the case since 
holistic representations can vary in the amount of information they contain which 
could affect how quickly they could be used.  Furthermore, the number of differing 
features between two faces would affect how different their holistic representations 
are, which in turn would affect how quickly a difference could be detected (note: the 
term features is referring to the features as defined and manipulated by the 
experimenters.  Of course, if faces were represented as holistic Gestalts, they would 
not contain any countable features).  Also, whether faces were matched using a serial 
or parallel search strategy does not distinguish holistic Gestalt processing from 
configural processing of the spatial relations of features since both would likely 
involve parallel search.  It is even possible that features could be processed in parallel 
without necessarily representing their spatial relationships (Tanaka & Farah, 1993).  
 
The next major line of related research was spurred on when presenting stimuli upside 
down was found to cause more impairment in recognition and perceptual tasks using 
faces compared to other types of objects and visual patterns (Yin, 1969).  This finding 
generated quite a lot of interest into what might be causing inversion effects and 
whether face perception involves special processes used only on faces.  Thus, the 
question switched from what is the relative importance of featural vs. configural 
processing in overall face recognition to is face perception more dependent on 
configural/holistic processing relative to featural processing than is the perception of 
other kinds of visual objects (Tanaka & Farah, 1993)?  If inversion impairs the 
perception of faces more than other types of objects, then determining more precisely 
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the locus of impairment will shed light on how facial processing might differ from the 
processing of most other objects. 
 
Most researchers agree that upright and inverted faces are not processed in the same 
way (Goffaux & Rossion, 2007).  In general, inverting a face makes it more difficult to 
recognize (Yin, 1969) and makes distortions or alterations applied to it more difficult 
to detect (Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Thompson, 1980).  The predominant view is that 
while information from the local features and their configuration are both important 
for processing upright faces, the processing of configural information is greatly 
impaired when faces are inverted (Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Barton, Keenan, & Bass, 
2001; Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000; Leder & Bruce, 1998; Leder & Bruce, 2000; 
Leder & Carbon, 2006; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001; Mondloch, Le 
Grand, & Maurer, 2002; Murray, Yong, & Rhodes, 2000; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 
1993; Rhodes, Hayward, & Winkler, 2006; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Sergent, 1984). 
 
One of the most common methods used to investigate the effects of inversion is 
measuring participants‟ sensitivity to manipulations of the featural vs. configural 
information within upright vs. inverted faces.  However, manipulations of featural or 
configural information often affect one another to some extent, so entirely pure 
measures of featural or configural processing are not possible.  Even still, through 
careful manipulation of stimuli, sets of faces can be produced that vary the configural 
information with little effect on the information about the local features and vice versa.  
To manipulate the configural information, the standard approach is to keep the 
individual features the same, but to alter their spacing or positioning within the overall 
face shape (e.g. Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Freire et al., 2000; Hosie, Ellis, & Haig, 
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1988; Kemp, McManus, & Piggot, 1990; Le Grand et al., 2001; Leder & Bruce, 2000; 
Leder & Carbon, 2006; Leder, Candrian, Huber, & Bruce, 2001; Mondloch et al., 
2002; Murray et al., 2000).  Less obvious is how features can be altered without 
disturbing the configuration among them (i.e. the precise distances between features). 
 
Past attempts at manipulating featural information have included swapping the facial 
features among images of different faces (Freire et al., 2000; Goffaux, Hault, Michel, 
Vuong, & Rossion, 2005; Goffaux & Rossion, 2007; Le Grand et al., 2001; Mondloch 
et al., 2002) and also making surface alterations like colour and brightness to the local 
features (Barton et al., 2001; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Leder & Carbon, 2006; Murray et 
al., 2000).  The obvious problem with the feature swapping method is that it will 
slightly alter the precise spatial relationships among the features.  Any manipulation 
that alters the shape of the facial features will have this problem by necessity.  Thus, 
researchers turned to surface manipulations of the features that would not alter the 
shape of the individual features or their spatial configuration.  One problem with the 
latter method is that featural processing (if it exists) supposedly would process the 
shape of the features, or at least would process more than just their hue and brightness, 
so it is unclear whether detecting changes to just the surface properties of features can 
provide a valid and representative measure of featural processing.  An alternative 
technique is to blur (Sergent, 1986) or add random noise (McKone et al., 2001) to 
images of faces to remove fine detailed information about the local facial features. 
 
Studies using manipulations of configural and/or featural information to investigate 
the face inversion effect have most commonly used a face discrimination task.  For 
example, in a typical experiment, pairs of faces are presented on a screen, and 
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participants are asked to judge if the two images are exactly the same or not.  Half of 
the face pairs are presented upright, and half are inverted.  The two faces in a pair are 
made different by either altering the positioning of the eyes and mouth or by swapping 
the eyes and mouth with the eyes and mouth of a different person‟s face.  Accuracy 
and reaction times are analyzed to compare the relative contribution of processing the 
featural vs. configural information between upright and inverted faces.  The consistent 
finding is that inversion reduces accuracy and increases reaction times much more so 
when discriminating changes to the configural rather than featural information in a 
face (e.g. Freire et al., 2000; Le Grand et al., 2001; Mondloch et al., 2002).  Another 
task that has been used by several researchers is distinctiveness ratings (Leder & 
Bruce, 1998; Murray et al., 2000; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996).  In this method, face 
stimuli are made to look more distinctive or bizarre by one of two methods.  Some 
faces have had their features distorted in some way (e.g. blackening teeth, whitening 
or blurring pupils, bushy eyebrows), and other faces have had the spacing of their 
features altered so as to appear unusual.  Participants are asked to rate how unusual 
each face looks.  Half of the faces are presented upright, and half are presented 
inverted.  Compared to upright, inverting faces that have been made configurally 
distinctive lowers bizarreness ratings much more so than those that have been made 
featurally distinctive.   
 
Of course it may not be that face specific processes are impaired by inversion.  Faces 
may just happen to belong to a class of stimuli whose properties make them more 
difficult to be perceived upside down.  In contrast to most other types of objects, faces 
are very similar in appearance to one another (i.e. visually homogenous), are almost 
always seen in the same orientation (upright), have bilateral symmetry, and belong to a 
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class of stimuli with which we have had extensive visual experience (Goffaux & 
Rossion, 2007).   
 
The studies, described thus far, that examined the face inversion effect did not set out 
to distinguish the view that faces are represented by their features plus the spatial 
relationships among those features from the view that faces are represented as holistic 
Gestalts.  Since featural processing was contrasted with configural information 
specifically about the spacing of the features, these experiments do not provide direct 
evidence for or against the hypothesis that upright faces are represented and processed 
as nondecomposable wholes.  So what evidence is there about the holistic nature of 
face processing? 
 
In an experiment examining the efficacy of Photo-Fit faces as a facial composite 
system, Ellis, Shepherd and Davies (1975) found that participants had difficulty 
reconstructing a Photo-Fit face by selecting the identical features (e.g. the same 
mouth) from a pool of variants on those features (i.e. from a pool of different mouths).  
Even when the target face that they were trying to build remained in view, participants 
still made errors when trying to select the identical features.  Bruce (1979) interpreted 
Ellis et al.‟s results as indirect evidence of faces being processed as wholes without 
parts.  Presumably, Bruce was implying that if facial features are represented explicitly 
and discretely, then participants would have been better at picking out the correct 
features.  In fact, much of the evidence for holistic processing of faces rests on the key 
assumption that it would be more difficult to recognize a facial feature presented in 
isolation (e.g. a particular nose) if the underlying face representation is an 
undifferentiated whole than if it is based on the individual facial features.  
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Tanaka and Farah (1993) point out that the holistic vs. featural distinction does not 
have to be completely dichotomous, since object recognition may rely on both types of 
representations to differing degrees for different classes of objects.  For this reason, 
they designed a series of experiments to test whether the degree of holistic processing 
used in face recognition is greater than that used in recognizing other objects and 
visual patterns.  They chose scrambled faces, inverted faces, and houses as the objects 
to contrast with normal upright faces.  The eyes, nose, and mouth were the features of 
the normal, inverted, and scrambled faces.  The door, a big window, and a small 
window were the features of the house stimuli.  The procedure was as follows: First, 
participants learn to name a set of normal upright faces and a set of one type of 
contrast stimuli.  Then, two types of two alternative forced choice recognition tasks 
were conducted.  In the isolated part test condition, two isolated features were 
presented simultaneously for comparison.  Participants were asked “which is Jim‟s 
nose?”  In the full face test condition, two full faces were presented.  Participants were 
asked “which is Jim?”  The full face condition was designed such that the target and 
foil differed only with respect to the particular feature being tested.  Thus, if Jim was 
the target, and the feature being tested was the nose; then, the foil would be Jim‟s face 
with his nose replaced with a different person‟s nose (see Figure 1.3).  The test was the 
same for the contrast stimuli as participants treated inverted and scrambled faces as 
though they belonged to different people and houses as though they were owned by 
different people.  Results showed that normal faces demonstrated a greater 
disadvantage for recognizing the isolated parts vs. the wholes compared to inverted 
faces, scrambled faces, and houses.  Again, this was true despite the only difference 
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between the stimuli used in the part and whole test conditions was the feature being 
tested.  This result has become known as the part-whole effect in face recognition. 
 
Figure 1.3.  Example stimuli of the Part-whole task (taken from Goffaux & Rossion, 
2007). 
First demonstrated by Young, Hellawell, and Hay (1987), the composite effect is the 
most well known and arguably the most convincing evidence of holistic face 
processing.  Young et al. constructed face stimuli by combining the top half of one 
famous face with the bottom half of another famous face.  When the two halves of the 
faces were aligned, participants found it more difficult to identify the top or bottom 
face compared to when the two halves were offset (see Figure 1.4).  This difference 
between the aligned and offset condition is known as the composite effect and is 
thought to be due to perceiving the aligned halves as a single whole face which 
interferes with the perception of the two halves.  Using a matching task, Hole (1994) 
found that unfamiliar faces also produce composite effects.  Interestingly, the 
composite effect disappeared when the same stimuli were presented upside down.  
This implies that the two faces could be identified by their local features, but 
alignment in the upright condition either interfered with extracting information from 
the local feature or led to the extraction of configural properties arising from the 
conjunction of the two original faces.  Inversion may have made it easier to process 
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the faces in terms of their component parts and/or suppressed processing of the 
misleading configural information.   
 
Taken altogether, the research to date provides no persuasive evidence that faces are 
represented only in terms of the nameable features of a face.  Whether faces are 
represented as a set of features plus their spatial configuration or as a holistic Gestalt is 
less clear.  These two viewpoints are difficult to distinguish as evidence for one view 
can often be taken as evidence for the other view as well.  Furthermore, since tests of 
the holistic hypothesis are centred around the presence or absence of featural 
processing, any evidence against featural processing can be taken as evidence for 
holistic processing.  This reasoning is flawed even though it underlies the 
interpretation of almost all of the relevant experimental findings.  The problem is that 
whether a face is treated as having features or not entirely depends on how one defines 
the features.  Thus, the original contrast between “parts” or no “parts”, would be more 
correctly framed as “these parts” or not “these parts”.  This would at least leave open 
the possibility that facial representations could be decomposable but not in terms of 
the nameable features of a face.   
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Figure 1.4.  The composite effect.  Left: an aligned composite.  Right: a composite 
with the upper and lower halves offset.  Tony Blair (top) and David Cameron 
(bottom). 
Theories of Concept Representation: Prototypes vs. Exemplars 
Theories have been put forward that store different identities as prototype 
representations.  In its simplest form, each person‟s face is stored as the central 
tendency of its variants.  The notion is that the within face variation can be overcome 
by storing a central face representation that emphasizes the shared properties of its 
constituent variants while washing away the variation that is inconsistent among them 
(Burton, Jenkins, Hancock, & White, 2005).  A purely prototype account of face 
recognition would posit that only the prototypes need be stored in long term memory 
for subsequent recognition.  However, most current prototype accounts allow for the 
storage of the individual variants, or exemplars, in addition to the prototype 
representation of a person‟s face. 
 
The opposing viewpoint is the purely exemplar account which maintains that there is 
no need to have a special unitary representation that reflects numerous previous 
encounters with a particular face.  Instead, models of the purely exemplar type only 
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store individual exemplars and do not build up abstract category representations of any 
sort in long term memory.  In its extreme form, a type of exemplar model known as 
episodic models of memory stores every experience with a face anew regardless of 
whether that exemplar has already been seen before or not. 
 
The prototype vs. exemplar distinction has received some attention in the face 
recognition literature (e.g. Bruce et al., 1991).  However, it is largely ignored by most 
of the models of face recognition that are currently popular (e.g. Valentine,1991; 
Burton & Bruce, 1993).  Models often use a stable unitary data structure to represent 
different face identities without giving any specification at all as to how these 
seemingly abstract representations came to be.  Granted, on intuitive and 
computational grounds, it is easier to conceptualize a representation of a person‟s face 
as being a single entity stored in memory.  Nonetheless, unlocking the secrets of the 
human mind is not expected to be easy. 
 
Although largely ignored in face recognition, the question of how information is 
internally represented has fuelled a long lasting debate in the broader domain of 
memory and cognition.  A review highlighting this debate will follow.  First, I will 
focus on studies of prototype effects found in non-face studies of recognition and 
categorization; then, I will focus specifically on the prototype effect in face 
recognition.   
The Prototype Effect in Non-face Domains 
 
Prototype Effects Using Dot Patterns 
The debate between prototype models and exemplar-based models has been the 
concern primarily of those developing theories of concept formation and general 
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memory mechanisms rather than the specific case of face recognition.  Posner and 
Keele (1968; 1970) brought the issue into the limelight through their research on 
prototype abstraction using a random dot pattern classification task.  In most of their 
experiments, 3 patterns served as the prototypical dot patterns of 3 different categories.  
Each of these patterns consisted of 9 dots filled in on a 30x30 grid (see Figure 1.5).  
Distortions of each category prototype pattern were generated.  Distortions included a 
training set as well as ones that were only presented in the transfer phase.  In the 
training phase, participants learned to classify the training set of pattern distortions 
into the three categories.  Participants received feedback after each trial, and the task 
continued until they reached a set criterion level of performance.  The transfer phase 
required participants to classify, without feedback, some of the “old” patterns from the 
training phase, the three category prototypes, and several new patterns that were also 
members of the learned categories.  Their basic finding was that in the transfer phase, 
participants were better at classifying prototype patterns than new exemplars of the 
learned categories.  Participants classified the prototypes equally as well as the old 
exemplars even though the prototype patterns never appeared as part of the training 
set.  Posner and Keele interpreted their results as being most consistent with a system 
that stores both the abstract prototype category representations and the individual 
exemplars.  Indeed, the prototype effect that Posner and Keele obtained in this study 
has been replicated (e.g. Homa, Cross, Cornell, Goldman, & Shwartz, 1973; Homa & 
Cultice, 1984; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 2001) and cited many times as offering strong 
evidence for the storage of abstract representations (e.g. Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 
1981; Rosch, 1977). 
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Figure 1.5.  Examples of two prototype random dot patterns along with exemplars 
across four levels of distortion (taken from Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & 
Catty, 2006). 
Posner and Keele (1968) argued for a mixed exemplar plus prototype representation 
system based on two main findings.  Two experiments they reported manipulated the 
level of distortion used to generate the training patterns.  Half the participants trained 
on low level distortions, and half the participants trained on high level distortions.  
Both experiments found that after training to criterion on high level distortions, 
participants subsequently showed better classification transfer to new exemplars of the 
learned categories compared to participants who trained on the low level distortion 
exemplars.  The new distortions were medium level distortions.  If only the category 
prototype was stored, new distortions should be classified equally as well in high and 
low distortion training groups.  This is because, between the two groups, the 
prototypes and the new distortions were the same, so the only difference was the 
distortion level of the original training exemplars; therefore, if the old training patterns 
were not stored, then the contents of memory would be the same between the high and 
low distortion groups.  Furthermore, if within category variability did affect the 
prototype representation in some way, one might expect abstraction to proceed with 
great ease and encoding precision when learning “tight” categories as opposed to more 
“loose” categories.  Since it was the training on highly variable category members that 
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led to increased generalization to new category exemplars, information about the 
individual training exemplars must have been stored.  Posner and Keele rejected a 
purely exemplar-based representational system on the basis that original training 
patterns were controlled to be equally similar to both the category prototype and the 
new distortions.  The authors argued that if prototypes were recognized better than 
new distortions, then it must have been because the prototypes were being abstracted 
and represented in some fashion. 
 
Posner and Keele (1970) also investigated whether the prototypes they believed were 
being stored in memory during classification tasks in their prior experiments (Posner 
& Keele, 1968) were in fact abstracted during learning.  They tested whether 
classification of prototype patterns would show less of an effect of forgetting than the 
old exemplars participants were trained on.  Half the participants were tested on the 
transfer patterns immediately, and half were tested one week after they were trained.  
The pattern of results did indeed show evidence of differential forgetting.  This effect 
was only significant on the first run of the transfer pattern list (the list was repeated 
four times in transfer phase).  In immediate testing, old patterns were better classified 
than prototypes, but after one week, olds were about equal to prototypes.  The authors 
argued that this pattern of results was strong evidence for the abstraction of prototypes 
during learning claiming that memory for central items is more enduring that memory 
of peripherally stored items (in some sort of perceptual pattern space).  According to 
their reasoning, prototypes must have been formed during learning because if they 
were formed during retrieval, memory deficits on old items should be associated with 
memory deficits on prototype items since prototypes would be recognized through 
generalization from the now weakened stored exemplars. 
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However influential the work of Posner and Keele (1968, 1970) may have been in the 
advancement of theories of concept abstraction and categorization (e.g. attribute-
frequency models (Neumann, 1974, 1977; Medin & Schaffer, 1978), there are some 
critical flaws in the methodology which render their interpretation of the results 
unfounded.  I will briefly touch on a few.  First is the obvious problem of training 
participants to criterion before the transfer phase.  Since learning to classify is more 
difficult when the category exemplars are highly variable, more learning and more 
practice will be required by participants in the high distortion training group compared 
to the low distortion group.  Better generalization to new category exemplars in the 
high distortion training group could simply be a consequence of those participants 
having undergone more demanding training procedures.  Hintzman (1986) also has 
pointed out that, in these experiments, variability of within-category exemplars is 
confounded with degree of learning. 
 
Accounting for differential forgetting of old items over prototypes is challenging, but 
not impossible, for a purely-exemplar based model.  Medin and Schaffer‟s (1978) 
context theory of classification is able to predict the differential forgetting effect.  
Recognition of old items relies heavily on a close match between the old item as a 
probe and its representation in memory from a previous encounter.  In contrast, 
recognition of the prototype does not rely so much on being very similar to any one 
trace in memory.  Rather, it is likely to be moderately similar to many stored traces 
and recognized on that basis.  Forgetting can cause the contents of stored 
representations to degrade which will prevent old items from matching closely to their 
stored representation after a delay.  This will have less of an impact on the prototype 
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because it only needs to be moderately similar to many traces, and after a delay it 
likely still will be.  The nonlinearity of the similarity metric has a lot to do with this 
because small changes in similarity of highly similar items will affect activation levels 
much more than small changes in similarity of items that are only moderately similar 
to start out.  Delay has the effect of flattening out the curve associated with the 
similarity-proximity function.  This means that in immediate testing, recognition is 
dominated by items that are highly similar.  Traces of moderate similarity to the probe 
have more influence on recognition after a delay relative to their influence during 
immediate testing. 
 
Hintzman‟s Minerva II (1986), an episodic exemplar-based model, can also account 
for differential forgetting by essentially the same reasoning.  In immediate testing, old 
items have an advantage over prototypes in the quality of information (is able to 
activate strongly a trace with near identical feature values thus the echo content will be 
very clearly a match, see section on models for more information), but after a delay, 
when the quality of the stored exemplars is impoverished, prototype recognition has 
the advantage due to redundancy in the number of traces that match on each property.   
 
Rejecting an exemplar view due to prototypes being classified better than new 
exemplars despite having equal similarity to the training patterns is also premature.  
By virtue of being the central tendency of the exemplars of the same category, the 
average distance (in a Euclidean similarity space) between a category prototype and its 
constituent exemplars must be smaller than the average distance between any given 
new distortion and the exemplars of the same category.  This is important because 
many current models compare the similarity of the-to-be classified (or recognized) 
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stimulus (which could be a face) to multiple stored exemplars or even to all stored 
exemplars rather than to just one.  The bottom line is that although the prototype 
advantage over new category members observed in visual classification paradigms 
was originally thought to be evidence that some sort of abstract prototype is stored in 
memory (perhaps in addition to the individual exemplars), more recent endeavours 
aiming to explain this effect within a purely exemplar-based framework have been met 
with considerable success (e.g. Nosofsky, 1988; Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004). 
 
Prototype Effects Using Other Visual Forms or Patterns 
While random dot patterns have been the most widely used stimuli because their 
properties can be precisely controlled, investigations of prototype effects using other 
visual stimuli have been made.  Geometric forms have been focussed on in several 
studies (e.g. Franks & Bransford, 1971; Homa, 1978; Homa, Goldhardt, Burruel-
Homa, & Smith, 1993; Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 1981; Solso & Raynis, 1979).  
Conclusions are difficult to draw.  In general, the prototype form or shape is 
recognized more than new forms, but not necessarily more than old forms.  
 
Prototype Effects in Verbal and Non-Visual Memory 
The prototype effect has been used to gain insight into how words are represented and 
recognized.  Interestingly, the impetus for examining memory for prototype words was 
to explain why words are sometimes falsely remembered rather than to explain how 
they are correctly remembered.  Using the standard experimental procedure introduced 
by Deese in 1959, Roediger and McDermott (1995) read aloud to participants lists of 
words that are highly related to a nonpresented word.  For example, the study list 
could contain: thread, pin, sewing, sharp, point, haystack, pain, and injection.  In the 
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test phase, participants often recalled or recognized the word “needle” as it is the 
common associate of the words in the study list.  The rates of recall (~50%) and 
recognition (~80%) of prototype words were approximately equal to those of the 
actually studied words
1
. 
 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) also found that participants will just as often report 
having conscious recollection of the prototype word compared to the studied words in 
a remember-know task (see Tulving, 1985 for information about the remember-know 
paradigm).  Interestingly, Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz (1996) found that 
when participants were asked if they remember which of two speakers had earlier 
spoken the words they produced in free recall, participants reported a speaker on 87% 
of the unspoken prototype words.  In some of the word lists, one speaker read aloud all 
of the words associated with one prototype and another speaker read all of the words 
associated with a second prototype.  Participants only chose the “correct” speaker of 
prototype words on 53% of the trials where they reported a speaker (participants left 
blanks when they were not sure of the speaker).  False recognition of the prototype 
word has even occurred following rapid presentation of words in the study list (Solso, 
Heck, & Mearns, 1993).  Thus, if prototype representations are being formed, they can 
be formed rapidly and possibly never make it to long term memory in some cases.  
This tendency to recognize the prototype word may be due to the same kind of 
mechanism as prototype effects observed in other domains.  The key difference is that 
this type of prototype is based on the meaning of the study words rather than their 
                                                 
1
 Some studies similar to Roediger and McDermott‟s 1995 study have reported slightly 
higher rates of recall for studied words compared to prototype words or a strong but 
nonsignificant trend in that direction (e.g. Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; 
Schacter, Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996).  Therefore, the general finding is that studied 
and prototype words tend to show similar rates of responding. 
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appearance (although the prototype need only be an associate of each of the studied 
words, but not necessarily similar in meaning).  There is some evidence to suggest that 
prototype effects using associated word lists are related to prototype effects using 
visual forms.  Category size (Shiffrin, Huber, & Marinelli, 1995) and differential 
forgetting effects (Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996) show the same pattern 
of results for both words and visual forms (e.g. random dot patterns, schematic faces, 
etc.). 
 
Words can, however, show non-semantic prototype effects.  Using lists of 
phonologically similar words, Schacter, Verfaellie, and Anes (1997) found essentially 
the same pattern of results as Roediger and McDermott (1995) did using semantically 
associated words. 
 
In addition to the auditory modality, prototype effects have be observed among 
kinaesthetic movements by Solso and Raynis (1979).  In the study phase, the 
experimenter would move the participant‟s arm to learn 10 exemplar movements.  
This task was almost like mimicking the movement of drawing a figure on a 
blackboard.  In the test phase, the experimenter again moved the arm of the 
participant.  Now the task was to rate how confident you are the movement was one of 
the training movements.  Even though the prototype movement was not part of the 
study phase, there was a striking increase in confidence for the prototype compared to 
both old and new movements.  Solso and Raynis concluded that kinaesthetic 
movements are represented in memory by a set of prototypical movements.  Their 
claim seemed to be based merely on the observation that the prototype of the studied 
series of movements was highly, and falsely, recognized.  Old movements were also 
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recognized more confidently than new movements.  Likewise, Solso and Raynis 
interpreted this finding as evidence that old items were also being stored in memory in 
addition to prototypes.  This is a good example of an assumption behind the logic of 
many recognition experiments.  The assumption is that something is recognized 
because it is like something stored in memory.  Thus we recognize previously unseen 
prototypes because they are “like” the representation we have stored in memory.  No 
one would disagree with this assumption altogether.  The major theoretical difference 
is whether the stimulus can be recognized because it is like many memories rather than 
like just a single memory. 
 
The Prototype Effect in Face Recognition 
A typical experiment investigating the prototype effect in face recognition is divided 
into separate study and test phases.  In the study phase, several sets of variants around 
different face identities are presented to participants.  Unlike in a standard test of face 
recognition, multiple exemplars of each identity are presented rather than learning 
each face from a single image.  The average of a set of seen exemplars corresponds to 
the prototype stimulus for that identity.  In the recognition test phase, a mix of 
prototypes, seen exemplars, and unseen exemplars are presented.  The prototype effect 
has been observed even when no prototypes were presented during the study phase.  
Thus, it seems that multiple instances of the same person‟s face are stored and/or 
retrieved in such a way that benefits recognition and classification of a person‟s 
prototype face (Cabeza et al., 1999). 
 
Prototype effects are often inferred as evidence of some sort of averaging or blending 
mechanism performed among face instances to form a single prototype representation 
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that is being accessed when participants judge whether a face is known to them.  
Prototype effects in face recognition experiments are often defined as a recognition 
advantage for prototypes over seen exemplars.  Note that studies of categorization and 
memory illusions use the term prototype effect to describe any pattern of data where 
the prototype is recognized or categorized more accurately than other non-prototypical 
new items. 
 
Previous Research of Prototype Effects in Face Recognition  
The first experiment investigating prototype effects in face recognition aimed to 
extend the previous research using dot patterns and geometric figures to a more natural 
and complex class of visual stimuli, faces.  Solso and McCarthy (1981) used Identikit 
faces (Identikit is a device used by police to construct a likeness of a suspect‟s face) 
which are constructed by selecting different of combinations of line drawn features 
from a premade pool.  Three prototype faces were constructed such that none of them 
shared any features with either of the other two prototypes.  Distortions of each 
prototype were made by swapping one or more features with a different feature from 
the pool (e.g. the mouth selected in the original prototype could be swapped with a 
different mouth from the pool of available mouths).  The four face feature types that 
were varied were: hairstyle, eyes plus eyebrows, nose plus chin, and mouth (see Figure 
1.6).  Distortions were made swapping 1, 2 or 3 features of the prototype with new 
features (75%, 50%, or 25% distortions respectively).  Distortions never shared any 
features with other distortions that were not shared with the prototype faces.  
Participants attempted to memorize three 75%, four 50%, and three 25% distortions of 
one of the prototypes.  A recognition test was given after a delay of either 5 minutes or 
6 weeks.  The recognition test included a Yes/No decision as to whether the test face 
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had been presented in the study phase followed by a confidence rating.  The stimuli in 
the recognition test phase included the never seen prototype and both old and new 
distortions at each of the three levels (1, 2, or 3 features different from prototype) as 
well as one face that shared no features with any other faces.  Results showed highest 
recognition confidence for prototype faces compared to both old and new distortion 
faces.  Old faces were called “old” more than new faces.  The pattern of results was 
the same regardless of the length of delay.  In fact, the 6 week delay did not seem to 
have much of a detrimental effect on memory performance for any of the stimuli types 
(which may be why no analyses of differential forgetting effects were reported).  The 
authors concluded that because the prototype face was recognized more than the old 
and new distortions, the prototype must have been stored in memory.  A similar study 
using essentially the same materials and procedure as the immediate testing condition 
was conducted on children aged 3-6 years old (Inn, Walden, & Solso, 1993).  The 
same pattern of results was found in 6 year olds as was found in adult participants.  
However, children younger than 6 did not falsely recognize the prototype face more 
than old and new faces.  The younger the child was, the less they recognized the 
prototype. 
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Figure 1.6.  Example stimuli from Solso and McCarthy‟s 1981 experiment. 
These abstract prototype memories are thought to be functionally similar to memories 
of the actual experiences, but may provide a more salient representation of a face 
during retrieval (Solso & McCarthy, 1981).  The finding that old faces were still able 
to be distinguished from new faces was interpreted as support for the view whereby a 
prototype is formed and stored in addition to the memories of individual experiences.  
Just why these prototypes are more salient or how they are formed in the first place 
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was not answered.  It is likely that the task demands are partially responsible for the 
observed pattern of results.  The only thing distinguishing the old and new faces 
(excluding the prototype) was that in the test phase, old faces had no entirely new 
features, and new faces had at least one feature that had never been seen at any time 
before the study phase or earlier in the test phase.  This would lead to more of a 
reliance on a frequency based method of recognition because the task could more or 
less be reduced to a frequency judgement on each feature where the choice was 
between zero or more than zero.  The higher frequency of presentation of prototype 
features both in the study phase and from previous trials in the test phase protect those 
features from being judged as new features.  The swapped features in the old items 
were seen only once in the study phase, so they have a higher chance of being judged 
as entirely new.  The more swapped features an old face has, the higher the likelihood 
that the face as a whole will be judged as new.  Likewise, the new features in the new 
faces are actually entirely new features, so they are even more likely to be judged as 
new features.  The more new features a new face has the more likely it will be called 
“new”.  However, this study provided an intriguing initial result for further enquiry 
into the nature of prototype representation of faces in memory. 
 
One of the most important contributions to the investigation of prototype effects in 
face recognition was made by Bruce, Doyle, Dench, and Burton (1991).  The results of 
several experiments were reported.  They used Mac-a-Mug faces as stimuli which are 
very similar to Identikit faces in appearance (line drawn) and in the way they are 
constructed (selecting features from a pool).  However, in Bruce et al.‟s experiments, 
the distortions around the prototype were not produced by swapping facial features but 
by varying the configuration (i.e. placement) of the features on the face outline.  Their 
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initial experiments shifted the feature placements up or down by varying amounts to 
mimic an aging transformation in a crude way.  They produced 4 exemplars around 
each of the 10 original prototype images which had no features shifted.  Participants 
made incidental ratings of the faces in the study phase and completed a forced choice 
task in the test phase which followed immediately after the study phase.  The forced 
choice task always pitted two images against one another that were based on the same 
original face.  The distractor was an unseen version of that face which had all of its 
internal features shifted up or down as a single unit by 10 pixels.  Results found that 
when the prototype image had been seen in the study phase (in addition to the four 
other exemplars), participants picked the prototype at a level nearing ceiling (90%).  
When the prototype was not shown in the study phase, participants still chose the 
prototype more often than the distractor (79%).  Seen exemplars were picked ~70% of 
the time against the same type of distractors.   
 
The remainder of Bruce et al.‟s (1991) experiments constructed the variations around 
the prototypes by simply shifting the internal features as a unit up or down on the face 
outline (see Figure 1.7).  This transformation left the configuration among the internal 
features intact, but it affected how high or low the internal features sat on the face 
shape.  Since the experiments so far all used the original image as the prototype, they 
repeated the procedure but this time shifted the features of the prototype and built the 
study phase exemplars around the now shifted prototype.  The original unshifted 
image was used as the distractor.  A prototype preference (82%) was found on the 
forced choice task even when the prototype was now an altered image and the 
distractor was now the original image.  The final forced choice experiment pitted a 
seen exemplar against the unseen prototype which resulted in chance responding 
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(prototypes=54%).  The final two experiments switched to an image recognition 
confidence rating task at test.  They also compared intentional vs. incidental learning 
and whether exemplars of the same face were presented consecutively in the study 
phase or not.  Three exemplar shift patterns were used to create the stimuli.  The first 
two, old and young, were essentially equivalent.  The only difference was that the 
features of the old faces were shifted up by 3, 6, 12, 15 and the young were shifted 
downwards by the same amounts.  The third type of exemplar pattern, the bimodal 
condition, was studied as two repetitions each of two different images (up 9 and down 
nine pixels).  Results indicated that learning instructions affected confidence ratings in 
the bimodal condition only.  After seeing the -9 and +9 exemplars two times each, the 
prototype effect was stronger for incidental learners compared to intentional learners.  
Whether the exemplars of a particular face were presented consecutively during the 
study phase or not made a difference only to the young and old conditions and not the 
bimodal condition.  For young and old faces, there was a stronger prototype effect 
when the exemplars were randomly distributed throughout the series of study faces 
rather than blocked by identity set. 
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Figure 1.7.  Internal facial features have been shifted up and down on the face outline 
in increments of 3 pixels (Adapted from Bruce, 1994). 
That study instructions and blocking, in Bruce et al.‟s (1991) experiment, affected 
recognition differently depending on whether the exemplars followed a 3, 6, 12, 15 
pattern or a -9, -9, +9, +9 pattern is very interesting.  This result demonstrates that 
participants‟ readiness to falsely recognize the unseen prototype of a set of related 
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exemplars is influenced not only by what they see but also by the circumstances of 
learning.  The explanation behind this interaction is not obvious.  However, it provides 
the grounds for examining the effects of similarity relations among exemplars of the 
same person‟s face on empirical measures of prototype abstraction.  This will not be 
an easy mystery to unravel.  Consider that the bimodal and old/young conditions 
produced comparably strong prototypes effects even though the +/- 9 exemplars 
actually were seen before in the bimodal condition but were unseen in the old/young 
condition.  This alone would lead one to expect smaller prototype effects in the 
bimodal condition.  On top of that, the prototype was less similar to its studied 
exemplars in the bimodal condition which again might lead one to expect prototype 
effects to be weakened. 
 
Bruce et al.‟s 1991 work was an important contribution to this area of research 
because it was the first study to use complex face stimuli (i.e. not schematic faces) to 
examine prototype abstraction using the natural category of identity.  Previous 
research using complex faces imposed artificial categories onto the set of faces.  This 
meant that participants were learning what a group of different peoples‟ faces had in 
common that made them different than another group of people‟s faces.  Obviously it 
is more informative for face recognition researchers to examine recognition of identity 
or prior exposure. 
 
Another notable finding from Bruce et al.‟s (1991) work was that participants were not 
learning the prototypical configural pattern of all faces in the study phase.  Rather, 
they showed sensitivity to the prototype configuration specific to each identity.  
Participants were not trained to classify the exemplars into identity based categories, 
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yet their strong responses to the prototypes of these identities indicates that the 
abstraction taking place was based on the exemplars of shared identity.  Thus, a 
prototype abstraction mechanism would seem to be most useful if it averaged across 
exemplars of the same person but not across exemplars of different peoples‟ faces. 
 
Cabeza et al. (1999) attempted to extend knowledge of the prototype effect in face 
recognition using more realistic stimuli and experimental tasks.  They reported a series 
of experiments which followed the same basic methodology.  The experiments all had 
two phases: study and test.  In the study phase, participants made incidental ratings 
about the appearance of each face.  The test phase asked participants to either rate their 
confidence of having seen that exact image of the face in the study phase or to make 
an Old/New judgement as quickly as possible about the person‟s face in general.  In 
the task of rating recognition confidence of the specific exemplars, all the identities 
had been seen before in the study phase.  Test stimuli included both new and old 
exemplars of each studied identity.  In the Old/New task, a mix of old and new 
identities were used.  Both types of test phases presented each studied identity in three 
different versions: old exemplar, new exemplar, and the unseen prototype. 
 
The first experiment manipulated feature locations as in Bruce et al. (1991).  However, 
Cabeza et al. (1999) used high quality colour photographs of real people‟s faces.  
Internal features were shifted up or down using Morph software which does not leave 
a noticeable joint at the edges.  Results showed prototypes were recognized more than 
both old and new exemplars.  This was true in both the exemplar recognition task and 
the Old/New face recognition task.  Thus, even though, intuitively, the demands of the 
two tasks seem quite different, they both produced the same pattern of results. 
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Cabeza et al. (1999) found no effect of prototypical view on the prototype effect (front 
vs. 45°-left view).  They also found some evidence that the prototype effect is more 
sensitive to changes in viewpoint angle than to variation in feature locations within a 
single view.  Cabeza et al. argued that an averaging mechanism was likely operating 
on instances of the same face from the same viewpoint but not across different 
viewpoints.  Instead, approximation to a limited set of stored views might be needed to 
recognize a face from different viewpoints.   
 
Cabeza et al. (1999) also used morphing technology to vary the shape and texture of 
the face features elastically.  This manipulation was a novel approach, at the time, to 
investigating prototype effects in face recognition.  They used the Morph software to 
vary the similarity among exemplars of the same face identity.  Results showed that 
prototypes were recognized as well as seen exemplars when the studied exemplars 
were similar enough to plausibly be perceived as the same person.  However, when the 
studied exemplars (of the same identity set) no longer resembled the same person, the 
prototype was recognized less than the seen exemplars.   
 
Busey and Tunnicliff (1999) provide partial support for the existence of a prototype 
mechanism that operates on instances belonging to different people‟s faces.  They 
used morphing to create a controlled set of stimuli of photographic quality that could 
be used to compare competing accounts of the prototype effect in face recognition.  
Their method was to blend, or “morph”, two images of different individuals together 
to create a 50%/50% morph that was equally similar to both of the original images, 
termed “parents”.  As exploring the role of similarity among exemplars was of 
particular interest, the perceived similarity among the original faces was assessed and 
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used as a guide to choose the parents in each pairing.  Similar and dissimilar parent 
pairs were selected.  This method resulted in a tendency for the dissimilar parent faces 
to look more distinctive than similar parent faces.  Results showed that after 
participants studied just the parent faces, the false positive rate to the prototype was 
higher than the hit rate to the parents, but this was true only for similar looking 
parents.  Dissimilar parents, on the other hand, were recognized more than their 
associated prototype morphs.  Pure exemplar-based models had difficulty predicting 
morphs of similar parents would be more recognized than their parents whilst 
simultaneously predicting that dissimilar parents would be more recognized than 
similar parents.  Busey and Tunnicliff concluded that the human data coming from 
their experiments were better explained by an exemplar plus prototype model.  In this 
model, when encoding a new item, another trace would be laid down at the averaged 
location between the new item and any sufficiently similar previously stored items.  In 
this case, the more similar the parent faces are to one another, the stronger the memory 
trace of the abstracted prototype. 
 
When comparing the adequacy of exemplar-based vs. prototype models in explaining 
their experimental results, Busey and Tunnicliff (1999) treat a purely exemplar 
approach as the null hypothesis.  If their data cannot be adequately explained by a 
purely exemplar-based model, then the pure exemplar approach can be rejected in 
favour of a mixed model.  If a mixed model is found to provide a better account for the 
human data, then this can be taken as evidence for the abstraction and storage of 
prototypes in memory.  This was in fact what the authors reported.  However, caution 
is urged when comparing theories based on tests of a limited number of models that do 
not represent the full range of models within those particular theoretical perspectives.  
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Although Busey and Tunnicliff mention it, it should be emphasized that the exemplar 
approach was rejected based only on models that used summed similarity to predict 
recognition scores.  They tested three exemplar models which were variants of either 
Nosofsky‟s (1986) generalized context model (GCM) or the search of associative 
memory (SAM) model (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984).   
 
Consider a purely exemplar-based model that computes the “oldness” of a probe by 
summing the activation it produces across all stored exemplars in memory.  If 
activation of a stored exemplar is dependent on its similarity to the probe, then the 
function that relates activation to similarity is very important.  If a probe produces 
considerable activation of exemplars that are moderately similar, predictions about 
prototype effects will differ dramatically from a situation where activation by a probe 
is effectively limited to only extremely similar exemplars.  This is especially relevant 
to Busey and Tunnicliff‟s (1999) work because the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) 
solution used to model similarity relations was based on pairwise similarity ratings 
made by participants after they had completed the experiment.  This might make it 
difficult for an exemplar model to predict prototype effects if preexposure to the 
stimuli reduces the probability of false alarming to the prototypes (e.g. familiarity with 
faces could affect the scaling parameter c, or possibly the attentional weights applied 
to the individual dimensions; model parameters are explained in a later section).  
 
In response to Busey and Tunnicliff (1999), Zaki and Nosofsky (2001) used the exact 
same stimuli in a mock subliminal recognition test.  Black rectangles were presented 
so quickly that all participants could detect was a flash on the computer screen.  
Participants were told before the start of the mock subliminal phase that faces were 
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going to be presented, but they would only appear as a flash.  Nonetheless, they should 
attend to the stimuli because a recognition test would follow.  Of course, in reality, no 
faces had been presented in the subliminal phase.  In the test phase, faces were 
presented one at a time, and participants were asked to rate how likely the face had 
been seen before in the previous phase.  It was suggested to participants that they 
should base their ratings on things like gut instinct or a sense of familiarity.  Results 
showed that faces that served as the morphs in Busey and Tunnicliff‟s experiments 
were rated higher than the faces that served as the parents.  Thus, Zaki and Nosofsky 
called into question Busey and Tunnicliff‟s use of explicitly stored prototype traces in 
their modified exemplar model to account for higher oldness ratings to morphs 
compared to parent faces.  Again, caution is needed when interpreting prototype 
effects as evidence of stored prototypes.  Zaki and Nosofsky obtained a prototype-like 
effect without any possibility of an abstraction process operating in the study phase.  
Yet, the morph advantage in Busey and Tunnicliff‟s study was deemed to be 
unaccountable unless storage of prototypes was assumed. 
 
Averages Vs. Prototypes 
Confusion arises from the use of the term prototype in norm-based models.  Norm-
based models are a subset of models based on a multidimensional Euclidean face 
space (Valentine, 2001).  Norm-based models are usually discussed in contrast to 
purely exemplar-based models.  In norm-based models, the prototype face is the 
average of all faces in the space and is located at the origin.  Faces are encoded 
relative to this norm face.  This is quite different to what I refer to as a prototype 
account because a norm-based model of face space does not explicitly address the 
issue of how our cognitive system represents a stimulus which constantly varies 
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slightly in appearance.  Rather, in face space different facial identities are represented 
as a single point in multidimensional space (pure exemplar-based model) or as a 
vector between that point and the origin (norm-based model).  A face space made from 
a Voronoi diagram does conceptualize a face identity as a region of variation, but 
these regions are constructed based only on a single image of each known face stored 
in memory (Lewis & Johnston, 1999).  These types of face space models do not 
conflict with a prototype model since one could think of the faces stored in the space 
as being the product of some abstraction mechanism that produces a prototype for 
each known face.  The main thing is to remember that this thesis concerns the 
recognition of prototypes of different identities not the recognition of faces varying in 
distance from the overall average, or „origin,‟ of face space (i.e. typicality effects). 
 
Another ambiguity in the discussion of prototype effects is what exactly is meant by 
the term “prototype”.  Initially, I defined it as “the central value of a set of varying 
exemplars”.  Indeed, almost all work in the area of visual perception conceptualizes 
prototypes within this description.  However, prototypes in studies of prototype effects 
in face recognition are often assumed to be the average face of a set of varying 
exemplars.  If prototypes really are represented internally, they do not necessarily have 
to correspond to the average value of a set.  Maybe prototypes correspond to the modal 
value of a set instead (see Neumann, 1974).  It is also possible that the mind may use 
more than one method of representing the central face depending on the 
circumstances. 
 
Goldman and Homa (1977) investigated whether the value of a prototype represents 
the means or the modes of the underlying distribution of feature values of the 
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instances.  They found stronger evidence for a modal prototype over an average 
prototype.  However, when the differences between individuals were made unclear, 
participants responded more to an average prototype (see also Homa et al., 2001). 
 
Conjunction Faces 
A related line of research has been conducted using conjunction faces (Hannigan & 
Reinitz, 2000; Reinitz & Hannigan, 2001; Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992; 
Reinitz, Morrissey, & Demb, 1994).  Conjunction faces are face stimuli that have been 
constructed by combining half of the features from one studied face with half the 
features from another studied face.  The result is a face whose features are all “old” as 
they have all been seen in the study phase.  However, the features of a conjunction 
face were never seen in that particular combination before since they were taken from 
two different faces. 
 
In a typical experiment, Identikit faces are used to make the stimuli as shown in Figure 
1.8.  Exemplars in the study phase share no features with one another.  In the test 
phase, a recognition test is given.  Target faces, conjunction faces, feature faces (half 
the features are old half are new) and new faces (all features are new) are presented for 
recognition.  The general finding is that conjunction faces are recognized more than 
feature or new faces.  Although conjunction errors are never higher than the hit rate for 
target stimuli, participants do not treat the conjunction stimuli the same as new stimuli 
and have difficulty rejecting them as being one of the training faces (Reinitz et al., 
1992). 
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Figure 1.8.  Two different Identikit faces are shown in the left and middle positions.  
On the right is a conjunction of the other two faces (taken from Reinitz et al., 1994). 
Reinitz et al. (1994) proposed that attention is needed to adequately store interrelations 
among features of stimuli in memory.  Little attention is needed to store the features 
themselves.  Thus, conjunction errors may be due to retrieval of the features of the 
studied faces in the absence of retrieving information about their co-occurrence with 
other features.  Reinitz et al. (1994) found that dividing attention during the study 
phase drastically lowered the reported “oldness” of target stimuli but had little effect 
on conjunction, feature, or new faces.  Using a remember know paradigm, divided 
attention lowered remember responses to target stimuli down to a level equal with 
conjunction stimuli.  Thus, sometimes an unseen stimulus can give rise to the feeling 
of conscious recollection if it is composed of features that have been seen.   
 
Reinitz et al. (1994) suggest that faces are stored as features and feature relations 
separately.  When recognizing a conjunction face, a recollective reconstruction process 
ensues that may give rise to a “transient visual whole” if relational information is 
lacking. 
 
Reinitz and Hannigan (2001) investigated whether the proximity between two studied 
faces influenced how likely their combined features would give rise to conjunction 
errors.  They found that conjunction errors did increase when pairs of faces were 
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presented simultaneously.  Surprisingly, no proximity effects could be found when 
pairs of faces were presented one after the other even when the pairs themselves were 
separated by a time lag from other pairs in the series.  Even when participants were 
instructed to remember which faces went together, sequentially presented face pairs 
never led to increased conjunction errors compared to conjunctions of faces from 
different pairs.  A clever final experiment in this study shed some light on the lack of 
proximity effects observed for sequential pairs.  Each face in each pair was presented 
two times.  For a pair AB there were two possible presentation orders at study: AABB 
(repeating) or ABAB (alternating).  The key difference between these two conditions 
is that in the alternating condition, attention can switch back and forth between the two 
faces in the pair, but in the repeating condition, this is not possible.  Results indicated 
a large effect of attention switching.  Alternating pairs gave rise to larger conjunction 
errors than did faces from repeating pairs.  Therefore, proximity effects in the 
simultaneous condition might have been due to attention being switched back and 
forth between the two faces on the screen in a similar manner as when face repetitions 
were presented in an alternating fashion.  This attention switching could be important 
in binding memories. 
 
Two main explanations of conjunction errors have been put forward (Reinitz & 
Hannigan, 2001).  The first is the familiarity hypothesis.  Old features of the 
conjunction stimulus give rise to familiarity, but the original faces they occurred in 
cannot be recalled.  Because they seem familiar and the relational information that 
may have led to a rejection was not recalled, conjunctions are judged as old on the 
basis of familiarity alone.  This could also be understood as an explanation based on 
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the stimulus similarity because familiarity, in this sense, is a function of the summed 
similarity of the test item to all items stored in memory. 
 
The second explanation of conjunction errors is the binding (failure) hypothesis.  
When two things are bound in memory, they will be retrieved together.  Conjunction 
errors in memory happen when the features of a face are encoded but are poorly bound 
together, or when information about the binding relationships of features is forgotten 
faster than the features are forgotten, or when features of different faces are bound 
together so that they are later retrieved together.  The main idea is that when features 
are poorly bound, they are more vulnerable to being miscombined with features from 
other faces.  It is also possible that features from different faces may be “bundled” in 
the initial encoding.  In both cases, the binding process is thought to have failed 
because its purpose is to bind the features within a single face together to distinguish it 
from other faces with similar features. 
 
The familiarity explanation of conjunction errors cannot account for proximity effects 
as observed by Reinitz and Hannigan (2000; 2001).  Thus, obtaining strong evidence 
of a proximity effect is critical to the debate.  Very recently however, Jones, Bartlett, 
and Wade (2006) conducted a series of experiments using naturalistic face 
photographs.  They found absolutely no effect of proximity using the simultaneous 
presentation method or the alternating repetition method.  Just why Jones et al. failed 
to replicate Reinitz et al.‟s (2001) pattern of results using real face photographs is still 
an open question.  The effect is probably not confined solely to simple line drawn 
faces though, as McKone and Peh (2006) have replicated proximity effects using 
naturalistic photographs of unfamiliar faces that were masked to remove external 
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features.  It should be noted that the general pattern of old>conjunction>feature(when 
included)>new was found in all experiments reported. 
 
Megreya and Burton (2006b) found that studying two unfamiliar target faces 
simultaneously decreased participants‟ ability to pick out the target face in a line-up 
task compared to studying one target face.  This was found in test of immediate recall 
and face matching with targets presented concurrently with the line-up.  Thus, the 
authors argue that the presence of another face on the screen had a detrimental effect 
on encoding a target face.  Although the tasks are very different from those used to 
probe conjunction errors, it is consistent with the notion that impoverished encoding 
will lower recognition of studied faces. 
 
A study by Cabeza and Kato (2000) reported a similar pattern of results using high 
quality colour photographs of faces.  Conjunction (or “prototype”) faces in this case 
were made from four different studied faces.  Two different prototype faces were 
constructed for each set of four faces: a featural prototype and a configural prototype.  
The featural prototype was equivalent to the conjunction faces made in the studies by 
Reinitz and colleagues, in that it was made by combining a different feature (eyes, 
nose, mouth, and face outline) from each face.  The configural prototype was built by 
averaging four studied faces using a morphing technique.  Results indicated that old 
stimuli were by far the best recognized, but participants were still more likely to report 
having seen the unseen prototype than to have not seen it.  Distractors were prototypes 
made by the same methods from novel faces, and they were more likely to be judged 
as new than as old.  Featural and configural prototypes were recognized more than 
distractors by about the same degree.  This could suggest several things.  Cabeza and 
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Kato concluded that this must mean that both features and configuration are 
represented separately in memory by what they call a “dual code”.  It is also possible 
participants may form more than one prototype by different processes or take a 
different approach to recognize the two prototypes.  Of course the simplest 
explanation is that both featural and configural prototypes were approximately equal 
in terms of their perceptual similarity to the studied faces. 
 
The study by Busey and Tunnicliff (1999) described in the previous section is 
important in understanding how the research on conjunction errors relates to that on 
prototype effects.  Busey and Tunnicliff set out to replicate the pattern of results found 
using Identikit conjunction faces with realistic photographs.  Busey and Tunnicliff 
reason that if the studied faces are subject to some sort of binding or blending 
mechanism, then an averaged face will provide better evidence of such a mechanism 
because an averaged face will match more closely with a blended representation than a 
conjunction face will.  It might be helpful at this point to distinguish between 
composites and compromises.  A composite recollection combines intact features of 
(at least) two different sources and leads to false recognition of conjunction stimuli in 
recognition tasks.  A compromise recollection does not contain the intact features of 
stored items; rather, a blend of (at least) two sources is recalled as in studies using 
averaged prototypes (Tanaka & Schooler, 1991).  It is not agreed whether these two 
phenomena can be explained by the same mechanism operating on the same type of 
representations.  However, binding as Reinitz and his colleagues discuss it is very 
different than blending as in, for example, Metcalfe‟s (1990) composite holographic 
association recall model (CHARM) or in any type of prototype model that represents 
concepts by their central tendencies.  Reinitz and colleagues maintain only that 
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features that are bound together will be retrieved together.  The features themselves 
are stored intact.  The miscombination of features from different faces is thought to 
occur during retrieval. 
 
The relationship between recognition of conjunction and prototype faces is an 
interesting issue to consider.  It circles back to the debate of whether faces are 
represented in terms of their features or as Gestalten.  It helps link prototype studies 
that used feature swapping (Solso & McCarthy, 1981) to studies that manipulated the 
spatial relations among discrete facial features (Bruce et al., 1991) to studies using 
morphed face blends (Cabeza et al., 1999).  Additionally, it raises the question of 
whether prototypes should only form from exemplars of the same person‟s face or if 
they are likely to occur between different people‟s faces at least in some 
circumstances. 
Relationships Among Tasks: Categorization, Identification, and 
Recognition 
Prototype effects have been investigated using two experimental tasks: categorization 
and, less commonly, recognition.  Exactly how these tasks relate to one another is not 
well understood, but the issue deserves some consideration.  Likewise, identification is 
a task frequently employed in the face recognition literature and shares an interesting 
relationship with both recognition and categorization. 
 
Identification, recognition, and categorization all require the visual system to 
overcome the influences of lighting and viewpoint on the initial percept.  Beyond that, 
the visual system faces the additional challenge of having to ignore certain changes in 
appearance while discriminating among others depending on the task and stimuli.  
Identification is primarily a task of discriminating similar stimuli, but categorization 
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involves generalizing across different stimuli.  Furthermore, categories can be part of 
larger categories which in turn require even greater degrees of stimulus generalization.  
Faces provide a good illustration of this.  While I can identify a face as my friend 
Ralph under different viewing conditions, I can also categorize his face being that of a 
male, a young adult, a Caucasian, or a human being. 
 
In prototype models, categorization can proceed by matching to the stored category 
central tendency (Posner & Keele, 1968).  Recognition of specific exemplars would 
require additional representations of events (Whittlesea, 1987).  On the other hand, in 
exemplar models, categorization, identification, and recognition can all be achieved 
using a single representational system of stored instances of exemplars (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Whittlesea, 1987).  Categorization and 
identification are based on the relative similarity of a probe stimulus to stored 
experiences with exemplars of the same or different categories or identities 
respectively.  Recognition is based on a signal of overall familiarity derived from a 
probe‟s similarity to all stored instances regardless of their identity or category 
membership (e.g. Hintzman‟s Minerva II, 1986).  However, to successfully account 
for all three tasks, a model must be able to use stimulus dimensions flexibly (Palmeri 
& Gauthier, 2004).  For example, the task demands should either constrain dimensions 
to ones relevant to the task (e.g. Kahneman & Miller, 1986) or alter the metric of the 
dimensions (i.e. stretch or shrink multidimensional space) to optimize task 
performance (Nosofsky, 1988).   
Cognitive Models 
There are a number of ways the numerous models of categorization and recognition 
could be divided up for comparison with one another.  Since one of the main themes 
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of the current thesis is the nature of the underlying representations stored in memory, I 
chose this division as a starting point for discussion.  Models of categorization as well 
as recognition are relevant to understanding prototype effects in face recognition, so 
both classes will be reviewed.  Note that the use of the term „category‟ will be used 
frequently, and facial identity can be thought of as the category of interest.  The term 
„exemplar‟ is best thought of as analogous to an example of a particular person‟s face 
rather than representing an entire identity by itself. 
 
Theoretical Context 
One of the easiest ways to distinguish memory models is by the representational role 
of individual instances.  This distinction gained importance through two theoretical 
debates.  One of the debates concerns whether memory requires two separate systems 
or if all aspects of memory can be explained using a single system.  The semantic-
episodic theory of memory maintains that there are separate memory systems for the 
storage of decontextualized general knowledge and specific events.  In contrast, 
episodic theories explain the representation of all information in memory as being 
based on the storage of individual events.   
 
The other debate deals with how experience leads to the formation of concepts.  One 
view is that concepts are formed by summarizing information across individual 
experiences.  This is the basis of prototype theories of concept formation.  
Alternatively, concepts are not contained within a single representation.  Rather, 
instance theories assert that a conceptual representation is distributed across many 
stored examples.   
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The distinction between abstract and event related information in the semantic-
episodic hypothesis of memory is echoed in prototype theories of concept formation.  
Because it attempts to explain all memory through memories of events, the episodic 
hypothesis mirrors instance-based theories of concept formation (Whittlesea, 1987). 
 
Prototype and Other Summary-based Representational Models 
Pure Prototype-based Models 
In most prototype models, a category is represented by only a single representation, 
the central tendency of its members (Elio & Anderson, 1981; Franks & Bransford, 
1974; Homa et al., 1981; Neumann, 1977; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972).  A 
prototype representation can be abstracted from a series of related or similar exemplars 
which, under normal circumstances, make up some type of category.  Abstraction of 
prototypes is thought to occur at the time of exemplar encoding rather than at the time 
of test retrieval.  The structure of the prototype representation takes the same form as 
that of an exemplar, but it may have some special qualities.  For example, the 
prototype may be more resistant to decay due to forgetting (Elio & Anderson, 1981; 
Homa et al., 1981).  For facial identity, the prototype can be defined as the face that 
has as its value on each dimension, the mean of all its stored instances.  Recognition of 
probe faces is a function of the distance between the probe and the prototype in 
psychological space. 
 
Feature-frequency distribution models 
The next class of models that represents categories or concepts as a summary are 
feature-frequency distribution models (e.g. Neumann, 1974; Neumann, 1977).  
According to feature-frequency distribution models, a category is represented by the 
frequencies with which feature/dimensional values occur across all seen instances of a 
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category.  If faces are represented by their values on n-features, then a particular 
identity could be represented by a frequency distribution of all experienced values 
across these features.  Each identity would have its own distribution.  Therefore, 
frequency increments would only be made to feature values of the distribution 
matching the identity of the probe face. The probability of a probe face being 
recognized is a function of the frequencies of the feature values of the probe.   
 
One could think of the pattern represented by the category mode on each dimension to 
be more or less equivalent to a prototype representation using the mode rather than the 
mean to represent the category‟s central tendency.  There are some differences 
between these two types of “prototypes”.  One is that the modal prototype has no 
special role or status compared with other items.  The modal prototype would not even 
be stored separately; it would just be reflected in the distribution of features.  Another 
difference is that the prototype is not the only thing stored in this model.  All 
experienced feature values are represented and counted by the summary distribution.  
Therefore, feature-frequency distribution models retain information about the 
occurrence of atypical category members and the range of experienced values along 
each dimension in psychological space.   
 
One key difference between the feature-frequency distribution model and the pure 
prototype model is that in the prototype model, the features can assume values that 
have never been experienced.  In the feature-frequency distribution model, however, 
the modal “best representative” pattern will not have any components that have never 
been experienced before.  In fact, only the most frequent values of each feature will 
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represent the modal pattern although the particular combination they form may not 
have been seen before. 
 
Representing faces as frequencies of particular values may not be sensible except in 
certain experimental tasks.  For example, if the variants of a person‟s face are 
constructed by swapping face features (e.g. eyes, nose, mouth etc.), then this model 
may be appropriate.  If continuous variables are used to represent a face (e.g. by 
principal components from PCA), then the model must be modified slightly so that 
frequencies within a range of values can be tallied along each dimension (Neumann, 
1977).  Using slightly overlapping intervals will allow values that have never been 
seen before to be treated as the most frequent. 
 
Limitations 
There are several shortcomings of prototype-based models.  Firstly, categories are 
represented by prototypes that are context free (Medin, 1989).  This leaves the effect 
of context on categorical judgements (e.g. Roth & Shoben, 1983) and recognition (e.g. 
Steyvers & Malmberg, 2003) unaccounted for. 
 
Secondly, because the features/dimensions of a prototype are independent and 
typicality is a function of the distance from the prototypical mean, typicality of an 
exemplar should be the sum of the typicality of its components.  However, this is not 
the case, and one cannot assume the features to be independent.  Prototype models fall 
short when trying to predict responses to stimuli with correlated features (Medin, 
1989; Nosofsky, 1986). 
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Thirdly, storing only a category‟s central tendency makes it difficult to form new 
categories on the fly as the need for a new category arises.  Barsalou (1985, 1987) has 
demonstrated that people can form goal oriented categories such as “foods to eat while 
on a diet”.  These categories did not seem to rely on the average prototype to 
determine category membership.  Instead, participants used an “ideal” member as 
reference (e.g. food with zero calories). 
 
The problems related to prototype models stem more from the way similarity is 
measured rather than the discarding of the individual instances.  Even if all of the 
individual instances were retained in a prototype model by computing the central 
tendency at the time of test rather than during encoding, the prototype model would 
still fail.  The reason why most prototype-based models fail in numerous ways is that 
the similarity between probe and prototype is computed as the sum of independently 
coded features shared between the two (Medin, 1989). 
 
Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1977) developed a feature-frequency distribution model 
that did retain information about the correlations among features.  This was achieved 
by storing not only the individual features but all possible combinations of them as 
well.  For example, if the feature values of a 3 feature stimulus were 1, 2, and 3, 
frequency counts would be incremented for values 1, 2, and 3 on the first, second, and 
third feature respectively.  In addition to the individual features, the combinations 12_, 
1_3, _23, and 123 would also be incremented.   
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Instance-based Models 
The Context Model and GCM 
Medin and Schaffer first proposed the context theory of classification in 1978, and it 
has proved to be very influential as a purely exemplar view of category representation.  
Nosofsky (1984, 1986, 1991) has further developed this model into the generalized 
context model (GCM).  According to the context theory, categories are represented by 
storing numerous individual exemplars in memory.  Classification decisions are made 
by comparing the similarity of the probe to each of the stored exemplars.  If the 
similarity of a probe to exemplars in one category exceeds that of other contrast 
categories, the probe will be classified as belonging to that category.   
 
This approach can also be applied to recognition.  In recognition, decisions are made 
based on the similarity to all exemplars summing across all categories.  The summed 
similarity can be thought of as the overall familiarity produced by the probe.  The 
higher the familiarity of a probe, the higher probability is that it will be recognized.  
Thus, the same representational structure underlies the process of both categorization 
and recognition, but the decision rules operating on it are different during the two 
tasks (Nosofsky, 1991). 
 
In contrast to prototype theory, the context theory assumes that all exemplars are 
stored, and no summary information is explicitly represented in memory.  Although all 
exemplars are stored, they do not need to be stored veridically.  Their encoding is 
variable and depends to some extent on the nature of the learning task, degree of 
attention, and participant strategies during learning.  Furthermore, the context theory 
does not propose the complete absence of summary information.  Indeed, summary 
information may very well be explicitly represented in memory.  The context theory 
 71 
only maintains that this type of abstract summary information is not used to make 
recognition or classification judgements (Medin & Schaffer, 1978).   
 
One of the most important theoretical differences between prototype theory and 
context theory is the assumption of independence of the component 
features/dimensions of a stimulus.  As described earlier, prototype theory assumes all 
dimensions of a stimulus are independent and are summed to measure summary 
information such as similarity or typicality.  In contrast, context theory assumes that 
dimensions are multiplicative.  The main consequence of interest is that high similarity 
to a particular exemplar will influence decisions more than average similarity to a 
number of different exemplars.  
 
Nosofsky (1986) extends the context theory of Medin and Schaffer (1978) from only 
being able to represent stimulus coded as binary-valued dimensions to being able to 
work with dimensions having continuous (or >2) values.  Nosofsky calls the extended 
version the generalized context model (GCM).  GCM uses a multidimensional scaling 
approach.  A multidimensional scaling solution (MDS) can be used to estimate the 
psychological distance between two stimuli which is a function of their similarity.   
 
How model works: 
First, the distance between the probe face and each exemplar stored in memory is 
calculated.  A weighted Euclidean distance metric is used.
2
  Let face i be the probe 
face and face j be a stored exemplar: 
 
                                                 
2
 An earlier version of GCM used the Minkowski r-metric. 
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where xim is the psychological value of face i on dimension m; wm (0 ≤ wm ≤ 1, ∑wm 
= 1) is the weight put on dimension m (weights are free parameters); and c is a 
sensitivity parameter reflecting overall discriminability in the psychological space.  
 
The dimensional values used to compute distance come from a MDS solution derived 
from similarity ratings that participants made about pairs of faces.  The solution 
arranges the faces into a multidimensional space reflecting their “psychological 
distance”.  The weights on the different dimensions can be used to model selective 
attention to particular dimensions.  In effect, the weights act to stretch or shrink 
psychological space along a dimension (Nosofsky, 1986). 
 
The similarity of face i and face j is found by converting the distance between them 
using an exponential decay function (Shepard, 1958, 1987): 
 
Activation of face j (aij) by face i is equal to their similarity plus noise.  A random 
normal variable (mean=0) models the random noise that might affect the level of 
activation of a face stored in memory:  
 
Since GCM is designed to model both categorization and recognition, overall 
activations are calculated by taking each category in turn.  The sum of activation 
produced by a probe face within a single category is referred to as the category‟s 
evidence.  In a two category case, the evidence for Category 1 given presentation of 
face i is the sum of the activations of all of Category 1 exemplars stored in memory.  
The evidence for Category 2 is calculated in the same manner. 
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In a classification task, the evidence difference between the two categories is 
compared to a criterion and if the difference is large enough a classification is made:  
 
where the critical amount is b, a response bias parameter. 
For recognition, the evidence for Category 1 is calculated separately from Category 2 
which is also calculated, and the sum of the two values is compared to a criterion.  In a 
face recognition task, each different identity could be considered a category, but I am 
sticking to the two category example for ease of communication.  If the summed 
activation for both categories exceeds a criterion xc, an “old” response is made: 
 
 
Episodic Models of Memory 
All episodic models of memory take memory of events as the basis of all processes in 
memory.  Every experienced event lays down its own trace in memory.  Thus, long 
term memory can be seen as a vast collection of episodic traces.  Another very 
important property of episodic models is that retrieval activates multiple events in 
parallel.  The strength of activation of a given memory trace is a function of its 
similarity to the probe.  The encoded dimensions of a stimulus are not assumed to be 
independent, but their exact relationship varies somewhat among different models.  It 
is more important to grasp the flavour of the episodic approach than to note all of the 
details and possibilities.  That is that there are no stable representations in memory, 
and it is the flexibility of encoding and retrieval that make the processes of memory so 
dynamic.   
 
Hintzman‟s Minerva II 
Hintzman‟s Minerva II (1986, 1988) is a good example of an episodic model of 
memory.  To facilitate discussion of this model, it is useful to distinguish primary 
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memory from secondary memory.  Primary memory is the representation of the 
current experience (i.e. the probe).  Secondary memory consists of the vast pool of 
episodic traces representing previously encoded events.    
 
The traces in this vast pool are represented in Minerva II by vectors.  Each event is 
encoded as a unique vector which codes the feature values of each feature/dimension.  
Like most other instance-based models, encoding the correct feature values on each 
feature is probabilistic.  The representations are quite simple, in that they only code for 
the presence or absence of features assigning a value of +1 or -1 respectively.  A value 
of 0 is also possible, and it indicates that the feature was not encoded or is irrelevant. 
 
According to Minerva II, when a probe is encountered, primary memory sends a signal 
of its contents to secondary memory where it activates the pool of stored traces.  All 
stored traces are activated in parallel to some degree.  The more similar a trace is to 
the probe, the more activated it will become.  Secondary memory then sends a signal, 
termed the “echo,” back to primary memory containing the result of the retrieval 
process.  
 
The echo has two properties that carry different summary information about the 
retrieved traces.  The sum of activations of all traces in secondary memory provides a 
signal of familiarity termed the intensity of the echo.  The echo intensity serves as the 
basis for recognition memory judgments.  The other property of the echo is its content.  
This summarizes the actual content of the traces that were retrieved.  A given trace 
will contribute more to the content of the echo the more it is activated by the probe.  
Thus, the echo is like a composite made from the most similar traces in memory. 
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How the model works: 
Because the vectors only code for presence or absence of a feature, the similarity 
between the probe and a trace can be computed easily.  That is, on every feature, the 
values will either match, mismatch, or will not be relevant or comparable (if either 
vector has a zero value that feature is deemed irrelevant).  Give matching values a +1, 
mismatching values a -1, and irrelevant comparisons a 0.  Sum these values across all 
features of the vectors to get the total similarity of the probe to a given trace i as in the 
equation: 
 
where Pj is the value of the jth feature of the probe, Ti,j is the value of the jth feature in 
memory trace i, Ni  is the number of features for which either Pj or Ti,j is nonzero, and N 
is the number of features in the trace and test item being compared (Hintzman, 1988).  
 
The similarity of a trace to a probe is transformed into the activation of the trace by 
cubing the similarity: 
 
where Si is the similarity of trace i to the probe and Ai is the activation of trace i in 
response to the probe (Hintzman, 1988).  The sum of activation values across all traces 
in memory gives the echo intensity as described earlier: 
 
where I is the echo intensity and M is the total number of memory traces (Hintzman, 
1988). 
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The content of the echo is given by a vector of feature values.  Imagine traces in 
secondary memory answering or “echoing” primary memory in response to a probe 
stimulus.  All traces echo back their values on each of the relevant features.  The more 
strongly activated traces will produce a louder echo, thus contributing more to the 
echo content.  The value of the jth feature of the echo content vector can be calculated 
as: 
 
Across all features, the echo content represents the information retrieved from 
secondary memory in response to a particular probe stimulus.  Strongly negative or 
positive values indicate a feature that is shared by many highly activated traces 
whereas low values indicate that traces were inconsistent in respect to that feature‟s 
value.  
 
Norm Theory 
Kahneman and Miller‟s (1986) norm theory is another good example of an episodic 
approach to memory and cognition.  Although norm theory focuses more on 
comparative judgments, the basic principles can easily be applied to a broad range of 
cognitive tasks.  I include a summary of it here because it emphasizes the need for 
flexible mental representations, and it explains how an event based system of memory 
can achieve this.  
 
Norm theory assumes that memory consists of a vast pool of episodic traces, and these 
traces can be rapidly recruited in parallel by a probe stimulus.  A norm is computed in 
response to a probe, and it is an aggregate of the recruited episodes.  The most 
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important point is that norms are computed ad hoc, so every event brings its own 
frame of reference to mind.  Norms contain information about a stimulus based on 
similar experiences from the past.  If the probe is a category name, a norm might 
contain useful information about the properties of this category.  A face classification 
task (face/no face) can be used to illustrate the function of norms.  To do the task, one 
must refer to some representation of what a human face ought to look like.  A norm 
can be computed for human faces, but this norm takes as its frame of reference the 
specific face stimulus being presented as well as the context of deciding whether the 
stimulus is a face or not a face.  Therefore, a slightly different norm would be 
referenced on each trial.  A scrambled face would deviate extremely from a norm for 
human faces and would likely be judged as not being a face.  In contrast, a typical face 
would match extremely well with its norm and would quickly be judged as a normal 
looking face. 
 
How the model works: 
What most exemplar models would call exemplars or instances, norm theory calls 
elements.  In norm theory, however, elements are the representations that are recruited 
by a probe, and the concept does not generalise to also include the existence of 
representations in memory independent of retrieval triggered by a probe.  A probe 
recruits a set of elements termed an evoked set.  Each element in the evoked set can be 
described by its feature values on different attributes (i.e. dimension).  Activation of an 
element will distribute activation across a range of values.  Elements are activated in 
parallel and to varying degrees.  The shape of the activation distribution reflects the 
generalization gradient across feature values and imprecise assigning of feature values 
to elements.  The area of the distribution associated with each attribute depends on 
how much the probe activates the element. 
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Now for each attribute, the activation of each feature value is summed across 
elements.  This produces an aggregate distribution of activation for each attribute 
which reflects the weighted contribution of each element in the evoked set.  These 
aggregate distributions serve as norms that summarize the evoked set along each 
attribute.   
 
Any type of stimulus together with its context could serve as a probe.  Category 
references could also be used as probes.  These are often important when making 
comparative judgements.  For example, in a laboratory setting, the comparison arising 
from the question “does this person look more like a male or a female?”  The words 
male and female would likely serve as probes, each creating its own category norms.  
The image of the face would also serve as a probe and would perform the useful role 
of constraining the possible attributes that norms could be constructed for.  For 
example, norms would not be constructed for attributes relating to clothing or height 
of males and females even though these attributes would often be useful in gender 
discrimination in everyday life.   
 
Recognition of a particular person‟s face also can be achieved through the use of 
norms.  An image of a face could act as a probe and recruit representations of similar 
faces or of faces seen in a similar context.  Norms based on the evoked set of faces 
would then be compared to the probe face.  The comparison is not as simple as in most 
other models because rather than comparing discrete points in a similarity space, the 
comparison involves regions of graded activation.  However, the norms play the same 
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role as the echo content in Hintzman‟s Minerva II model (1986).  The mode of a norm 
can be thought of as its prototypical value, but in this case it is computed online. 
 
The Current Work 
The experiments presented in the following three chapters investigate the modulating 
role of different variables on the prototype effect in face recognition.  By identifying 
variables of theoretical relevance and testing their effects, I aimed to further our 
understanding of the prototype effect.  As of yet, the existing literature contains no 
research that takes as its focus the differing accounts of the prototype effect in face 
recognition.  Experiments were designed to distinguish competing accounts as much 
as possible.  However, as it would be nearly impossible to provide unequivocal 
evidence in support of a single viewpoint, other variables were explored to further 
constrain possible models of face recognition.  My more general goal, throughout the 
present work, is to investigate how we learn new people‟s faces, and in particular, how 
our memory representations may change as we become more familiar with a face. 
 
The experiments can be grouped into three families according to the type of face 
stimuli used.  One chapter is devoted to each of the following families of experiments 
that used: (1) faces created from combining greyscale photographs of different facial 
features, (2) PCA generated faces and morphed faces, and (3) natural photographs of 
real people.  The variables selected for their potential to modulate the prototype effect 
were examined in experiments spanning across chapters, and thus chapters share 
related themes and methodologies.   
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All of the experiments had a study phase followed by a test phase.  In the study phase, 
either two or four exemplars were shown of each identity.  In the recognition test, one 
of the seen before exemplars, the unseen prototype, and an unseen exemplar were 
shown of each studied identity.  Faces of unstudied identities were used as distractors 
in some of the experiments.  Higher recognition of the unseen prototypes compared to 
the seen exemplars was the criterion chosen to indicate a prototype effect. 
 
Variables Affecting the Prototype Effect in Face Recognition 
 
Familiarity 
Learning how the prototype effect in face recognition will fare under conditions of 
increased familiarity will provide important information about how we represent 
different people‟s faces in long term memory.   
 
Different instances (i.e. different images) are more likely to be attributed to the same 
individual if that individual is familiar to the viewer.  If there is a mechanism that 
averages different instances of the same individual (but not between different 
identities), then this mechanism will be more likely to lump and average together 
different instances of a familiar face because those instances are more likely to be 
treated as belonging to a single identity. 
 
If prototype effects are larger for more familiarized faces than less familiarized faces, 
this finding would be in accord with accounts that include explicit formation of 
identity based prototypes.  Instance-based models would have more difficulty 
explaining this pattern of results but cannot be discounted. 
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If the prototype effect is smaller for more familiar faces, then explanations of 
previously observed prototype effects for unfamiliar faces need to be re-examined.  If 
indeed there is a blending mechanism operating on different instances of the same 
individual‟s face, then it would be difficult to explain why the contribution of this 
mechanism would decrease if experience with a face is increased. 
 
Context and Identifying Information 
The prototype effect has the potential to reveal important clues about the type of 
representational system underlying our ability to recognize faces.  Although the basic 
effect has been documented in the face recognition literature (Bruce et al., 1991; 
Cabeza et al., 1999; Cabeza & Kato, 2000), there have not been any serious attempts 
to isolate its cause.  I attempted to do so by devising a series of experiments that 
predicted different outcomes depending on the theoretical model being considered.  
Ascribing identity and applying context to the faces will affect how they are processed 
and therefore influence the strength of the prototype effect.  The two major theoretical 
accounts, prototype and episodic, differ on how context and identity information will 
affect processing. 
 
I will compare episodic or instance-based models of memory with prototype-based 
models.  The main difference between these two viewpoints is that in episodic models, 
every experienced event is represented in memory by its own trace, whereas in 
prototype-based models, an average representation is abstracted during encoding and 
stored explicitly in memory.   
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To understand how attaching names to faces might affect the internal representations 
we form, imagine meeting a pair of identical twins.  If you meet them separately, you 
might never know they are actually different people, and thus never learn to tell them 
apart.  However, given information about their identity, you can learn to distinguish 
them.  To study this experimentally, I created variations on pairs of highly similar 
faces.  In one condition, all these faces were given the same name; in the other, the 
two sets of variants were given separate names.  In the test phase, all faces were 
presented without names.  If the formation of prototype representations normally 
operates on instances within an identity but not between different identities, then 
prototype effects are predicted to be lower when a face was learned with two different 
names as compared to when learned with a single name.  An episodic model might 
abstract a prototype at the time of retrieval, and thus still show a strong prototype 
effect regardless of whether it was learned with one name or two names.   
 
Essentially the same method was used to apply different associated contexts to faces.  
In this case, cartoon bodies provided the context.  This allowed the manipulation of 
whether a test face was presented with or without context at the time of retrieval.  
Predictions vary depending on the details of the model, but if the abstracted prototype 
representation is stored context free, then the strength of the prototype effect should 
not be affected by a contextual manipulation.  In contrast, an episodic model in which 
context is encoded in each episodic trace would predict a different pattern of results 
depending on the manipulated context.   
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Investigating Prototype Effects Using Different Types of Face Stimuli 
Chapter 2 (the first experimental chapter), presents three experiments using images of 
face composites as stimuli.  Composites were constructed using the PROfit software 
package which the police use to help witnesses “build” the face of the perpetrator as 
they remember it (see General Methods for details).  This system can produce fairly 
realistic greyscale images of faces.  Faces of differing identities were prepared such 
that all faces of the same identity shared all of the same facial features (same eyes, 
same nose etc.), but no two faces of differing identity shared any feature in common.  
The configuration of features was varied systematically so that there was always a face 
image with the average identity specific configuration.  Following the approach taken 
by Bruce et al. (1991), the internal configuration of facial features was left intact 
among faces of the same identity, but the relative positioning of the internal features 
was manipulated by shifting all of the internal features (as a single unit) up or down on 
the external face shape.   
 
Chapter 3 used two kinds of face stimuli in separate experiments.  Experiments 4 and 
5 used faces made by an in-house software program that generates images of faces 
using PCA (see General Methods for details).  The faces are greyscale and have had 
the hair and ears removed.  The image quality is near photographic and substantially 
higher than PROfit faces.  The advantage of using PCA generated faces is that their 
similarity (in PCA space) can be prespecified and made to order.  Later, I will describe 
how I put this property to use.   
 
Experiment 6 used full colour morphed faces made using Psycho-Morph (Tiddeman, 
Burt, & Perrett, 2001), a software program similar to the popular Gryphon Morph 
software.  The image quality was extremely high and on the same level as natural 
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photographs (this was largely due to the high resolution of the original photographs).  I 
did not have access to multiple images of the same person‟s face to morph between, so 
I used pairs of photographs of different peoples‟ faces and morphed using tiny 
increments to produce exemplars that appeared similar enough to belong to the same 
identity.  Using PCA and morphing techniques to probe for prototype effects is 
important to extend findings using simple configural variants to conditions using more 
complex subtle changes to the facial features and their configuration alike. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 4, the studied identities were real people.  Two full colour, natural 
images of each identity were shown in the study phase.  One of the images was a high 
quality photograph, and the other was a video still of lesser quality (but still easily 
identifiable by a familiar viewer).  The two images were taken at the same time, and 
thus by far the most obvious differences in their appearance are the superficial image 
properties such as brightness, contrast, and graininess.  A 50%/50% morph was 
created for each identity from its two original images.  It was important that at least 
some of the experiments used natural images to ensure any prototype effects found in 
the preceding chapters were not particular to the artificial image manipulations that 
were used.  Before I can make any claims about how our face recognition system deals 
with everyday encounters with the same person‟s face, I need to test for the prototype 
effect using naturally occurring sources of facial variation, within and between.   
 
The Big Questions 
The questions central to this thesis are: how robust is the prototype effect in face 
recognition?  Are there any variables that affect the strength of the prototype effect?  
In particular, what role does familiarity play?  Will the use of context and identity 
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information be able to distinguish between prototype- and exemplar-based accounts of 
face recognition memory?  Can the prototype effect be replicated with other types of 
stimuli?  Will comparable prototype effects be found using real photographs of real 
people?  The studies presented in the next three chapters will address these questions.  
Their success will be evaluated and discussed at the end of each chapter and in the 
General Discussion in Chapter 5.  The implications of the present work to the larger 
body of research in face recognition and general memory mechanisms will also be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
General Method 
All of the experiments follow a similar methodology, and this section will cover some 
general information about the equipment, the preparation of stimuli, and the 
procedure. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Equipment 
Images were displayed and responses were collected using a Hi-Grade Notino 3600 
windows laptop with a 14” monitor at 1024 x 768 resolution.  The program E-Studio 
from the E-Prime software package (version 1.1) was used to present the stimuli and 
to record any responses made using the laptop keyboard. 
Stimuli 
Image Manipulation Software 
1.) PROfit Windows Version 3.1: 
PROfit was used to prepare face stimuli for experiments in Chapter 2.  It is a facial 
composite system designed for use by the police in the area of eyewitness testimony.  
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Witnesses can work with an operator to build a face that resembles the perpetrator as 
remembered by the witness. 
 
PROfit uses a large database of greyscale photographs of individual facial features 
(e.g. eyes, noses, mouths, hairstyles etc.).  There are about 200 options per feature 
depending on the feature.  Originally, the options on each feature belonged to different 
people‟s faces, but once isolated, the features of different people‟s faces can be 
combined to form novel faces.  Presently, the database includes features photographed 
from male faces only. 
 
The system is easy to use.  A default face appears on the screen.  By clicking on a 
feature, one can flip through the options for that feature while watching the default 
face change to display the selection.  The configural arrangement of features can also 
be easily adjusted.  Selecting a feature and clicking an arrow button will move the 
feature a small fixed distance up, down, left, or right relative to the rest of the face. 
 
The resulting composites themselves are fairly realistic faces.  Although they are 
comprised of pieces of photographs, they do not appear as realistic as a photograph of 
a face normally does.  This is partially because the pattern of shading from the original 
lighting may appear discontinuous especially along the joint between different face 
parts.  The system does allow you to make alterations to the brightness of each feature 
separately, and this does improve the realism of the face.  Similarly, there is an 
“airbrush” tool that can reduce the noticeability of the feature joints.  I used these two 
types of adjustments frequently whilst preparing the PROfit faces for the experiments 
in Chapter 2. 
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2.) PCA Face Generator:   
To explain how the generator works, an overview of PCA may be helpful to some 
readers: 
PCA takes a large multivariate set of data and summarizes the patterns in the data by 
constructing a smaller number of new variables called principal components.  The 
principal components will correlate with the original variables, but they will each 
reflect independent sources of covariation.   
 
In terms of face images, an image can be expressed as a vector whose components are 
the intensity/brightness value on each pixel.  The number of dimensions in the original 
image space is the number of pixels per image.  PCA can reduce the number of 
dimensions by forming a new co-ordinate axis through the image space in the 
direction that maximizes the variability in the data set.  Images can be projected onto 
this new axis and their score recorded.  The first axis will always account for the most 
variance in the set, but subsequent axes will be laid down that account for 
progressively less and less variance.  The result is a set of eigenvectors which are also 
called eigenfaces when the analysis is preformed on a large number of face images.  
The number of possible eigenfaces is equal to the number of faces, so a relatively 
small number of them are selected to be the principal components of the space.  In 
theory, the principal components define the space of all possible human faces.  
Therefore, any point in the space can be expressed as a face image just as any face 
image can be expressed as a point in PCA space.  Thus, the PCA face generator can 
generate novel face images, and this approach was used to generate stimuli for 
Experiments 4 and 5. 
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The principal components used by the in house generator computer program were 
derived from a set of 300 images of young Caucasian male and female faces.  Each 
face was “marked up” by manually locating 219 points around key features such as 
eyes, nose, and the face outline, using Psycho-Morph.  An average face shape was 
computed, and each image was morphed to the average shape using Psycho-Morph.  
All further processing and image generation was carried out in Matlab, with code 
written by Peter Hancock at Stirling University.  The faces were cropped using an oval 
set to just include the jawline, but exclude the ears and curve across above the 
eyebrows to exclude hair.  The shape free face images and the shape parameters for 
each face were then separately subjected to a Principal Components Analysis.  This 
gives the principal modes of variation in the image domain (eigenfaces) and in the 
shape domain (eigenshapes).  For the purposes of this study, the first 30 eigenfaces 
and 18 of the first 20 eigenshapes were used.  The two removed were numbers 1 and 
3, which code for the head nodding and shaking respectively.  While attempts were 
made to get the participants to look directly at the camera, people do vary, resulting in 
these components carrying much of the variance in shape. 
 
Linear recombination of the eigenfaces and the eigenshapes, in random amounts, 
specifies a novel face.  The specified eigenfaces are added together and then morphed 
to the shape specified by the eigenshapes to produce the final output image.  The 
generator can also specify images that are contingent on other images.  For example, 
the user could have the generator produce images three at a time.  The location of the 
first face is random.  The second and third faces are moved in the opposite direction 
by a specified amount of distance away from the first face.  Thus, the user can control 
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the similarity among the faces by controlling the distances in PCA space.  I made use 
of this feature by creating exemplar images that were equidistant from a prototype 
image.  The twin faces were created this way in Experiment 5 by setting the distances 
among exemplars of the same face to be very small.   
 
The high level of control over the similarity relations and the speed of generating 
stimuli are the two major advantages over other methods of image manipulation.  The 
quality of the images is quite good in general, but artefacts and peculiarities are 
frequent.  Trial and error can be used to help avoid image oddities.  Even though the 
PCA space should represent all possible faces, in practice, the total variability in the 
images produced was somewhat limiting.  It would be difficult to produce a set of say 
50 different identities that all clearly looked like different people.  For experiments 
only requiring 20 identities or less, the generator can do an adequate job.  One final 
criticism is that similarity is being manipulated within a physical image space, so there 
is always uncertainty as to how psychologically similar the images are. 
 
3.) Psycho-Morph 
To prepare images for morphing, control points must be plotted on the face.  Although 
Psycho-Morph has an auto-delineation option, ultimately, the precise locations of the 
points must be manually adjusted to produce a high quality morph.  Many of the 
control points are located in important positions on the face like the pupils, the tip of 
the nose, or along the curve of the eyebrow.  An equal number of corresponding 
control points are plotted onto each image.  In addition to morphing, the control points 
can also be used to fit a mask around the contours of face.  In Experiment 6, a black 
mask was fitted around each face which excluded the hair, ears, and neck. 
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Psycho-Morph locates the control points of the morph face by moving a specified 
distance along the vector connecting the control points in the parent images according 
to the specified degree of morphing.  Linear interpolation is used to determine the 
locations of intervening pixels across the image based on the location of the nearest 
control point.  A fade process then weights the brightness values for each 
corresponding pixel according to the specified proportion of each parent face in the 
morph (Wolberg, 1990). 
 
With Psycho-Morph, essentially the same process can be used to take the difference 
between two parent images and apply that difference to a third face image.  
Caricatures are generated in this way by taking the difference between a premade 
average face (average of the population) and a particular person‟s face and then 
applying this difference back onto the image of the person‟s face.  The direction and 
magnitude of the difference can be specified by the user to say, for example, create 
differing degrees of caricature and anticaricature.  This process was used to mimic 
within face variation in Experiment 6 by applying the differences between two faces to 
a third face image by the same amount in the positive and negative direction.  This 
leaves the third image as the prototype, or average, of the two newly constructed faces.   
 
4.) Adobe Photoshop 6.0 
When small adjustments to the images were required, Adobe Photoshop was used in 
all experiments unless otherwise stated.  Small adjustments included centring faces 
within the image and resizing images.  Changes particular to the different types of 
stimuli are as follows: 
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PROfit faces: Hair and ears were removed from the PROfit faces by selecting the to-
be-removed area and filling it with the background colour.  An inverse rectangular 
shaped frame usually provided a sufficient fit along the hairline.  In cases where the 
rectangle did not fit well with the shape of the face or hairline, the selection was 
adjusted accordingly.  Importantly, all variants based on the same identity shared the 
same external features, so once a selection had been made to remove the hair on one 
variant of a face, that same selection could be reapplied to all the other variants of that 
identity to standardize the external face shape. 
 
Morphed faces:  Some minor alterations were made to images prior to morphing.  In 
particular, the hairline sometimes had to be adjusted slightly if one of the two paired 
images had hair protruding into the area of the face not excluded by the external 
feature mask.  Such hair was hidden using the clone stamp tool to select a nearby area 
of skin on the face and “stamp” it down over the hair.  Some images needed to be 
resized and/or centred.  Touch-ups were sometimes needed to remove obvious marks 
like large moles or blemishes.  This helped to produce realistic, high quality morphs 
by reducing artefacts like blurred lines from a stretched blemish. 
 
Natural faces:  The faces in the video stills were on a blue background, so this was 
removed and replaced with a white background.  Anything below the top of the neck 
was removed as well, so the video stills would resemble the photographs.  The original 
blue background had leaked onto the face in some cases, so the blue was stamped over 
or painted the same colours as the skin tone or hair depending on where the leak was.  
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Images were resized, centred, and set to the same resolution.  The hair of the morphed 
images needed to be filled in or shaved down a bit to look normal.   
 
General Procedure 
Experiments were divided into separate study and test phases.  Different identities 
were presented in the study phase, and more than one exemplar of each identity was 
studied.  A recognition test followed with different versions of each studied identity.  
The procedure of a typical experiment was as follows: 
 
Study phase:  Participants read instructions for the study phase off the monitor, and the 
experimenter elaborated on them.  Participants then raised any questions they might 
have had.   
 
Images were presented one at a time in the centre of the screen.  Presentation was 
selfpaced, and participants pressed the space bar to view the next face in the series.  
While they viewed the faces, participants were asked to either remember them or to 
make a subjective rating about their appearance.  The number keys on the laptop 
keyboard were used to enter ratings.  Depending on the experiment, either 2 or 4 
exemplars of each identity were presented.  The study phase was blocked so that 
exactly one exemplar of each face was included in each block.  This reduced the 
likelihood that two exemplars of the same face would be shown on consecutive trials.  
The prototypes never appeared in the study phase.  Filler faces were interwoven into 
the series of study faces.  The filler faces were prepared in the same way as the 
prototypes.  In this way, prototypes would not be rejected at test merely because they 
looked different in some way from anything participants saw in the study phase.   
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Test Phase:  Participants read instructions for the test phase off the monitor, and the 
experimenter elaborated on them.  Again, participants raised any questions they had. 
The task was either to judge if the image on the screen was one of the images in the 
study phase, or if an image of the same person had been presented earlier (regardless 
of whether images were the same or slightly different).  Participants rated how 
confident they were about their decision from 1 to 10 (1=sure not seen; 10=sure seen).   
 
General format of the test phase was as follows.  Again, images were presented one at 
a time in the centre of the screen, and the number keys on the laptop were used to 
enter responses.  Once a number key was pressed, the next trial proceeded.  There 
were no response time limits.  The first six trials of the test phase were practice trials.  
The data from these trials was not analyzed.  For each identity shown in the study 
phase, there were three different versions of it in the recognition test.  One was a seen 
exemplar, one was the unseen prototype, and one was an unseen exemplar.  If the task 
at test was to recognize the same people shown earlier, then half the test trials 
presented distractor faces of novel identities. 
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Chapter 2: The Role of Familiarity in Recognizing 
Prototypes of Individual Faces 
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Chapter Introduction 
The purpose of the experiments in this chapter was to gain insight into how the 
identity of faces is represented in memory and how these representations develop with 
experience.  I chose familiarity as a starting point for inquiry into the prototype effect 
in face recognition and its origins.  This seemed an obvious choice because the issue 
driving all research on prototype effects is how we are able to learn abstract 
information.  We learn based on our experiences, and generally speaking, the more we 
experience, the more we learn.  Despite being fairly poor at recognizing unfamiliar 
faces, people are surprisingly accurate at recognizing familiar faces even across large 
transformations in viewpoint, lighting, and expression.  How do our representations of 
faces change as they become more familiar? 
 
Although two past studies, Bruce et al. (1991) and Cabeza et al. (1999), have focussed 
specifically on learning prototypes of different facial identities, no study to date has 
examined this at different points in the familiarization process (but see Burton et al., 
2005 for a different approach using famous faces).  Both Bruce et al. and Cabeza et al. 
presented participants with a series of exemplars of unfamiliar faces in a study phase 
followed by a recognition test phase.  In the study phase of every experiment, 
participants either saw four different exemplars of each unfamiliar face or two 
exemplars twice each.  Thus, the degree of learning participants had with the faces was 
quite limited.  If familiar and unfamiliar faces really are processed in different ways, 
then one might wonder if prototype abstraction could be affected by the amount of 
experience participants had with faces in the study phase.   
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My goal was to extend previous research by manipulating how familiar participants 
were with the faces in the study phase.  The simple construction of the face stimuli 
used by Bruce et al. (1991) appealed to me, so I chose to model my experiments in this 
chapter after the ones in their study.  For example, in their Experiments 7 and 8, Bruce 
et al. created different exemplars of the same person‟s face by shifting the internal 
features (eyes, nose, and mouth) up and down on the face outline.  In their bimodal 
condition, two exemplars of each face were made by shifting the internal features by 9 
pixels up (+9) or down (-9) from the starting face (0).  Exemplars were presented 
twice each within a series of study faces.  Half of the participants made incidental 
ratings during the study phase.  The other half of participants were warned of the 
recognition test, and their task in the study phase was to examine the faces and try to 
remember them.  In the test phase, faces were presented one at a time, and participants 
were asked to rate how sure they were that they had seen that particular exemplar 
before in the study phase.  Participants were more confident of seeing the unseen 
prototype (0) than the actually seen exemplars (+/-9).  Although this was true for 
participants in the incidental learning group, participants in the intentional group, who 
were asked to attend to the details of the study faces, did not show a clear prototype 
effect. 
 
Although Bruce et al.‟s (1991) results were intriguing, it cannot be concluded that 
prototype representations were being formed simply because the prototype effect was 
observed.  More investigation is needed to form a convincing account of what 
underlies the so called “prototype effect”.  It is therefore necessary to move beyond 
the limits of past experiments that have only used unfamiliar faces under conditions of 
minimal learning. 
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The approach taken in my experiments was simple.  The procedures and stimuli were 
kept very similar to those used in Bruce et al.‟s (1991) experiments, but the critical 
difference is that my designs included an initial familiarity training phase prior to the 
experiment proper.  Thus, some faces will have been familiarized in the training phase, 
whereas other faces will be shown for the first time in the study phase.  By using this 
within subjects approach, recognition performance in the test phase for familiarized 
vs. unfamiliar faces was compared.  The key question of Chapter 1 is does familiarity 
with the exemplars affect the magnitude of the prototype effect in face recognition? 
 
It was predicted that the prototype effect will be stronger for newly familiarized faces 
compared to faces that were not part of the initial familiarization training phase.  To be 
clear, increased confidence ratings for prototypes over the seen exemplars should be 
observed more for the familiarized faces compared to unfamiliar faces.  
 
The above prediction is based on the following rationale.  Different exemplars are 
more likely to be attributed to the same individual if that individual is familiar to the 
viewer.  If there is a mechanism that averages different exemplars of the same 
individual (but not different individuals), then this mechanism will be more likely to 
lump and average together different exemplars of a familiar face because those 
exemplars are more likely to be treated as belonging to a single identity. 
 
Thus, one possible prediction made by a prototype account of face recognition is that 
more familiar faces will produce stronger prototype effects than less familiar faces.  
Predictions made by an exemplar account are less clear and likely would depend on 
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the categorical structure of the training stimuli.  Despite this, knowing how familiarity 
affects the prototype effect would be useful for developing formal models of face 
recognition from either a prototype- or exemplar-based point of view. 
 
Experiment 1 
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the magnitude of the 
prototype effect is affected by the amount of familiarity training participants receive 
with the studied faces.  I also wanted to replicate the prototype effect under conditions 
of minimal learning as in Bruce et al. (1991) and Cabeza et al. (1999) to ensure the 
stimuli and procedures I used were capable of producing a prototype effect.  The 
important manipulation was the addition of a familiarity training phase prior to the 
normal study phase of the experiment.  Participants received familiarity training on 
half of the faces in the study phase. 
 
The stimuli used were PROfit faces and were similar to the faces Bruce et al. (1991) 
constructed using the Mac-a-Mug system.  In order to examine prototype recognition 
of face identity, a set of variants representing the same individual‟s face must be 
created.  This is one of the most difficult aspects of designing experiments in this line 
of research.  The exemplars of a face need to be different enough to be distinguishable 
but similar enough to be perceived as depicting the same person‟s face.  Bruce et al. 
showed that a simple up or down shift of the internal features was capable of 
producing prototype effects.  I borrowed this technique in the present experiment to 
create identity variants around each starting face. 
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In the training and study phases, participants learned the faces incidentally in that they 
were not warned that there would be a subsequent recognition test.  Instead, 
participants rated several attributes regarding the appearance of each face (e.g. 
attractiveness, honesty etc.).  This approach was adopted because Bruce et al. (1991) 
found it yielded stronger prototype effects compared to when participants were asked 
to memorize the faces. 
 
Although familiarity was the main focus, the role of similarity among exemplars of the 
same face was also tested out of additional interest.  Past research suggests there is 
good reason to expect that the similarity of studied exemplars will have an effect on 
prototype abstraction.  For example, Cabeza et al. (1999, Experiment 3) found that 
when the similarity of exemplars was high, there was a prototype effect, but when the 
similarity of exemplars was reduced to the point that they no longer resembled the 
same individual, the prototype effect was absent.  Moreover, predictions about the 
effect of similarity on prototype recognition can be made using the same rationale 
used to predict the effect of familiarity.  That is, if a prototype mechanism operates by 
averaging exemplars of the same person‟s face, then more similar exemplars of a face 
will be more likely to be averaged together into a prototype representation than less 
similar exemplars would be.  Thus, the more similar the exemplars of a face are in the 
study phase, the higher the prototype recognition will be in the test phase.  However, it 
is harder to make a prediction about how similarity will affect the strength of the 
prototype effect because the studied exemplars would also be predicted to be 
recognized better when similarity is high.  This is because the abstracted prototype 
will resemble the studied exemplars more whenever variability among exemplars of 
the same face is low.  If one assumes a model that stores only the prototype of an 
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individual‟s face, then the prototype effect should be strongest when the variability 
among exemplars of the same face is as high as possible without being so high as to 
not trigger the averaging mechanism. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 24 University of Stirling psychology undergraduates.  They received 
credit toward their degree requirements in the Psychology Honours programme for 
their participation.  Each participant was tested individually and completed the 
experiment in a single session which lasted approximately 20 min.  Participation was 
voluntary, and at the end of the session, participants were fully debriefed as to the 
purpose and theoretical basis of the experiment.   
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
Face stimuli were made using the software package PROfit by combining photographs 
of different features to create semi-realistic greyscale images of faces.  See the General 
Methods section at the end of Chapter 1 for more information about PROfit.  
 
Twenty faces of different identities were constructed.  No two faces had the same face 
shape, eyes, eyebrows, nose, mouth, or ears.  All faces were males that appeared to be 
between 16-40 years of age.  The faces were centred on a teal background.  Image 
resolution was 10 pixels/cm, and the face portion of the images was approximately 11 
cm wide by 17 cm high. 
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A series of five variants were constructed for each of the twenty identities.  Each series 
consisted of two exemplars that had their internal features shifted down (-2,-4), two 
exemplars that had their internal features shifted up (+2,+4), and a prototype (+0) face 
that served as a starting point for the shifting (see Figure 2.1).  Features were shifted 
by fixed amounts corresponding to clicks on the computer mouse.  A +2 or -2 
exemplar was shifted two clicks up or down respectively on the mouse; a +4 or -4 
exemplar was four clicks up or down respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1. Example stimuli from Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  Shows four exemplars of 
the same face made by shifting the internal features up and down on the face outline 
by a fixed distance.  The central face was the starting face and served as the prototype 
of the set of exemplars.  The uppermost and lowermost faces show a pair of seen 
exemplars in the near and far condition respectively. 
Equipment. 
All aspects of the experiment were conducted using a Hi-Grade Notino3600 windows 
lap top with a 14” monitor at 1024 x 768 resolution.  The program E-Studio from the 
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E-Prime software package (version 1.1) was used to control the presentation of stimuli 
and to record responses made using the laptop keyboard. 
 
Design 
A 2 (Familiarity) x 2 (Distance) x 3 (Exemplar Type) within-subjects design was used 
to compare prototype effects across two levels of familiarity.  The two levels of 
familiarity were familiarized and unfamiliar.  Familiarized faces were shown in both 
the training and study phases whereas unfamiliar faces were shown only in the study 
phase.  Distance refers to the distance between the position of the internal features of 
the two seen exemplars for a given identity shown in training and study.  Manipulating 
the internal feature distance between the two exemplars affects their similarity.  This 
factor was included out of additional interest.  The two levels of distance were near 
and far.  Near faces were shown as +2 and -2, but far faces were shown as +4 and -4 in 
the training and study phases.  The three levels of exemplar type were prototype, seen, 
and unseen.  Prototype faces had features placed in the position that corresponded to 
the average of two exemplars shown of a given identity in training and study.  Seen 
faces were one of the two exemplars of an identity shown in training or study.  Unseen 
faces were one of the two non-average exemplars of an identity that were never shown 
in the training or study.  For example, if +2 and -2 were shown in the study phase, 
either -4 or +4 was shown as the unseen face in the test phase. 
 
Half of the 20 face identities were randomly assigned to be used as familiarized faces; 
the other half, as unfamiliar faces.  Familiarized faces were presented in an initial 
training phase as well as a separate study phase, whereas unfamiliar faces were not 
presented until the study phase of the experiment.  Half of both the familiarized and 
unfamiliar face identities were assigned to the near condition; the other half, to the far 
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condition.  Exemplars of near faces were more similar, or “near”, to one another and 
were shown as +2 and -2 versions in the training and study.  Far faces were shown as 
+4 and -4 versions. 
 
In addition to the 20 critical identities, six filler identities were created in a  
similar manner without adjusting the configuration from the starting position.  Thus, 
no additional variants were made on these identities; just the zero version was used.  
The fillers were used so that participants would not notice that there was anything 
“strange” about the shifted faces that were seen in the study phase and reject the 
prototype at test merely on the basis that it looked more normal than anything seen in 
the study phase. 
 
Recognition memory performance was measured by recognition confidence ratings 
collected during the test phase.  A 10 point Likert-type scale (1= definitely never seen 
before, 10= definitely seen before) was used to assess how sure participants were that 
each exemplar had been shown previously in the study or training phases.  
Importantly, judgments were made about the particular image rather than the person‟s 
face in general.  Prototype effects were calculated by subtracting ratings of seen faces 
from those of prototype faces. 
 
Programming and Counterbalancing. 
The particular identities allocated to the familiarized, unfamiliar, near and far 
conditions were rotated, so that across participants all faces served in all conditions of 
the experiment.  The series of faces prepared for the training and study phases were 
divided into two halves.  The first half contained one exemplar of each identity; the 
second half contained the other exemplar.  This was done to reduce the chance that 
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two exemplars of the same identity would be shown consecutively within the series.  
Each half of the training and study series contained an equal number of plus (+2 or +4) 
and minus (-2 or -4) faces.  Order of presentation of the two halves was randomized as 
was the order of exemplars within each half.  Three of the six filler items were 
randomly assigned to each half of the study phase as well. 
 
The series of faces for the test phase was prepared by selecting three exemplars of 
each of the 20 identities.  The prototype (0) face was always one of the three of each 
identity.  The remaining two were either -2 and +4, OR +2 and -4.  Half of the 
identities at test used -2, +4, and half used +2, -4, and the particular identities used 
were counterbalanced across participants.  Order of presentation during the test phase 
was randomized for each participant. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was divided into three separate phases: the training phase, the study 
phase, and the test phase. 
 
1. Training. 
In the training phase, all 10 of the identities selected to be familiarized were presented 
one at a time for 4 s.  Two exemplars of each identity (+2/-2, or +4/-4) were presented 
four times each over four blocks.  For each block, participants were asked to rate each 
instance on a different attribute: intelligence, confidence, honesty, and attractiveness 
respectively, as part of an incidental learning task.  All images were presented for 4 s 
each.  After 4 s, the face was replaced with a white screen containing a prompt 
message.  The message reminded participants of what they were rating and instructed 
them to enter a response.  Participants could not respond until the prompt screen was 
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displayed.  The next trial began immediately after a response key was pressed. 
 
2. Study. 
In the study phase, all 10 of the identities selected to be unfamiliar were presented in 
addition to the same 10 familiarized face identities presented in the training phase.  
Again, two exemplars (+2/-2, +4-4) of each identity were presented.  Also included in 
the series were six filler faces.  Each exemplar was presented only once, and 
participants tried to guess its perceived age.  All faces were presented one at a time for 
4 s each, and responses were entered when a prompt screen replaced the face as in the 
training phase. 
 
3. Test phase. 
In the test phase, 10 familiarized and 10 unfamiliar face identities were presented one 
at a time.  For each familiarized and unfamiliar face, one seen and one unseen 
exemplar were presented (e.g. -2/+4 OR +2/-4) as well as the unseen prototype (0) for 
each identity.  Thus in total, 60 images were presented as test items (20 identities x 3 
exemplar types).  Participants were asked to judge how sure they were that each image 
was exactly the same as one they had seen in the study phase by rating each test face 
on a 10 point Likert-type scale (1=definitely never seen before, 10=definitely seen 
before) by pushing the appropriate number key on the keyboard.  Faces remained on 
the screen until a key was pressed to enter a response.  There was an intertrial interval 
(ITI) of 500 ms during which a blank white screen was displayed.  Participants were 
informed that no entirely new people‟s faces would be presented in the test phase.  
Rather, all faces would belong to people shown in the study phase, but some of the 
images would be identical and some slightly different to the particular images 
presented in the study phase.   
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Results 
Main Analyses 
Mean ratings given to the test faces in each of the experimental conditions are shown 
in Figure 2.2.  A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to analyze whether the 
factors familiarity, distance, and exemplar type had any influence on recognition 
ratings.  The type I error rate was set at .05 for all analyses in all experiments. 
 
Figure 2.2. Mean recognition confidence ratings (1=definitely never seen before, 
10=definitely seen before) of prototype, seen, and unseen exemplar types across levels 
of familiarity and distance between studied exemplars in Experiment 1.  Error bars 
represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
There was a main effect of familiarity on ratings, F(1,23)= 62.01, MSE= 4.91, p<.001.  
As one would expect, familiarized faces (M=7.65, SD=1.23) were rated significantly 
higher than unfamiliar faces (M=5.60, SD=1.48).  There was no main effect of 
distance, F < 1.  Near faces were rated equally as high as far faces.  The main effect of 
exemplar type was significant, F(2,46)= 15.02, MSE= 1.52, p<.001.  Mean confidence 
ratings (with standard deviations in parentheses) for prototype, seen, and unseen 
exemplars were 7.12 (1.21), 6.57 (1.37), and 6.17 (1.34) respectively.  Post hoc paired-
samples t tests using a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons confirmed that 
prototypes were rated significantly higher than seen exemplars which were rated 
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significantly higher than unseen exemplars (see Table A1 in Appendix A for exact 
statistics). 
 
There were two significant interactions.  The first was a Distance x Exemplar Type 
interaction, F(2,46)= 15.62, MSE= 1.01, p<.001.  As can be seen in Figure 2.3, 
although prototypes were rated highest at both levels of distance, seen exemplars were 
rated higher than unseen exemplars for near faces, but the opposite was observed for 
far faces.  This may seem surprising, but as will be discussed later, it is likely because 
unseen fars were closer to the prototype than seen fars.  Post hoc paired-samples t tests 
(on all possible pair-wise comparisons) detected two significant differences among 
exemplar types in the near condition but none in the far condition after Bonferroni 
adjustment.  In the near condition, the unseen exemplar was rated significantly lower 
than the prototype, t(23)=4.85, SD=1.65, p=.001, and the seen exemplar, t(23)=4.25, 
SD=1.31, p=.004.  Post hoc comparisons also confirmed that unseen exemplars were 
rated significantly higher in the far condition compared to the near condition, 
t(23)=3.70, SD=1.35, p=.018. 
4
5
6
7
8
Prototype Seen Unseen
Exemplar Type
R
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
 R
a
ti
n
g
Near
Far
 
Figure 2.3.  Mean recognition confidence ratings of prototype, seen, and unseen 
exemplar types across levels distance (near and far) between studied exemplars in 
Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
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The second interaction was the three-way among familiarity, distance, and exemplar 
type, F(2,46)= 3.32, MSE= 0.46, p=.045.  This interaction was due to a smaller rise in 
recognition ratings for familiarized over unfamiliar faces specifically when a face was 
unseen and near.  In other words, the familiarity training raised ratings by 
approximately equal amounts for all exemplar types across both levels of distances 
with the only exception being unseen near faces which received less of an increase.  
Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests (on all possible pair-wise comparisons) 
confirmed that ratings were significantly higher after familiarization training in all 
conditions except when the face was unseen and near.  All interactions not mentioned 
were non-significant (p> .05). 
 
Analysis of Prototype Effects 
An additional repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare just the 
prototypes with seen exemplars (ignoring the unseen condition) across all levels of 
familiarity and distance.  This analysis directly tests the experimental hypothesis that 
familiarity will increase the strength of the prototype effect (defined here as prototype 
– seen).  Furthermore, if any of the interactions revealed by the main ANOVA were 
modulating the prototype effect, dropping the unseen condition from the analysis will 
provide a more sensitive and direct means of assessing this possibility.   
 
There was a main effect of familiarity in the expected direction, F(1,23)= 63.21, 
MSE= 3.59, p<.001.  There was a main effect of distance, F(1,23)=7.75, MSE=0.92, 
p=.01.  Near faces (M=7.05, SD=1.21) were rated higher than far faces (M=6.66, 
SD=1.31).  The main effect of exemplar type was also significant, F(1,23)= 15.02, 
MSE= 1.52, p<.01.  Prototypes were rated higher than seen exemplars.  Most 
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importantly, there were no significant interactions (all p‟s> .4).  The strength of the 
prototype effect was unaffected by familiarization or distance (i.e. similarity) of 
exemplars in the learning phase as manipulated in this experiment. 
 
Discussion 
Results of Experiment 1 revealed an advantage for recognizing the average picture of 
a given person‟s face over an actually seen picture of that same person.  This prototype 
effect was observed both when participants had only minimal exposure to a person‟s 
face and when they received addition familiarity training beforehand.  The prototype 
effect was also demonstrated at both levels of exemplar similarity (near and far).  
However, the magnitude of the prototype effect was not influenced by either 
familiarity or the distance between studied exemplars.  Recognition ratings of 
prototypes received just as much of a boost from the familiarity training as the actually 
seen exemplars did. 
 
Thus, the prediction that the strength of the prototype effect would be stronger for 
newly familiarized faces compared to the unfamiliar faces was not supported.  This 
prediction was based on two key assumptions.  The first was that different exemplars 
are more likely to be attributed to the same individual if that individual is familiar to 
the viewer.  The second was that there is a mechanism that averages information 
across exemplars belonging to the same identity but not between different identities.  
Why then did the results fail to show an effect of familiarization training on magnitude 
of the prototype effect?  Perhaps the two exemplars of each identity looked so similar 
to one another that they would be treated as the same individual even without any 
previous exposure or familiarization.  Familiarity might have greatest impact on the 
prototype effect when exemplars are maximally dissimilar while still being similar 
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enough to be treated as the same person‟s face.  The lack of effect of distance on the 
strength of the prototype effect is inconsistent with this idea.  However, the unseen 
exemplars of far faces were within the range of the seen exemplars whereas the unseen 
exemplars of near faces were outside the range of the seen exemplars.  This makes it 
difficult to compare prototype effects between near and far faces because participants 
responded quite differently to the seen and unseen exemplars depending on whether 
the exemplars shown in the study phase were near or far. 
 
It is important to consider the possibility that identities are not stored as prototypes 
produced by a mechanism that averages exemplar representations of the same person‟s 
face.  Since the prediction that familiarity would increase the prototype effect was 
based on the assumption that prototypes were abstracted during the study phase, this 
may be why the prediction failed.  Could the lack of effect of familiarity be explained 
by any other perspectives on the nature of memory representation?  The simplest 
conception of human memory is that we store and retrieve information about each 
exemplar separately (i.e. a nearest neighbour model).  This type of simple model 
would not predict additional familiarity to increase prototype effects.  In fact, it would 
make the opposite prediction.  Namely, that the more exposure one has to the 
individual exemplars, the less likely one is to believe having seen the unseen prototype 
compared to one of the actually seen exemplars.  However, the simple model would 
predict actually seen exemplars to be better recognized than an unseen prototype at all 
levels of familiarity.  Bruce et al. (1991) found some evidence that unintentional 
learning during the study phase yielded stronger prototype effects than intentional 
learning.  Perhaps consciously trying to remember and distinguish each exemplar 
reduces the likelihood of exemplars being lumped together and being incorporated into 
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a single average representation.  It would be interesting to know whether participants 
are even capable of selectively recognizing the exemplars that were actually studied.  
To examine this, Experiment 2 was conducted which was the same as Experiment 1 
except that participants were told to try to remember exactly the way each picture of 
each face looked while they completed the familiarity training and study phases. 
 
Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test whether participants would still give higher 
recognition ratings to the unseen prototype compared to a seen exemplar even after an 
extended learning phase requiring intentional memorization of each exemplar.  If 
participants really are capable of selectively recognizing the specific seen exemplars, 
then they should give higher recognition ratings to seen exemplars than to prototypes.  
On the other hand, prototype abstraction may occur whenever two exemplars of the 
same face are shown despite the efforts of participants to store and retrieve exemplars 
separately. 
 
To relate back to the rationale proposed in Experiment 1, if the mind stores facial 
information pertaining to identity by averaging exemplars of the same face, then 
intentionally trying to remember each exemplar as a separate entity will lead to 
reduced prototype effects (compared to incidental learning) to the extent that intention 
is capable of interfering with the averaging process.  With additional learning, 
participants should be better able to differentiate the exemplars and build separate 
representations for each of them. 
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Experiment 1 found that additional learning did not help participants to reject the 
unseen prototype as having been one of the pictures seen before.  However, if 
participants were using the additional learning trials to try to distinguish between 
exemplars of the same face, then familiarization might affect the strength of the 
prototype effect.  In Experiment 2, by using an intentional learning task and providing 
an additional training phase, we aimed to give participants a much better chance of 
selectively recognizing the actually seen exemplars than the incidental task in 
Experiment 1 provided.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 24 University of Victoria undergraduates enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course.  Participants received extra credit points in their class for their 
participation.  Participants were tested in a single session lasting approximately 25 
min. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1 except 4 more identity sets were constructed 
thus upping the total number of different face identities to 24. 
 
Programming and Counterbalancing. 
The same procedures were used as in Experiment 1 except that the order of the 
prototype, seen, and unseen exemplar of each identity at test was counterbalanced 
across participants, so it would be possible to check if recognition ratings to faces 
were influenced by earlier variants of those faces presented earlier in the test phase.   
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Equipment. 
Same as in Experiment 1 
 
Design 
The design was the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
Each session was conducted as in Experiment 1 except participants were informed at 
the start of the experiment that there would be a subsequent recognition memory test 
for the faces they were about to see.  The structure of the identity series and the nature 
of the recognition rating task were fully explained beforehand.  Participants were 
shown an example of an identity series that was not shown in the actual experiment.  
Also, this time there were 12 and 24 different identities presented in training and study 
phases respectively.  The test phase contained a total of 72 trials (24 different 
identities x 3 different versions). 
Results 
Main Analyses 
Mean ratings given to the test faces in each of the experimental conditions are shown 
in Figure 2.4.  Recognition ratings were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA 
which included the factors familiarity, distance, and exemplar type. 
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Figure 2.4.  Mean recognition confidence ratings (1=definitely never seen before, 
10=definitely seen before) of prototype, seen, and unseen exemplar types across levels 
of familiarity and distance between studied exemplars in Experiment 2.  Error bars 
represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
There was a main effect of familiarity on ratings, F(1,23)= 175.98, MSE= 3.50, 
p<.001.  As expected, participants gave higher recognition ratings to familiarized faces 
(M=7.64, SD=1.09) compared to unfamiliar faces (M=4.72, SD=0.82).  The main 
effect of exemplar type was significant, F(2,46)= 21.71, MSE= 1.12, p<.001.  Means 
(with standard deviations in parentheses) for prototype, seen, and unseen exemplars 
were 6.69 (0.74), 6.18 (0.78), and 5.68 (1.14) respectively.  Bonferroni paired-samples 
t tests indicated that prototypes were rated higher than seen exemplars which were 
rated higher than unseen exemplars (see Table A2 in Appendix A for exact statistics).  
There was a nonsignificant trend of distance, p=.10.  Overall, faces studied as a pair of 
far exemplars were rated slightly higher than those studied as a pair of near exemplars. 
 
Two interactions reached statistical significance.  The Familiarity x Exemplar Type 
interaction that was only a non-significant trend in Experiment 1 was significant in the 
current experiment, F(2,46)= 3.40, MSE= 0.82, p=.02.  As can be seen in Figure 2.5, 
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familiarity training increased ratings to prototypes and seen exemplars by similar 
amounts, but had less of an impact on unseen exemplars.  Bonferroni paired-samples t 
tests on the difference scores between levels of familiarity (familiarized – unfamiliar) 
revealed that the familiarity difference was greater for prototypes than unseen 
exemplars, t(23)= 3.64, SD= 1.21, p=.007.  The difference between levels of 
familiarity was also slightly greater for seen faces compared to unseen faces although 
this difference did not approach significance, p=.195.  Prototypes and seen exemplars 
did not differ from one another in terms of the difference between levels of familiarity. 
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Figure 2.5. Mean recognition confidence ratings of prototype, seen, and unseen 
exemplars in Experiment 2 comparing faces that had been part of the familiarization 
training to those that had not.  Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence 
intervals. 
There was also an interaction between distance and exemplar type, F(2,46)= 22.01, 
MSE= 1.17, p<.001.  Like Experiment 1, the general pattern was that unseen 
exemplars were the lowest rated type of exemplar in the near condition, but seen 
exemplars were the lowest rated in the far condition.  Bonferroni post hoc paired-
samples t tests confirmed that unseen exemplars were rated lower than prototypes and 
seen exemplars in the near condition (see Table A3 in Appendix A for exact statistics).  
However, the differences among exemplar types in the far condition were not 
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significant after adjustment for multiple comparisons.  The Bonferroni comparisons 
also indicated that unseen exemplars were rated lower in the near condition than the 
far condition, t(23)=4.87, SD=1.47, p=.001. 
 
Analysis of Prototype Effects 
As in Experiment 1, an additional repeated measures ANOVA was ran to further 
examine the effects of familiarity and distance on the strength of the prototype effect 
(ignoring the unseen condition).  The main effect of familiarity was significant and in 
the expected direction, F(1,23)= 179.46, MSE= 2.62, p<.001.  The main effect of 
distance just missed significance, F(1,23)=4.07, MSE=1.18, p=.056.  Near faces 
(M=6.59, SD=0.68) tended to be rated higher than far faces (M=6.27, SD=0.88).  The 
main effect of exemplar type was significant, F(1,23)= 15.37, MSE= 0.82, p<.001.  
Prototypes were rated higher than seen exemplars.  Importantly, no interactions 
approached significance (all p‟s> .2).  Thus, the two-way interactions of exemplar type 
with familiarity and with distance in the main analysis were primarily driven by 
ratings made to unseen exemplars and had no reliable influence on the ratings of 
prototypes relative to seen exemplars.   
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, participants were unable to reject the unseen prototype even if they 
tried to memorize each of the exemplar images in the study phase in exact detail.  
Furthermore, even after a familiarization training, they still could not learn to reject 
the prototype face.  However, the strength of the prototype effect was unaffected by 
whether the face was part of the familiarization training or not.   
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In fact, just as in Experiment 1, participants were actually worse at correctly rejecting 
the unseen prototype as one of the seen exemplars from the study phase after 
familiarization training on that identity.  Familiarization training had the effect of 
raising recognition ratings to all versions of a given identity (i.e. prototype, seen 
exemplar, unseen exemplar).  This is perhaps surprising considering participants were 
made fully aware of the way exemplars of the same identity would vary (internal 
features shifted up or down), and they were also warned a prototype exemplar might 
be shown later during the recognition test.  One might argue that participants were 
simply unable to distinguish the prototype from one of its seen exemplars because the 
difference between the images was too subtle to be detectable.  However, the 
recognition rating data suggest otherwise.  Participants reported being more confident 
of having studied the prototype image compared to an actually seen exemplar, so it 
was not the case that participants were insensitive to the differences produced by this 
method of image manipulation. 
 
Even the unseen exemplar was more confidently rated as having been seen before after 
familiarization.  Although familiarization raised recognition ratings more for 
prototypes and seen exemplars compared to unseen (near) exemplars, I did not expect 
additional learning from the familiarization training to make participants worse at 
correctly rejecting unseen exemplars falling outside the range of variation of the 
studied pair of exemplars of the same identity. 
 
Since intentional learning still produced prototype effects comparable to those in 
Experiment 1, it is possible that if an averaging mechanism was underlying the 
observed pattern of results, this mechanism may be driven largely by the visual 
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similarity of exemplars.  Put simply, the system will average together any two 
exemplars that look similar even if the viewer attempts to retain a distinct 
representation for each.  This may not be the case if exemplars are learned by a 
different method like categorization training with feedback.  Obviously categorical 
influences must play some role in an abstraction mechanism for prototype formation to 
be a plausible account of face recognition.  Otherwise, it would not be possible to 
eventually learn to tell identical twins apart.  This raises two important questions 
leading from the results of Experiments 1 and 2.  First, if participants are given 
categorical training with feedback to help them build separate representations of two 
similar exemplars, will they still recognize the prototype more confidently?  This 
question will be addressed later in Chapter 3.  Second, was the degree of learning in 
the familiarization training sufficient to produce an observable change in the 
magnitude of the prototype effect?  This question was the focus of the next 
experiment. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 had a straightforward purpose.  If the familiarization training in 
Experiments 1 and 2 had no effect on the prototype effect, then was this because it was 
not a strong enough manipulation of familiarity?  Even though, in the previous 
experiments, the number of exposures to familiarized faces was 4 times that of the 
unfamiliar faces, participants still may have treated them similarly to the unfamiliar 
faces.  Perhaps learning in the familiarization phase could still have been considered 
minimal.  In Experiment 3, the amount of familiarization training that participants 
received was doubled.  
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Method 
Participants  
Participants were 24 University of Victoria undergraduates enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course.  Participants received extra credit points in their class for their 
participation.  It took participants approximately 40 min to complete the experiment. 
 
Materials and Apparatus  
Stimuli. 
Same as in Experiment 2 
 
Equipment. 
Same as in Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Design 
Design was the same as in Experiment 2.  However, to be clear, note that the 
exemplars in the familiarization training were presented eight times each rather than 
four times each as in Experiment 2.  Also, the current experiment used an incidental 
learning procedure as in Experiment 1 rather than an intentional learning procedure as 
in Experiment 2. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was kept almost identical to that in Experiment 1.  There were only two 
differences.  The familiarization training was doubled and four more identities were 
added to the stimulus set (two familiarized and two unfamiliar).   
 
In addition to rating each instance on intelligence, confidence, honesty, and 
attractiveness, participants also rated how responsible, playful, kind, and sociable they 
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thought each person in the training phase looked.  Thus, the familiarization training 
was extended from four blocks of trials in Experiment 1 to eight blocks (Experiment 
3).  As before, each identity was depicted by exactly two different exemplars, and each 
of these exemplar pairs was only presented once per block. 
 
As a reminder, the task at test was to rate the familiarity of each image of each face 
based on how sure you are that the same exact image had been presented in the study 
phase.  The rating was from 1-10 (1=sure new, 10=sure old).  One small detail differed 
from Experiment 1 in the way the instructions at test were explained to participants.  
During the test instructions of Experiment 3, participants were shown an example face 
as a +2 and -2 exemplar.  Next, they saw all five variants of that identity on the same 
screen, in order, from -4 to +4.  They were told that if they actually had seen this 
person‟s face in the study phase (which they had not), in the test phase, they should 
only give high ratings to exemplars which were identical to the ones seen in the study 
phase (+2 and -2 in this example).  If a -4, 0, or +4 exemplar is shown in the next 
phase, and you are absolutely certain you saw this person‟s face before, you should, 
despite this, rate the face low if you think the particular image of this person looks 
slightly different than before.  The example was explained to participants one more 
time assuming they had seen the +4 and -4 exemplars in the study phase.  The example 
face was added to the test instructions to make them aware of how slight the 
differences might be among exemplars of the same face. 
 
A summary of the number of presentations in each phase may be helpful since the 
number of identities was increased from 20 (Experiment 1) to 24 (Experiment 3).  In 
the training, 12 identities were shown as exemplar pairs.  Each member of the pair was 
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presented eight times each throughout the training.  The study phase contained the 12 
identities from the training phase plus 12 unfamiliar identities.  Exemplar pairs were 
presented once each in the study phase.  In the test phase, 24 identities were presented.  
Each identity was presented once as the unseen prototype, once as the seen exemplar, 
and once as the unseen exemplar. 
 
Results 
Main Analyses 
Mean ratings given to the test faces in each of the experimental conditions are shown 
in Figure 2.6.  A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to analyze whether the 
factors familiarity, distance, and exemplar type had any influence on recognition 
ratings. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Mean recognition confidence ratings (1=definitely never seen before, 
10=definitely seen before) of prototype, seen, and unseen exemplar types across levels 
of familiarity and distance between studied exemplars in Experiment 3.  Error bars 
represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
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There was a main effect of familiarity on ratings, F(1,23)= 218.41, MSE= 2.82, 
p<.001.  As expected, familiarized faces were rated significantly higher than 
unfamiliar faces.  There was no main effect of distance, F > 1.  Near faces were rated 
as high as far faces.  There was a main effect of exemplar type, F(2,46)= 17.02, MSE= 
0.52, p<.001.  Mean confidence ratings (with standard deviations in parentheses) for 
prototype, seen, and unseen exemplars were 6.61 (0.94), 6.28 (1.13), and 6.01 (1.25) 
respectively.  Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons revealed that prototypes were rated 
higher than seen exemplars, t(23)=3.20, SD= 0.52, p= .012.  Seen exemplars were, in 
turn, rated higher than unseen exemplars, t(23)= 2.62, SD= 0.51, p=.046. 
 
There was one significant interaction.  Distance interacted with exemplar type, 
F(2,46)= 15.18, MSE= 0.65, p<.001.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, prototype faces were 
rated highest at both levels of distance.  However, seen faces were rated higher than 
unseen faces when they were near, but the reverse was true when they were far.  
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons found that ratings to prototypes did not differ across 
levels of distance, t>1; but seen exemplars were rated significantly higher in the near 
condition than the far condition, t(23)=2.73, SD=0.90, p=.036; and unseen exemplars 
were rated significant higher in the far condition than in the near condition, t(23)=3.54, 
SD=1.07, p=.006. 
 
There was also a trend towards the three-way interaction, Familiarity x Distance x 
Type, p=.074.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, this was mainly due to the unseen near 
faces receiving less of a recognition ratings boost compared to all other conditions. 
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Analysis of Prototype Effects 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, an additional repeated measures ANOVA was ran which 
further examined the effects of familiarity and distance on the strength of the 
prototype effect (ignoring the unseen condition).  The main effect of familiarity was 
significant and in the expected direction, F(1,23)= 214.50, MSE= 2.03, p<.001.  The 
main effect of exemplar type was significant, F(1,23)= 10.25, MSE= 0.54, p<.01.  The 
main effect of distance was observed only as a trend, F(1,23)=2.51, MSE=1.08, p=.13.  
However, the main effects of distance and exemplar type were qualified by a two-way 
interaction, F(1,23)= 6.56, MSE= 0.52, p=.02.  Although prototypes were rated higher 
than seen exemplars overall, this difference was clearer for far faces than for near 
faces.  Bonferroni post hoc paired samples t-tests revealed that the prototype effect 
was significant in the far condition, t(23)=3.83, SD=0.77, p=.005, but not in the near 
condition. 
 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment were highly consistent with those of Experiments 1 and 
2.  Overall, participants were more confident about having seen the unseen prototype 
in the earlier study phase compared to the exemplars they really did see in the study 
phase.  The magnitude of the prototype effect was not influenced by the amount of 
familiarization training in the learning phase.  However, similarity (i.e. distance) of 
exemplar pairs in the learning phase did influence the strength of the prototype effect, 
and this will be returned to later in the discussion. 
 
The main purpose of this experiment was to probe for differences in the strength of the 
prototype effect due to the level of familiarity training in the learning phase.  Since the 
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null effect of familiarity on the prototype effect found in Experiments 1 and 2 left 
open the possibility that the familiarity manipulation had not been strong enough, the 
amount of learning trials in the initial familiarity training phase was doubled in the 
current experiment.  By the end of the learning phase, each exemplar of a familiarized 
identity was presented nine times vs. only once for exemplars of an unfamiliar 
identity.  Although the familiarization training was effective at raising recognition 
confidence ratings, the increase in ratings was approximately equal for both prototype 
and seen exemplars.  Therefore, even when the familiarity training was doubled 
(relative to Experiments 1 and 2), it still made no difference to the magnitude of the 
prototype effect. 
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, the results of Experiment 3 indicated stronger prototype 
effects for faces learned in the far condition compared to the near condition.  The 
simplest explanation of this result is that seen near exemplars (+/-2) are recognized 
more confidently because they are more similar to the prototype (0) than seen far 
exemplars (+/-4).  Assuming a prototype model, participants would store an average 
representation of each identity during the learning phase which would correspond to 
the prototype (0) stimuli shown in the test phase.  Thus, being more similar to the 
stored prototype, the near (+/-2) faces were recognized more than the far (+/-4), but 
since the average value was 0 in both learning conditions, near and far prototypes (0) 
were recognized equally well.  What is left unexplained by this account is the reason 
why Experiments 1 and 2 did not show the same pattern of results. 
 
Further examination of the pattern of means suggests that distance had the general 
effect of increasing recognition ratings of prototype and seen exemplars in the near 
condition relative to the far condition.  The exception to this pattern is unfamiliar 
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prototypes which, in Experiment 3, showed a trend for lower ratings in the near 
condition relative to the far condition.  This trend may provide a clue because in 
Experiment 2, unfamiliar prototypes also did not show the basic near over far pattern.  
In Experiments 2 and 3, participants were shown example stimuli and informed how 
the seen exemplars would differ from the prototype and unseen exemplars (in 
Experiment 3, learning was incidental, but participants were fully informed about the 
nature of the test phase).  Being aware of how subtle the differences were among 
exemplars of the same face may have affected participants‟ confidence or perhaps how 
they used the ratings scale.  In fact, it is possible that the effect of distance on the 
prototype effect may be due to floor effects caused by the task instructions.  
Confidence of unfamiliar faces was at floor in all conditions except for +/-4 test faces 
which were rated with low confidence as having not been seen.  This account is 
consistent with the data across all three experiments.  Confidence ratings were higher 
in Experiment 1; thus, the prototype effect was not modulated by distance. 
 
The overall pattern of results of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 could be summarized as the 0 
(unshifted) images rated highest, followed by +2/-2 and +4/-4 respectively.  This 
pattern is what would be expected if participants were matching test items to stored 
prototype representations of each different face identity and not retaining the 
individual exemplars in memory. 
 
Chapter Discussion 
The experiments in the current chapter were designed to investigate whether the 
prototype effect in face recognition is affected by the level of familiarity participants 
have with the different face identities.  Experiments 1-3 tested this idea by giving 
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participants preexposure to half of the identities in an initial familiarization training 
phase before the study phase proper began.  In the study phase proper, the other half of 
the identities which had not been presented in the familiarization training were 
presented in addition to those that had just been familiarized.  At test, participants 
rated how sure they were that the image on the screen was identical to one of the 
studied images.  For each of the identities in the study phase, one seen exemplar, one 
unseen exemplar, and the unseen prototype were presented in the test phase.  Across 
three experiments, the level of familiarization did not alter how confident participants 
were that the unseen prototype had been presented in the study phase relative to one of 
the actually seen exemplars.  Thus, the prediction, based on a prototype account of 
memory, that the strength of the prototype effect would increase after additional 
familiarization was not supported. 
 
The main finding of Chapter 2 was that the prototype effect in face recognition is 
obtainable under conditions of both minimal and extended learning of identity 
exemplars.  Previous studies (Bruce et al., 1991; Cabeza et al., 1999) have found the 
prototype effect in face recognition under conditions of minimal learning, but none 
had tested whether the effect would still be present at higher levels of learning.  
Experiments 1-3 replicated the prototype effect found at low levels of learning and 
extended this finding to higher levels of learning.  So although it could not be 
concluded for certain whether learning or familiarity can influence the magnitude of 
the prototype effect, there was strong evidence that increased learning would not cause 
the prototype effect to disappear.   
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Why were the predicted results not obtained?  It was reasoned that familiarity would 
increase prototype effects because different exemplars are more likely to be attributed 
to the same individual if the viewer is familiar with that person‟s face.  If there is a 
mechanism that averages different exemplars of the same individual, then this 
mechanism will be more likely to combine different exemplars of a familiar face 
compared to a less familiar face because those exemplars are more likely to be 
perceived as the same identity.  Perhaps this prediction failed because identity 
information was highly consistent among exemplars of the same face.  Thus, an 
additional training phase did not increase the likelihood that participants would treat 
the two exemplars as belonging to the same person‟s face because it was obvious even 
on the first presentation. 
 
It is difficult to ascertain how well the pattern of results found in Chapter 2 generalizes 
to other circumstances.  The current findings may have been dependent on the way the 
identity variants were constructed and the task at test.  Using an internal feature shift 
manipulation to create different exemplars based on the same face identity had a few 
notable consequences.  First, the external features of the face were held constant 
among exemplars of the same identity.  Since external features, especially hairstyle, 
are important to recognizing unfamiliar faces (Bonner, Burton, & Bruce, 2003), 
prototypes, seen, and unseen exemplars all contained a lot of unaltered information 
that would support recognition.  Even the internal features, and the spatial relations 
among them, were identical across all exemplars (including prototypes) of the same 
identity.  It was only the vertical positioning of the internal features, moved as a unit, 
on the face shape that differentiated same-face exemplars.  If the mechanism 
underlying the prototype effect relies on a signal that two exemplars are the same 
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person‟s face, then it may have been important that the facial features of different 
exemplars of the same identity were identical.  Perhaps this made it easier for 
prototype formation to occur or for both studied exemplars to be retrieved together 
regardless of which image of a particular face was presented in the test phase.  It is 
possible that additional learning in the training phase may produce a different pattern 
of results if exemplars of the same face vary subtly and smoothly in both texture and 
shape information. 
 
Because images of the same identity all had the same internal and external features, all 
test images will probably engender a feeling of familiarity to some extent.  
Furthermore, participants were told that there would be no new people‟s faces in the 
test phase, only new images of the same people seen in the study phase.  If all test 
images belonging to the same identity looked so similar to one another, how could 
participants be sure of which images were exactly the same as in the study phase and 
which ones were not?  The results indicate that they could not.  Participants 
confidently rejected neither the unseen prototype nor even the unseen exemplar.  The 
sense of general familiarity participants got from the images shown at test might have 
influenced participants‟ ratings of confidence at least to some extent.  Participants 
could not rely on successful retrieval of a memory of a prior occurrence of an 
exemplar as an indication that the test image was indeed one of the studied images 
because there was no way to know that the test image was truly identical or just too 
similar to be distinguished.  Thus, they fell back on a subjective evaluation of how 
familiar each face seemed to them.  As more average looking faces tend to be judged 
higher in terms of their subjective familiarity (Bartlett, Hurry, & Thorley, 1984), to the 
extent that the prototypes were perceived as more typical, they may have been at an 
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advantage in this type of task.  Bruce et al. (1991) pointed out that the default 
unshifted zero position of the facial features may give an appearance that is more 
typical within faces of the general population.  Thus, it is possible that the prototype 
effects observed in Experiments 1-3 were partially due to the tendency of prototype 
faces to be slightly more typical looking.   
 
However, there is evidence that the prototype effect in face recognition cannot be 
explained merely as a consequence of face typicality.  Bruce et al. (1991, Experiment 
4) attempted to rule out the confound of typicality by shifting the internal features of 
the faces down from the default position (0) in steps of 3 pixels.  In the study phase, 
participants saw the -3, -6, -12, and -15 shifted exemplars of each face identity.  At 
test, participants made a forced choice between the unseen -9 and the unseen 0 
versions belonging to the same person‟s face.  Participants chose the -9 prototype 82% 
of the time.  In two other experiments (Experiments 7 and 8), Bruce et al. also ruled 
out the possibility that participants were responding to the average configuration of all 
faces in the experimental set.  They presented three types of identity sets.  In the study 
phase, the “up” set showed +3, +6, +12, and +15, and the “down” set showed -3, -6, -
12, and -15.  The third type of set was the “bimodal” set.  It showed +9, +9, -9, -9.  
The prototype configuration of entire set of faces was still 0; however, only faces in 
the bimodal condition also had an identity prototype of 0.  Faces in the up and down 
conditions had identity prototypes of +9 and -9 respectively.  Each of the identities 
shown in the study phase was presented in the test phase as a -9, 0, and +9 at some 
point in the test series.  In general, participants rated +9, -9, and 0 faces highest in the 
up, down, and bimodal conditions respectively.  Thus, Bruce et al. showed evidence 
that participants were storing and accessing configural information specific to each of 
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the studied identities rather than relying on typicality or a global configural prototype 
to make their ratings.  Furthermore, it was the prototype of each identity that 
participants responded most strongly to rather than the most typical looking face or the 
average configuration of faces in the experimental set.  The results of their 
experiments provide persuasive evidence that the prototype effect in face recognition 
is observable even when the unseen prototype is not the most typical exemplar of an 
identity.   
 
It is possible that typicality may have a partial influence on participants‟ confidence 
ratings even if it is not the primary determinant.  In another study, not reported in the 
present work, I tested whether identities centred around the default unshifted (0) face 
would produce larger prototype effects than identities centred around prototypes that 
had been shifted up or down from the default position.  Half of the identities were left 
in the “normal” configuration as they were in Experiments 1-3.  The other half were 
made “extreme” by shifting all the variants in each identity set either up or down by 
four units of distance.  Thus, in the test phase, the internal facial features of half of the 
unseen prototypes were in the zero position, and half were in the +/-4 position.  The 
results showed nothing.  The only exception was a main effect of familiarity (used the 
same familiarization procedure as Experiment 1) which was unsurprising.  No 
prototype effects were found for identities in either the normal or extreme conditions.  
However, this experiment was also designed to test whether an identity-based face 
recognition task would produce a prototype effect.  Therefore, there were a number of 
differences between this unreported experiment and Experiments 1-3.  The task at test 
was different.  Rather than an image recognition confidence rating, a face/identity 
recognition confidence rating was used instead.  Although it was not expected to do so 
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(see Cabeza et al, 1999), judging the prior occurrence of an identity, rather than an 
image, may have affected the pattern of results.  While the role of the type of task at 
test will not be discussed any further in this chapter, the lack of prototype effects in 
this experiment may provide an important clue in interpreting the results of later 
experiments (Chapter 4) using a similar recognition task, and this point will be 
returned to in the General Discussion (Chapter 5).  Also, in order to avoid ceiling 
effects, the hair was cropped out of each image in the test phase.  Cropping may have 
affected the perception of the internal feature positioning since it shortened the 
distance from the internal features to the top of the face/head (cropping often removed 
a small part of the top of the forehead as well as the hair).  The nature of the 
recognition task also required a number of distractor faces to be used as well.  
Experiments 1-3 never included any novel identities in the test phase.  Because the 
normal faces did not replicate the prototype effects found in Experiments 1-3, the role 
of typicality in the earlier experiments could not be interpreted from the results of the 
experiment that was not reported.  Furthermore, since all typicality effects were null 
results anyway, the experiment was not reported as it did not provide any useful 
information.  However, in Chapter 3, experiments will be reported that used stimuli in 
which the prototype and seen exemplar did not systematically differ in terms of face 
typicality.  
 
One noteworthy finding from Experiments 1-3 was that not only were participants 
unable to correctly reject the unseen exemplar with even a moderate degree of 
confidence, but after familiarization training on a face, they were actually worse at 
doing so.  Although familiarization did increase participants‟ ability to discriminate 
seen from unseen exemplars (for unseen exemplars outside the range of the seen 
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exemplars), participants nevertheless became more confident that an unseen exemplar 
was one of the studied exemplars if the studied exemplars were shown more times 
during the learning phase compared to less times.  This suggests that participants were 
unable to ignore the familiarity of the identity even if the face was presented as an 
unseen exemplar.  
 
Since results of Experiments 1-3 all showed an interaction between the type of 
exemplar shown at test and the distance (of the internal feature position) between the 
pair of same-face exemplars learned at study, it is worthwhile to discuss what was 
causing this pattern to emerge.  First of all, remember that a near face was studied as 
+2 and -2 and a far face was studied as +4 and -4.  The unseen exemplar shown at test 
was always taken from the pair not seen in the study phase; thus, +/-2 for far faces and 
+/-4 for near faces.  Now the pattern was that seen exemplars were rated higher than 
unseen exemplars in the near condition, but the opposite was true in the far condition.  
Prototypes were rated higher than seen and unseen exemplars at both levels of 
distance.  Hence, the pattern of results could be expressed as: confidence ratings were 
highest in response to the average prototype of the two studied exemplars, and ratings 
decreased as similarity of the test image to the prototype decreased.  This finding is 
highly consistent with a pure prototype account of face recognition.  According to this 
account, only the prototype of an identity is stored in memory, and recognition is 
achieved by matching the probe exemplar to the different prototype representations.  
Recognition performance should increase as similarity between the probe and the 
closest stored prototype representation increases. 
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Alternatively, the higher similarity of the two studied near exemplars may have led to 
a higher net activation level because the seen exemplar would be a near perfect match 
to the stored trace of its presentation in the study phase, but also a moderate match to 
the other near exemplar.  All things being equal, in both distance conditions, the seen 
exemplar highly activates its own trace in memory; and thus, the only difference is 
how much additional activation will be received from the other studied exemplar of 
the same face.  Hence, a seen exemplar was rated higher if it was learned as a pair of 
near, rather than far, exemplars because it was more similar to, and thus more likely to 
recruit, the other studied exemplar of the same identity.  This is how an episodic 
model might account for the interaction between distance and exemplar type.  
 
One final remark will be made about the outcome of the experiments presented in this 
chapter.  It is clear that the familiarization training did increase recognition of the seen 
exemplars at least when measured by recognition confidence ratings.  It did not, 
however, increase how well the seen exemplars could be distinguished from other 
unseen exemplars most notably the prototype.  Because the prototype was rated higher 
than the seen exemplars, the possibility is ruled out that recognition ratings are driven 
by the degree of match between the probe image and the nearest exemplar stored in 
memory.  Likewise, there was no solid evidence that participants “built up” separate 
representations for each of the studied exemplars in the familiarization training.  That 
is at least in the sense that the representations of exemplar pairs seemed to generalize 
to unseen exemplars (including prototypes) equally well regardless of the level of 
familiarity despite the task being to recognize the precise image.  Thus, whether the 
combining happens during encoding or during retrieval, the traces of the two studied 
exemplars seem to be used together during the recognition process.  In conclusion, 
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there was no evidence to suggest that the familiarization training either encouraged or 
discouraged different exemplars of the same identity to be stored or retrieved 
separately.  Perhaps this is why it did not modulate the prototype effect.  If categorical 
learning could improve participants‟ ability to discriminate exemplars, would the 
prototype effect still be observed?  This is one of the questions explored in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3: The Role of Context and Identity 
Information in Prototype Formation 
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Chapter Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 3 was to identify and test an experimental manipulation which 
would predict different outcomes depending on the theoretical model being 
considered.  Episodic, or instance-based, models of memory were contrasted with 
prototype-based models.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the main difference between 
these two viewpoints is that in episodic models every experienced event is represented 
in memory by its own trace, whereas in prototype-based models, an average 
representation is abstracted during encoding and stored explicitly in memory.  Thus, a 
recognition advantage for a person‟s average face could be explained by the summed 
activation across episodic traces (e.g. Hintzman, 1986) or by its close correspondence 
to that face‟s prototype representation in memory.   
 
Differential support for either an episodic or prototype account of memory is 
notoriously difficult to obtain from experimental results.  Predictions based on these 
two accounts are almost always identical.  Although, it might be impossible to ever 
provide unequivocal evidence for or against prototype formation, obtaining a result 
that poses a serious challenge to either theoretical viewpoint is crucial to developing 
plausible models of memory.  To this end, in the experiments of this chapter, the 
context and identity information associated with a face during learning were 
manipulated.  Ascribing identity and applying context to the faces will affect how they 
are processed and therefore influence the strength of the prototype effect.  This will 
place constraints on how a plausible model of memory might operate. 
 
To understand how attaching names to faces might affect the internal representations 
we form, imagine meeting a pair of identical twins.  If you meet them separately, you 
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might never know they are actually different people and thus never learn to tell them 
apart.  However, given information about their identity, you can learn to distinguish 
them.  Until then, according to a prototype account, the faces of both twins might be 
represented by a single prototype face in memory.  To identify each twin accurately, 
one must build up a separate prototype representation for each of them.   
 
In contrast, an episodic account maintains that a memory trace is laid down for every 
experienced event, or episode, with either twin.  These traces will become activated if 
one of the twins is encountered.  If the viewer does not know they have been seeing 
twins, memory traces of both twins will likely be highly activated when recognizing 
either twin alone.  But if you are trying to learn to tell the twins apart, information of 
the identity of the twin will be stored as part of the episode of viewing their face.  This 
identity information will become activated when trying to recognize this twin in the 
future.  The basic idea is that viewing twin A should activate traces of twin A more 
than traces of twin B because twin A traces are, by and large, more similar to the 
current experience (i.e. the probe) with twin A.  For the sake of simplicity, let us 
assume the names of the twins are the only nonface identity related information 
relevant to the task of learning to tell the twins‟ faces apart.  Since activation of a 
memory trace activates all relevant information stored in the trace, the associated 
name of the face will become available as well.  Since traces with twin A‟s name will 
be more highly activated and thus contribute more to the retrieved content, the face 
will be identified as twin A.  Although to the extent that identity information is not 
important to the retrieval task, a probe image (e.g. an image of Twin A) may not 
selectively activate traces containing the same identity information whilst suppressing 
activation to traces containing conflicting identity information.  For example imagine 
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flipping through a photo album of a family with identical twin boys whom you are at 
least moderately familiar with.  Several photos were of the twin‟s most recent birthday 
party.  One photo showed Twin A‟s face as he blew out the candles on his cake.  On 
your next visit to the family‟s home, you notice a framed picture which you do not 
remember from your last visit.  You wonder if you have seen it before, so you go over 
to get a good look at the photograph it contains.  It was a photo of Twin B‟s face as he 
blew out his birthday candles, and you falsely recognize it as one of the photos you 
saw in the album.  Although you may have been able to correctly identify the twin in 
either photograph, when the task was image recognition, you failed because the probe 
image was being compared to how similar it was to previously seen photographs.  
Whereas, if the task was to verify the identity of the twin (“is this Twin A”), activation 
could be effectively restricted to traces of faces containing Twin A identity related 
information, and information specific to the particular image would become less 
important. 
 
To emphasize the differences between the prototype and episodic accounts, remember 
that the episodic account maintains that every experience is encoded and stored in 
memory, whereas the prototype account maintains that the central tendency alone is 
sufficient to represent a concept or category.  Furthermore, while an episodic model is 
capable of abstracting the central tendency of a category‟s members, this abstraction 
does not occur until the time of retrieval.  Abstraction in a prototype model always 
occurs at the time of encoding whenever an exemplar of that category is experienced.  
At the time of retrieval, an episodic model will activate all stored memory traces in 
parallel.  The strength of activation of each trace is dependent on its similarity to the 
stimulus probe.  In contrast, a prototype model would never involve mass parallel 
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activation because each of the representations stored in memory already reflects a 
number of past experiences, and the sole purpose of the abstraction mechanism is to 
differentiate faces on the basis of their identity. 
 
According to a prototype account, all learned categories are represented by their own 
prototype representation.  As applied to the case of face recognition, proponents of this 
account assert that if the system is operating as it should, a prototype representation 
should be abstracted across exemplars of the same person‟s face but not across 
exemplars of different people‟s faces (Bruce, 1994; Cabeza et al., 1999).  The 
assumption here is that facial identity is the relevant level of categorization for face 
recognition to operate on.  Although there may be other perceptual categories of faces 
represented by prototypes (e.g. gender, emotion, race etc.), they do not play a role in 
recognizing the identity of a person‟s face.  A standard prototype account would not 
allow for a representation of, say, John‟s face to be composed of a prototype of John‟s 
face looking happy and another prototype for John‟s face looking sad.  Although 
happy John and sad John are both valid categories, a prototyping system will only 
abstract a single “John” face, and this representation incorporates all instances of 
John‟s face regardless of emotional expression or any other contextual factor.  Having 
a prototypical happy John face stored in memory might potentially aid recognition of 
John‟s face when he happens to be smiling and in a good mood.  However, the task of 
face recognition is not to recognize and discriminate happy John from sad John; it is to 
recognize and distinguish any instance of John from any other person‟s face.  Since 
the human face recognition system has evolved to discriminate between different 
identities and generalize across instances of the same identity, identity is the 
predetermined level of categorization that abstraction operates on (although see Bruce 
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1994 for a discussion about the necessity of multiple prototypes representing different 
viewpoints of the same face in developing models of face recognition based on image 
averaging).  
 
In contrast, categories do not exist in memory outside of a context according to an 
episodic account.  Category knowledge comes into being at the time of retrieval and is 
constructed from the pool of episodic traces stored in memory.  The recognition probe 
event provides the context for retrieval.  This approach maintains that there is no need 
to specify in advance which categories will be helpful to represent in memory for later 
use.  If all experienced events are stored in memory, then category abstraction can 
occur anytime that category knowledge is needed.  After the abstracted information 
has been retrieved and used for some immediate purpose, the individual episodic 
traces are retained in memory and can be used again and again for many different 
purposes.  If the task is to recognize the face, an image of John‟s face will activate 
traces of episodes with similar looking faces primarily those of past experiences with 
John‟s face.  Although all traces in memory are presumed to be activated to some 
extent, the degree of activation of all but the most similar traces is thought to be 
negligible.  An aggregate representation is constructed reflecting the shared attributes 
of the highly activated traces.  This aggregate then functions as a prototype 
representation for comparison with the probe stimulus.  However, unlike a prototype, a 
representation of John‟s face in an episodic model of memory will be transient in the 
sense that it will be a little different each time it is retrieved because it must be 
constructed anew.  The precise image of John will affect how activated each trace 
becomes, and thus the ease of recognition.  Many other factors besides similarity to the 
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probe stimulus affect how strongly a trace is activated.  Recency, task demands, and 
contextual information are three of the most important. 
 
The experiments in this chapter explored how contextual information associated with a 
face might influence how it is learned, represented, and recognized.  The experiments 
were designed to make contrasting predictions depending on whether a prototype or 
episodic account of memory is assumed.  One key question raised in this chapter is 
whether identifying information like a person‟s name plays a special role in guiding 
the abstraction process, or whether it functions the same as other contextual 
information. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 tested whether contextual information has any effect on the strength of 
the prototype effect in face recognition.  Contextual information (as the term is used 
here) could refer to any type of information presented with a face that is not 
considered to be a face or part of a face.
3
  For example, the butcher‟s shop and the 
counter he stands behind provide a context for recognizing the butcher‟s face as does 
the smock he always wears while working.  Understanding the effect of context is an 
important step toward understanding how we represent faces because the role of 
contextual information in the face recognition process differs between prototype and 
episodic accounts of memory. 
 
                                                 
3
 Although it is possible that a face could serve as a type of associated context for another face if the 
two faces are seen together, I restricted the type of contexts under consideration to only include nonface 
contexts.  If a face is associated with another face it raises the concern that information from the two 
faces may be miscombined during encoding or retrieval especially if the two faces are similar (see 
Busey & Tunnicliff, 1999) or presented simultaneously (see Reinitz & Hannigan, 2001).  See the 
memory conjunction errors section in Chapter 1 for a discussion relating to this issue. 
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According to a prototype account of face recognition, an exemplar of a face is 
recognized by matching it to prototype representations stored in memory.  If the 
exemplar is similar enough to one of the stored prototypes, it will be recognized.  Note 
that this is purely a face to face comparison, and the derived similarity value does take 
into consideration how similar the current (i.e. probed) context is to contexts of 
previous encounters with that face.  Thus, in a prototype model of face recognition, 
identity prototypes are stored context-free. 
 
In contrast, in an episodic approach, context is important to face recognition.  Context 
is part of the event information stored in each episodic memory trace.  In the case of 
face recognition, each trace contains information about a face plus the context the face 
was seen in.  Context is also present in the retrieval probe.  Thus, the probe-trace 
similarity of both the face and the context determines the activation level of each trace 
(although similarity of the face information would be weighted more heavily than 
contextual information in determining the overall match).  Also, if a person‟s face has 
been learned in a fairly consistent context, the studied context can be retrieved from 
memory in response to a probe that does not contain the studied context.  Of course, 
seeing a face outside its normal context may make it slightly more difficult to 
recognize.  A close match between the face part of a trace and probe will produce 
enough activation to lead to successful recognition most of the time.  It is important to 
keep in mind that the saliency of an encoded context varies, and the effect of context is 
particularly dependent on the saliency of contextual information in the probe.   
 
In this experiment, contexts were applied to the faces during the learning phase as well 
as in the recognition test phase.  The applied contexts were drawings of cartoon 
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bodies.  The bodies were much smaller than the face images which gave the overall 
image a resemblance to a style of caricature art in which the subject‟s head is 
disproportionately large compared to his body.  The design is very similar to the basic 
design used by the experiments in Chapter 2.  This time, the participants learned four 
different face exemplars from each identity set.  Half the participants learned all four 
face exemplars of a given identity with the same body.  The other half of the 
participants learned two face exemplars with one body and the other two exemplars 
from the same identity set with another body.  
 
This design also manipulated whether a test face was presented with or without 
context at the time of retrieval.  Predictions vary depending on the details of the 
model, but if the abstracted prototype representation is stored context free, then the 
strength of the prototype effect should not be affected by a contextual manipulation.  
In contrast, an episodic model in which context is encoded in each episodic trace 
would predict a different pattern of results depending on the manipulated context.  In 
particular, episodic models would predict that prototype effects would be weaker when 
a face is learned in different contexts and one of those contexts is reinstated at the time 
of recognition compared to if no context was presented at test or if the face had always 
been learned with the same context.  Reinstating the context at test increases the 
amount of information contained in the probe that will be used to retrieve the 
corresponding information from similar traces stored in memory.  A trace that matches 
closely to the probe in terms of both the face and the context will be activated more 
when the context is well represented in the probe than when the probe contains very 
little contextual information.  The higher the total activation produced by all traces in 
memory, the more powerful the signal of familiarity will be in response to the probe.  
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Thus, when a seen exemplar is presented at test with its context reinstated, it should 
produce more activation than if context had not been reinstated.  Furthermore, 
recognition of a prototype probe, which relies on similarity to traces of multiple 
exemplars, will not benefit as much from context reinstatement if the face was learned 
with two different contexts because traces with a context that conflicts with the probe 
will be inhibited.   
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 48 University of Victoria undergraduates enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course.  Twenty-four participated in the consistent context group and 24 
participated in the inconsistent context group.  Participants received extra credit points 
toward their course grade as compensation for participating.  Each participant was 
tested individually and completed the experiment in a single session lasting 
approximately 25 min.  Participation was voluntary, and at the end of the session, 
participants were fully debriefed as to the purpose and theoretical basis of the 
experiment.   
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
The stimuli consisted of photographs of human faces and cartoon drawings of human 
bodies wearing clothes.  Displays were constructed by positioning the face just above 
the body centred on a white background.  Faces were 10 cm wide and 13 cm high with 
an image resolution of 28 pixels/cm. 
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All face stimuli were greyscale computer generated photographs of young adult faces.  
All face photographs were cropped within an oval frame that preserved internal facial 
features but blocked hair, ears, and neck.  An in house Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) generator program was used to generate the face photos to specification (See 
General Methods in Chapter 1 for a description of how the generator operates).  This 
method was used to generate 12 sets of face photographs; each set contained a 
collection of different variants around a central prototype.  The apparent gender of the 
generated faces was constrained by using components only from females for half of 
the face sets and only from males for the remaining sets.  
 
To generate each face set, an initial random face was generated by picking component 
values at random from within the normal range of the population of faces used to 
produce the model.  Despite this, faces were occasionally produced that looked 
abnormal, due to an unusual combination of parameters.  In that case, the program was 
simply rerun to generate a new set.  The variations, described in more detail below, 
were generated by adding random amounts to the image and shape parameter sets to 
give a direction of change, and then constraining the distance, as measured within the 
parameter space, to be fixed, to a value found by trial and error to give suitably 
different images. 
 
In the end, the generator produced a set of eight exemplars for each different face 
identity, collectively termed an identity set.  One exemplar, termed the prototype (P), 
was the average of all the other exemplars combined.  Two more exemplars, termed 
the local averages (L), were generated equal distances from P along a trajectory in 
opposite directions.  Another pair of exemplars, termed the seen instances (S), was 
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generated in a similar fashion around each L.  Thus, each of the two L‟s were the 
average of two S‟s, and P was the average of the two L‟s and at the same time was the 
average of the four S‟s.  Finally, two more exemplars were generated in opposite 
directions along a trajectory orthogonal to the first trajectory.  One of these two was 
selected to serve as an unseen instance (U), which was not the average of any of the 
other exemplars just described.  Even though only one U was included in the final set 
of stimuli, two were generated, so that if there were any oddities or artefacts in the 
appearance of the first face but not the second, the second face could be used as a 
replacement.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationships among the eight different 
exemplars for each identity set. 
Local Average A
Prototype
Local Average B
Unseen Instance
Seen A1 Seen A2
Seen B2Seen B1  
Figure 3.1. Relationships among the different exemplar types within a face identity 
set.  Arrows of the same colour represent changes of equal distance along a trajectory 
in PCA space.  The prototype is the global average of all exemplars in the set 
excluding the unseen instance.  The four seen instances shown in the study phase are 
labelled as A1, A2, B1, and B2.  Local averages A and B are the averages of the A and 
B pairs of seen instances respectively. 
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Context pictures consisted of scanned images of cartoon bodies taken from children‟s 
activity books.  Figure 3.2 shows two examples of a context body paired with a face.  
Twelve bodies were taken from the book Tracing Fun: Funny Faces and 12 more from 
the book How to Draw Cartoons.  All context bodies were black and white line 
drawings of human bodies wearing clothes from about the neck down.  Some of the 
cartoon bodies were wearing casual clothes, but many were wearing uniform or 
costume type clothes such as an American football uniform or a laboratory coat.  The 
scanned images were altered using Adobe Photoshop 6.0 to remove all heads, 
unwanted accessories, and imperfections.  Small changes needed to be made to a few 
of the images in order to create a set of half plausibly male and half plausibly female 
bodies.  Thus, half of the context bodies were assigned to be male and half to be 
female based on how “male” or “female” the body and clothes looked at my 
discretion. 
 
Figure 3.2.  Example male and female context bodies with their faces from 
Experiment 4. 
Equipment. 
All aspects of the experiment were conducted using a Hi-Grade Notino3600 windows 
lap top with a 14” monitor at 1024 x 768 resolution.  The program E-Studio from the 
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E-Prime software package (version 1.1) was used to control the presentation of stimuli 
and to record responses made using the laptop keyboard. 
 
Design 
The three independent variables in this experiment manipulated the context the face 
was shown with in the study phase, the context the face was shown with in the test 
phase, and the type of face exemplar shown in the test phase.  The context of the face 
in study was manipulated between groups, while the context and type of face shown at 
test were both within-subject variables.   
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two study context groups, either the 
consistent study context or the inconsistent study context group.  In the consistent 
study context group, participants saw all exemplars within each identity set with the 
same context body, context A, during the study phase.  In contrast, participants in the 
inconsistent study context group saw half (one pair) of the face exemplars with context 
body A, and the other half with context body B.  Put simply, in the consistent study 
context group, the same person‟s face was always presented in the same context, but in 
the inconsistent study context group, a person‟s face was shown in two different 
contexts- half the time in one, half the time in the other. 
 
In the test phase, four different types of face exemplars were shown from each identity 
set.  The four levels of face exemplar type were Prototype (P), Local Average (L), 
Seen Instance (S), and Unseen Instance (U).  Remember that P was the average of the 
four S faces and also the average of the two possible L faces.  It is also important to 
note that no P, L, or U items had been seen before in the study phase.  Only S 
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instances were identical to face photographs that were actually shown before in the 
study phase.   
 
There were three levels of test context: test context same, test context different, and 
test context none.  Test context same trials presented a face exemplar with the same 
context body it had been shown with before.  Test context different trials presented a 
face exemplar with a different context body than it had been shown with before.  
Finally, during test context none trials, the face exemplar was presented alone on the 
screen with no body to serve as a context.  In the test context different condition, the 
different context was always the body of a face from a different identity set shown in 
the study phase.  This meant that the context bodies presented in the test phase had all 
been seen before in the study phase, but only half of them were seen with the same 
face. 
 
Taken all together, the experiment used a 2 (Study Context) x 4 (Exemplar Type) x 3 
(Test Context) mixed factorial design with a total of 24 conditions.  Each participant 
contributed data to half of the conditions according to which context study group they 
were assigned to. 
 
Recognition memory performance was measured by recognition confidence ratings 
collected during the test phase.  A 9 point Likert-type scale (1=definitely never seen 
before, 9=definitely seen before) was used to assess how sure participants were that 
each exemplar had been shown previously in the study or training phases.  As in the 
other experiments reported thus far, judgments were made about the particular image 
rather than the identity of the person‟s face in general. 
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Counterbalancing. 
Each identity set was randomly paired with two context bodies (Contexts A and B) 
with the constraint that all three were of the same gender.  Gender of the face was 
always kept in equal numbers across all grouping of items for counterbalancing or 
other similar purposes described below. 
 
To reduce the likelihood of presenting exemplars of the same identity set 
consecutively in the study phase, four sublists were constructed such that each one 
contained exactly one of the four S faces from each identity set.  The order of the 
sublists within the series of study faces as a whole was random for each run of the 
series, as was the order of the S faces within each of the four sublists.   
 
In the test phase, the P face, one of the L, one of the S, and the U face were presented 
from each identity set.  Since there was only one P and one U face in each identity set, 
all participants saw the same ones.  Because there were two L and four S faces, one of 
each type was presented at random for each identity set and for each participant.  
Similarly, when Contexts A and B were both shown in the study phase, and the same 
context was to be presented in a test trial, either Context A or B was presented at 
random to each participant for P and U faces since there were two possible context 
bodies to choose from.  Order of the P, L, and S faces was counterbalanced such that 
the first, second, or third picture shown within an identity set was equally often a P, L, 
or S face.  The counterbalancing groups of faces were rotated across participants so 
that every possible ordering of P, L, and S could be shown of every identity set.  The 
list of test items was divided into three blocks: one block for the 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 3rd 
presentation of exemplars from the same identity set.  Since U faces acted more or less 
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as distractor items, the order of their presentation was only controlled such that there 
was an equal number of U faces presented in each of the three blocks, and groups of U 
faces were rotated around the three blocks across participants.  Test context was also 
counterbalanced such that each block of trials and each type of face (P, S, L, and U) 
contained an equal number of same, different, and no contexts.  Again, test context 
was counterbalanced across participants so that within each block every identity set 
could be shown in all possible combinations of face exemplar type and context. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to be in either the consistent or inconsistent study 
context group.  Participants sat at a comfortable distance, centred in front of a laptop.  
The following procedure was completed twice through by each participant.  The 
values reported below for both number of trials and item types are the totals across 
both runs of the experiments.  Six identity sets were used for the first run and a 
different six for the second run. 
 
Study phase. 
Participants were told that they would see a series of pictures of faces with cartoon 
bodies on the screen and that they were to rate each picture from 1(lowest) to 
9(highest) on different personality and perceptual characteristics.  Ratings could be 
based on information from both the face and clothes, but ratings could not be based 
solely on the clothes alone.  Participants were warned that they should try to remember 
how each picture looked because there would be a facial recognition test following the 
ratings task.  It was suggested to them that trying to remember the clothes might help 
them recognize the pictures of the faces later because some of the faces would be 
wearing the same clothes in the recognition test.  It was pointed out that no two 
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different people would be shown wearing the same outfit in the study phase.  Then an 
example identity set was shown to the participants in a figure/diagram to give the 
participants an idea as to what the stimuli at study and at test would look like.   
 
In the study phase, a series of face exemplars (S faces) with a context cartoon body 
were shown sequentially on the screen.  The series consisted of 4 exemplars (S faces) 
from each of the 12 different identity sets and its associated context body.  The series 
was repeated five times, each time in a random order.  For each run of the series 
participants rated a different characteristic about the appearance of each face-body 
display.  The order of the first four ratings (intelligence, kindness, attractiveness, and 
confidence) was randomized for each participant.  The fifth rating was always about 
how well a particular face was matched with a particular outfit.  Before the start of 
each run of the series, a message appeared on the screen instructing participants as to 
what characteristic to rate.  A reminder of the values of the 1-9 scale for each attribute 
appeared with labels at the bottom of the screen.  Stimuli remained on the screen until 
participants entered their response rating by pressing the appropriate number key on 
the laptop‟s keyboard.  Trials advanced automatically with each typed response.  No 
data were collected during the study phase. 
 
Test phase. 
Participants were asked to rate how well they could recognize each photograph of each 
face from 1(definitely NOT seen in study phase) to 9(definitely seen in study phase).  
The test phase followed the same procedure as the study phase except for the 
following differences.  Participants were asked to base their rating only on the face 
part of the stimulus display rather than the clothes as well.  Participants were told that 
sometimes the face would be shown in the same clothes it was wearing before, but 
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other times it would be wearing a different person‟s clothes or have no body at all.  
Also, participants were warned that their ratings should be based on the exact 
photograph of the face, rather than the face in general, and that all faces they were 
about to see were either identical to or only just slightly different from ones shown in 
the study phase (no entirely new people‟s faces). 
 
Among the series of 48 faces shown at test, exactly four different exemplars (1 S, 1 L, 
1 P, and 1 U) were presented from each of the 12 identity set.  The computer recorded 
the recognition confidence ratings entered on each trial.  
Results 
Mean ratings given to the test faces in each of the experimental conditions are shown 
in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean recognition confidence rating (1=definitely never seen before, 
9=definitely seen before) to face images in Experiment 4 as a function of exemplar 
type, context consistency in the study phase, and context congruency at test.  The 
context for each test face was either the same as or different to its studied context, or 
absent.  Error bars represent the 95% within-subject confidence interval and are 
appropriate for comparing patterns of means across conditions of exemplar type and 
test context (Loftus & Masson, 1994; Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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A 2 (Study Context) x 4 (Exemplar Type) x 3 (Test Context) mixed factorial ANOVA 
was conducted to analyze the influence of these factors on recognition ratings.  Study 
context was a between subjects measure.  Exemplar type and test context were both 
repeated measures.   
 
There was no main effect of study context on recognition ratings, F(1,46)= 1.62, 
MSE= 2.94, p= .21.  Although faces studied with a consistent context (M= 5.73, 
SD=.44) were rated slightly higher than those studied with inconsistent contexts (M= 
5.55, SD=.54), this difference was not significant. 
 
There was a main effect of exemplar type on recognition ratings, F(3,138)=174.48, 
MSE= 1.76, p< .001.  In order from highest recognition confidence to lowest was the 
prototype (M= 6.81, SD=.70), the local average (M= 6.38, SD=.79), a seen instance 
(M= 5.83, SD=.80), and an unseen instance (M= 3.53, SD=.99).  This pattern of means 
is displayed graphically in the left panel of Figure 3.4.  Bonferroni post hoc paired-
samples t tests revealed that all possible pairwise comparisons were significant (see 
Table B1 in Appendix B for exact statistics).  
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Figure 3.4. Mean recognition confidence ratings to face images in Experiment 4 
varying in exemplar type (left panel) and test context (right panel).  Error bars 
represent the 95% within-subject confidence interval constructed separately for each 
panel. 
There was also a main effect of test context, F(2,92)= 10.26, MSE=0.99, p< .001.  As 
can be seen in the right panel of Figure 3.4, when the same context (M= 5.90, SD=.67) 
was presented along with a face in both the study phase and the test phase, participants 
rated their confidence higher than when a different context (M= 5.56, SD=.66) or no 
context (M= 5.46, SD=.59) was provided at test.  Bonferroni post hoc comparisons 
found that same test context faces were rated significantly higher than both different 
and no context, but different and no test context faces were rated equally (see Table 
B2 in Appendix B for exact statistics).  None of the interactions were significant. 
 
Discussion 
The manipulation of context within neither the study phase nor the test phase had an 
effect on the strength of the prototype effect.  Whether exemplars from the same 
identity were all studied with the same context body or two different ones made little 
difference to recognition confidence ratings at test.  Reinstating the studied context at 
test increased confidence ratings overall.  However, context reinstatement did not have 
 156 
a differential effect on images according to their exemplar type (prototype, local 
average, seen instance, or unseen instance).   
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding was that confidence ratings showed such high 
sensitivity to the exemplar type of the test image.  The difference in appearance among 
exemplars of the same face was often barely noticeable, and yet participants clearly 
rated their confidence highest to prototypes. 
 
An overall prototype effect was observed, but its magnitude was consistent across all 
levels of the other variables.  This was consistent with the prediction based on a 
prototype account of memory in which each face identity is represented by its own 
prototype stored independent of any associated context.  The results were inconsistent 
with the prediction based on an episodic account of memory that context would 
weaken the prototype effect when the same identity was learned in different contexts, 
and one of these contexts was reinstated at test.  Context reinstatement should increase 
activation to seen exemplars more than prototypes when exemplars of the same 
identity were learned with two different contexts.  Since the prototype effect was not 
affected by the context presented at study or at test, then either context does not affect 
how we store and retrieve our internal representations of faces or context was not 
salient enough in the current manipulation to produce an observable change in 
magnitude. 
 
Experiment 5 
In Experiment 5, participants learned to associate a name with each of the face 
exemplars in the study phase.  The purpose of the name learning task was to encourage 
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participants to treat all exemplars with the same name as belonging to the same 
person‟s face and to treat all exemplars with different names as belonging to different 
peoples‟ faces. 
 
Learning to combine instances of faces sharing the same identity is of utmost 
importance to the success of a prototyping mechanism.  Therefore, learning identity 
related information in the form of face-name pairs could potentially guide the 
abstraction of identity-based facial prototypes.  Therefore, based on a prototype 
account, it was predicted that prototype effects will be stronger for faces learned with 
the same name than faces learned with two different names. 
 
An episodic model might abstract a prototype at the time of retrieval, and thus still 
show a strong prototype effect regardless of whether it was learned with one name or 
two names.  In Experiment 4, it was predicted, based on an episodic model, that 
context would have an effect on the strength of the prototype effect when the context 
learned at study was reinstated at test.  In this experiment, names could be thought of 
as a type of associated context information.  However, no modulation of the prototype 
effect was predicted in the current experiment because names were not presented in 
the test phase, and the task at test was to recognize the specific image shown in the 
study phase.  Therefore, name information was of little relevance to the task at test, so 
it should not alter the strength of the prototype effect. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 48 University of Victoria undergraduates enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course.  Twenty-four participated in the same name and 24 participated in 
the different name versions of the experiment.  All other details regarding participation 
were the same as in Experiment 4.  The only exception is that this experiment took 
approximately 30 min to complete rather than 25 min as in Experiment 4. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
The stimuli consisted of photographs of human faces and first names.  Displays for the 
study phase were constructed such that the face and name were centred horizontally on 
a white background, but the face was moved upwards slightly to leave space for the 
name to be presented at the bottom of the display.  No names were presented on the 
screen during the test phase. 
 
The face stimuli were constructed using the same method as in Experiment 4.  
Therefore, 12 identity sets (6 male and 6 female) of different people‟s faces were 
generated, each consisting of 8 different exemplars (1 P, 2 L, 4 S, and 1 U).  The only 
difference between face stimuli in this experiment from those in Experiment 4 was 
that in general, exemplars within each identity set in the current experiment were more 
similar to one another.  Exemplars were made more similar to look like they could 
plausibly depict the same individual.   
 
Names were arbitrarily chosen from a booklet of baby names.  A total of 24 names 
were selected.  Half of the names were male names and half were female names.  
 159 
Names considered to be unisex were not selected.  All names were two or three 
syllables in length.  No two names shared the same initial letter. 
 
Equipment. 
Same as Experiment 4 
 
Design 
The two independent variables in this experiment manipulated whether a person‟s face 
was learned with one name or two names and also the type of face exemplar shown in 
the test phase.  The number of names learned for each face at study was a between-
subjects variable, while the type of face exemplar shown at test was a within-subjects 
variable.   
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two name groups, either the same or 
different name group.  In the same name group, participants saw all four exemplars 
within each identity set with the same name during the study phase.  In contrast, 
participants in the different name group saw half (one pair) of the face exemplars with 
one name, and half with another name. 
 
In the test phase, five different types of face exemplars were shown.  The five levels of 
exemplar type were Prototype (P), Local Average (L), Seen Instance (S), Unseen 
Instance (U), and entirely new Foil faces (F).  Foil faces were not included as a level 
of exemplar type in the subsequent analysis as they were only presented for task 
demand purposes.  Faces belonging to the first four levels (P, L, S, and U faces) were 
part of the same identity sets that S faces were taken from in the study phase.  As a 
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reminder, no P, L, and U items had been seen before in the study phase.  Only S faces 
were identical to one of the photographs actually shown before in the study phase. 
 
Taken together, this resulted in a 2 (Name) x 4 (Exemplar Type) mixed factorial 
design with a total of eight conditions.  Each participant contributed data to half of the 
conditions according to whether they were in the same or different name group.  
Recognition confidence was measured using the same confidence scale as in 
Experiment 4. 
 
Counterbalancing. 
Each identity set was randomly paired with two names (names A and B) with the 
constraint that all three were of the same gender.  Like Experiment 4, the study series 
of names and faces was divided into four sublists, and the order within and among 
sublists was randomized.   
 
In the test phase, the P face, one of the L, one of the S, and the U face were presented 
from each identity set.  Selection of the individual items was made on the same basis 
as Experiment 4.  The order of the P, L, and S faces was also counterbalanced as in 
Experiment 4, as was the presentation of U faces.  Since this experiment also included 
entirely new faces as distractors, these faces were divided into three groups.  One 
group was presented in each of the three blocks.  Across participants, the three groups 
of new faces were presented in every possible order. 
 
Procedure 
As in Experiment 4, the procedure was actually completed twice through by each 
participant.  The values reported below for both number of trials and item types are the 
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totals across both runs of the experiment.  Six identity sets were used for the first run 
and a different six for the second run. 
 
Study phase.  
Participants were told that they would see a series of pictures of faces, and the name of 
the person in each picture would be presented below the face.  The task was to learn 
the names of the different people‟s faces.  Participants were informed whether there 
would be two or four pictures of each different person‟s face.  All pictures of faces 
sharing the same name were to be treated as being different pictures of the same 
person.  Accordingly, all pictures with different names were to be treated as different 
people.  Participants in the different name group were informed that there would be 
pairs of very similar looking brothers or sisters within the series of faces that might be 
difficult to tell apart.  All participants were warned that after the learning parts of the 
experiment there would be a recognition test of the specific images they studied in the 
learning parts. 
 
The study phase was divided into four rounds.  The series of 48 study phase faces was 
presented once during each of the four rounds to give a total of 192 study trials.  Items 
remained on the screen until participants pressed the space bar to advance to the next 
display.  In Round 1, participants passively viewed each face in the series with its 
name one at a time on the screen.  Round 2 also did not require participants to enter a 
response, and it had three displays per face item in the series.  First, a face was 
presented alone on the screen, and participants were asked to guess its name silently.  
Once the space bar was pressed, the first letter of the name of the face appeared under 
the face to act as a memory cue.  Finally, the third display showed the completed name 
below the face.  In Round 3, the task was to name the face by entering the first letter of 
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the name on the keyboard.  Round 3 had two displays per face item in the series.  The 
first display presented the face alone, the second, displayed the face and feedback 
about the response.  The first display in Round 3 remained on the screen until 
participants entered a naming response which triggered the onset of the second 
display.  Feedback appeared on the screen indicating if the preceding response was 
correct or incorrect in blue or red letters respectively.  Feedback always included the 
complete correct name of the face.  Round 4 was a repeat of the Round 3 procedure.  
In summary, Round 1 introduced the faces with their names, Round 2 helped with 
learning the names as well as the faces, and Rounds 3 and 4 targeted face naming and 
provided feedback to assist with fine grained discrimination. 
 
Test phase. 
In the test phase, participants were asked to rate how well they could recognize each 
photograph of each face from 1(definitely NOT seen in study phase) to 9(definitely 
seen in study phase).  Participants were warned that their ratings should be based on 
the exact photograph of the face, rather than the face in general, and that there would 
be new, but very similar, pictures of the people they had just studied within the 
upcoming series.   
 
There were a total of 60 faces in the test phase series.  For each of the 12 identity sets 
studied 1 P, 1 L, 1S, and 1 U face was shown.  Twelve F (Foil) faces that were not part 
of any identity set in the study phase were also included in the series.  Faces were 
presented one at a time and remained on the screen until a number key was pressed on 
the keyboard indicating the recognition rating.     
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Results 
Study Phase 
In Rounds 3 and 4, participants responded with the correct name on 79% of the trials if 
they were in the same name group and on 52% of the trials if they were in the different 
name group.  Although all letters of the alphabet were possible responses, participants 
in the same name group learned three names at a time of each gender.  Participants in 
the different name group learned six names at a time per gender.  Based on these 
numbers chance responding would lie at about 33% and 17% for the same and 
different name groups respectively.  However, it is likely participants in the different 
name group could narrow their responses down so that they were effectively guessing 
between two names from the same identity set on many of the trials.   
 
Test Phase 
Mean ratings given to the test faces in each of the experimental conditions are shown 
in Figure 3.5.  A 2 (Name) x 4 (Exemplar Type) mixed factorial ANOVA was 
conducted to analyze the influence of these variables on recognition ratings.  Name 
was a between-subjects IV, and exemplar type was a within-subjects IV.  
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Figure 3.5. Mean recognition confidence rating (1=definitely never seen before, 
9=definitely seen before) to face images in Experiment 5 as a function of exemplar 
type at test and whether exemplars of the same face were learned with the same name 
or two different names.  Error bars represent the 95% within-subject confidence 
interval and are appropriate for comparing patterns of means across conditions of 
exemplar type. 
There was no main effect of name on recognition ratings, F(1,46)= .12, MSE= 1.26, 
p= .73.  Faces studied with the same name (M= 6.45, SD=.53) were rated equally as 
high as those studied with two different names (M= 6.40, SD=.59). 
 
There was a main effect of exemplar type on recognition ratings, F(3,138)= 356.43, 
MSE= .50, p<.001.  In order from highest recognition confidence to lowest was the 
prototype (P; M= 7.74, SD= .69), the local average (L; M= 7.45, SD= .84), a seen 
instance (S; M= 6.89, SD= .85), and an unseen instance (U; M= 3.59, SD= .93).  
Bonferroni post hoc paired-samples t tests revealed that the differences in all possible 
pairwise comparisons were significant. 
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The interaction between name and exemplar type was also significant, F(3,138)=2.78, 
MSE=0.50, p=.045.  The pattern of means suggest that the interaction was driven by an 
effect of name on the confidence ratings at test for U faces but not for the other 
exemplar types.  When faces were learned with the same name, confidence ratings of 
U faces were higher than when the faces had been learned with two names.  However, 
this difference did not reach significance in Bonferroni post hoc comparisons which 
compared the difference between learning with the same name vs. different names 
across each level of exemplar type. 
 
Also, participants rated distractor faces in the same name group (M=1.70, SD=.64) 
slightly higher than participants in the different name group (M=1.5, SD=.56).  This 
difference was not significant according to an independent samples t test, t(46)=1.16, 
p=.25. 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 4, there was a very clear overall prototype effect.  However, the 
naming manipulation did not affect the strength of the prototype effect.  Whether the 
task in the study phase encouraged participants to treat the exemplars of a set as the 
same person or as two different people made no difference to how confident 
participants were that the unseen prototype was one of the images in the study phase. 
 
The results of this experiment, taken on their own, were actually more consistent with 
an episodic account of memory rather than a prototype account.  The prediction based 
on an episodic account was that naming in the learning phase should not influence 
image recognition in the test phase because names were irrelevant to the task at test.  
The task at test was simply to judge (i.e. rate one‟s confidence) whether the test image 
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was identical to one of the images studied earlier.  Since the test faces were presented 
without names, and the task did not require names to be recalled, the probe and hence 
the retrieved information should contain very little, if any, name information.  The 
information encoded in probe determines what information will be entered into the 
probe-to-trace similarity comparison.  Thus, although traces of the seen exemplars 
from the study phase may have contained information about the associated name, this 
name information would not have affected the similarity between the probe and a 
given trace. 
 
It was perhaps surprising that the naming manipulation did not have any effect on the 
strength of the prototype effect because a prototype account of face recognition 
predicts that naming should have an effect.  If learning to associate different names 
with the two pairs of twin exemplars did indeed help participants to build separate 
prototype representations for each twin, one would expect the local averages to be 
rated highest at test for participants in the different name condition.  Even if 
participants could not perfectly discriminate between the twins, one would expect at 
least some drop in ratings to the overall prototype from increased sensitivity to image 
changes especially those along the trajectory that discriminated the twins.  Thus, the 
results suggest that either different identities are not represented by their own facial 
prototype, participants did not receive enough learning trials to produce an observable 
change in the strength of the prototype effect, or that the naming task does not in 
principle affect prototype abstraction regardless of learning level (at least with the 
stimuli used in this experiment). 
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In fact, participants in the different name group were only responding with the correct 
name (indicated by the first letter) on about half of the trials, so there is reason for the 
concern that participants did not receive enough discrimination training.  Therefore, 
before abandoning the investigation into how learning name-face associations 
influences the way we store and retrieve internal representations of identity in faces, 
Experiment 5 was repeated using a different type of face stimuli and an increased 
degree of learning in the study phase. 
 
Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 is a follow up to Experiment 5 again using the name learning approach.  
Through learning to associate face exemplars with the same name or two different 
names, I aimed to manipulate how participants perceived identity in those faces.  
Although the naming task in Experiment 5 had no significant effect on the prototype 
effect, it is possible that the high similarity of exemplars of the same identity set made 
the name learning task ineffective.  To investigate this possibility, Experiment 6 tested 
the prototype effect at three levels of exemplar similarity.  This manipulated the 
similarity between the two named pairs of exemplars within a single identity set.  
When the pairs were very similar, it would be like seeing two photographs of each 
twin of a pair of identical twins.  When the pairs were very dissimilar, they resembled 
pairs of photographs of two different people.  It was predicted that the naming 
manipulation would affect the prototype effect most when exemplars were of 
moderate similarity.  The reasoning was that exemplar pairs that were very similar 
might be too difficult to learn to discriminate, and faces that were very dissimilar 
might always be perceived as two different people regardless of whether they shared 
the same name or not. 
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This is an important follow up because if the different named faces are too similar to 
be discriminated, then both prototype and episodic accounts of memory would predict 
no effect of the naming manipulation.  An episodic account would have predicted no 
effect of naming regardless of similarity.  A prototype account would interpret poor 
twin discrimination as a failure to build separate prototype representations for each 
twin.  Thus, no matter if the twins‟ faces were learned as one person or two, exemplars 
at test would still be recognized by matching to a single prototype.  Because the point 
of manipulating identity information was to make contrasting predictions of prototype 
and episodic accounts, it was important to vary the similarity of the named exemplar 
pairs (i.e. the twins) to ensure it was not preventing us from observing an influence of 
the naming manipulation on the strength of the prototype effect. 
 
Rather than PCA generated faces, Experiment 6 used full colour morphed images.  
These images are very realistic and rich in individuating information which might 
further increase the effectiveness of the name learning task. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at 
the University of Victoria participated in this study.  Each participant was tested 
individually in sessions lasting approximately 30 min.  At the end of each session, 
participants were fully debriefed and awarded partial course credit.  Data from all 48 
students were collected and analysed. 
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Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
Twelve face sets were constructed.  The end products were full colour photographic 
quality images depicting faces of young adults.  Images were approximately 9.5 cm 
wide and 13.5 cm high (29 pixels/cm resolution).  They were displayed centred on a 
black background.  Each face set consisted of a number of exemplars which could 
depict a single named identity (in the same name condition) or a pairing of two named 
identities (in the different name condition).  Three versions of each face set were 
prepared which differed by the degree of similarity (low, medium, or high) between 
the two paired identities (if assuming the different name condition). 
 
Regardless of the level of similarity, face sets were made by selecting two photographs 
of different people of the same gender and morphing them together by different 
proportions to create two morphed images that served as the local average images in 
the test phase (see Figure 3.6).  Remember that in the different name condition, these 
local averages depict two different, although possibly very similar, people‟s faces.   
 
Around each local average, two more variants were created giving a total of four 
training exemplars (two pairs) in each face set.  These were created using Psycho 
Morph software which can take the difference between two images and apply it to a 
third image transforming it to emphasize the differences between the first two images 
(see General Methods section in Chapter 1 for more information about Psycho 
Morph).  Two more photographs of different people of the same gender were used to 
serve as the first two images in the procedure just described.  Whenever possible, large 
differences in skin tone were avoided when selecting these two photographs because 
the differences between them created the within variability for each pair in a face set.  
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Each local average was morphed by a certain amount equally in both the positive and 
negative direction of the difference between the first and second photographs (see 
Figure 3.7).  All similarity levels (low, medium, and high) of the same face set used 
the same two “variation images” and morphed their local averages by the same 
amounts (physically the same amounts).  In contrast, variants from completely 
different face sets all used different variation images, and the amount of morphing 
used to create the variants was individually determined for each face set. 
 
Although only four exemplars in each face set were used in the study phase, a fifth and 
sixth were constructed for use in the test phase only.  The fifth was the prototype, and 
fell at the midway point between the two local averages.  The sixth was an out of 
range unseen exemplar, and it was made by creating a morph that fell two steps away 
from one of the local averages in the opposite direction of the other local average (if 
one imagines a morphed continuum divided into 10% steps between the original pair 
of faces chosen for each face set).  Of course, the two local averages were also part of 
the face set, and they too were only shown in the test phase. 
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Prototype
10% 90%30% 70%50%
0% 100%
 
Figure 3.6. Example stimuli from Experiment 6 depicting the construction of the 
global and local prototypes.  A full morphed continuum between two different faces 
was created using increments of 10% (only a subset is shown above).  For each level 
of similarity (low, medium, and high), a pair of morphs was selected as the two local 
averages.  If, for example, the faces circled in yellow were selected as the local 
averages for the low similarity condition, the global prototype would be the 50% 
morph because it is exactly half way between the two local averages. 
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Local Average A Local Average B
 
Figure 3.7. Illustration of the manipulation used in Experiment 6 to generate within-
identity variation.  Circled in yellow are the 10% and 90% morphs from Figure 3.6 
shown here as a pair of low similarity local averages.  Above and below the local 
averages are the exemplars presented in the study phase.  These exemplars were made 
by taking the difference between the two “variation” images in the middle column and 
applying this difference to the local averages.  Local averages were transformed in 
both the positive and negative direction which amounts to exaggerating the difference 
toward the opposite variation image. 
Pilot testing. 
Every time the morphing transform was used, the amount of morphing needed to be 
specified.  Pilot testing was conducted to get a rough idea of how much morphing the 
stimuli needed to undergo in order to achieve the desired effect (to appear as images of 
the same person or different people).  Participants were shown pairs of images that had 
undergone different degrees of morphing and were asked to classify them as either the 
same person but different photos, different people, or totally identical photos.  One 
thing that became clear from doing the pilot study was that the perceptual effect of the 
morphing procedure depended on the similarity of the particular photos being 
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morphed rather than just the quantitative value the software used to warp and blend the 
images.   
 
Equipment. 
Same as Experiment 4 
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of the 48 counterbalancing conditions.  The 
experiment was divided into separate study and test phases.  Before participants began 
the study phase of the experiment, the procedures for both the study and test phases 
were outlined.  Detailed instructions for the test phase were delivered immediately 
after completion of the study phase. 
 
At the start of the session, participants were told they would be learning the names of 
several faces.  They were warned about the image recognition test that would follow 
the learning phase.  Participants were told the following: “All pictures with the same 
name are the same person.  Some faces will have undergone extreme makeovers, so 
they will look very different from one picture to the next.  On the other hand, some 
faces will look almost the same as another face with a different name.  In this case, the 
different faces are probably siblings or twins.” 
 
Since the entire experimental procedure was repeated twice, only the procedure for the 
first run through will be described.  The second run through was identical to the first, 
but it used a different set of faces. 
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Study phase. 
The run through consisted of three sub-blocks.  In all sub-blocks, faces were presented 
one at a time against a black background in the centre of the computer screen.  There 
were no time constraints placed on the participants.  The screen remained unchanged 
until the space bar was pressed to advance.  Order of presentation of the trials was 
randomized within each block for each participant. 
 
In the first sub-block, all the faces in the study set were presented (6 sets x 4 
exemplars= 24 images) with their corresponding names printed below.  Participants 
were instructed to simply view the faces with their names and try to remember them.  
In the second sub-block, the study set was again presented only once, but this time the 
face appeared on the screen initially without a name, and participants tried to guess the 
name without actually responding.  Pressing the space bar brought up the first letter of 
the name to provide a cue if the name could not be recalled from the face alone.  
Pressing the space bar once again brought the entire name into view.  The third press 
of the space bar initiated the presentation of the next face in the series.  The third sub-
block presented the study set four times through (6 sets x 4 exemplars x 4 repetitions= 
96 images).  Initially, each face was presented alone on the screen.  Participants 
pressed a key on the keyboard corresponding to the first letter of the name of that face.  
The key press triggered feedback to appear on the screen indicating if the response 
was correct or incorrect.  If incorrect, the feedback displayed the correct response 
below. 
 
Test phase. 
In the test phase, participants completed a recognition confidence task.  Recognition 
confidence was measured using a Likert-type rating scale from 1-9 (1=definitely NOT 
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seen in study phase; 9=definitely seen in study phase).  Participants were asked to 
make their ratings about how sure they were that they saw the particular image before 
rather than the person‟s face in general.  They were also informed that all images they 
were about to see would be of the same people they had just been learning, so there 
would be no new people‟s faces.  Participants were told that a rating of 1 meant that 
they were 100% sure they had never seen the test image before in the study phase.  In 
contrast, rating of 9 meant that they were 100% sure they had seen that exact image 
before in the study phase no change in the image whatsoever.  Participants pressed the 
number keys 1-9 on the keyboard to enter their responses.  It was pointed out that 5, 
because it was the central value of the scale, was equivalent to having zero confidence.   
 
As pointed out earlier, the entire procedure was conducted twice each time with a 
different set of faces.  To avoid redundancy, only the first test phase procedure will be 
described.  A series of 18 images were presented one at a time on a black background 
in the centre of the computer monitor.  A black line with the numbers 1-9 below it was 
displayed below the image.  This line was a reminder of the confidence scale.  It was 
labelled “definitely not seen” and “definitely seen” beside the 1 and the 9 on the scale 
respectively.  When participants pressed a number key to indicate their response, there 
was a 1 s ITI in which a black screen was displayed.  Immediately following this short 
pause, the next image in the series automatically appeared on the screen.  For each of 
the six faces learned in each study phase, three versions, a prototype, a local average, 
and an unseen exemplar, were presented during the test phase.   
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Design 
The experiment had three within-subjects independent variables and one dependent 
variable.  The three independent variables manipulated whether a face identity set was 
learned with one name or two names, the similarity of exemplar pairs within an 
identity set, and also the type of face exemplar shown in the test phase.  Overall, the 
structure of the experiment followed a 2 (Name) x 3 (Similarity) x 3 (Type) fully 
within subjects design.   
 
The two levels of name were different and same.  In the same name condition, 
participants learned to associate all four studied exemplars within a given identity set 
with the same name in the study phase of the experiment.  In the different name 
condition, participants learned to associate one exemplar pair within an identity set 
with one name and the other exemplar pair with another name.  The three levels of 
similarity were labelled low, medium, and high.  These labels referred to the level of 
similarity between the two pairs of studied exemplars from the same identity set.  For 
example, high similarity in the different name condition would be like seeing twins 
because the images of the two twins were extremely similar.  The three levels of 
exemplar type were prototype, local average, and unseen exemplar.  Prototype refers 
to the average of all four exemplars of a given face identity set regardless of whether 
that set had been learned with one name or two names.  Local average refers to the 
average of a pair of studied exemplars from the same face identity set.  In the case of 
learning with different names, a local average, in theory, would serve as a prototype of 
a particular named person‟s face because it would be the average of the two exemplars 
associated with that name in the study phase.  Unseen exemplars were similar in 
appearance to at least one pair of studied exemplars, but they were not presented in the 
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study phase.  Importantly, unseen exemplars were outside the range of variation 
exhibited by studied exemplars from the same identity set.  Note that all of the 
exemplar types shown in the test phase were technically unseen images since none of 
them were identical to one of the images presented in the study phase.  However, the 
label unseen exemplar has been given to unseen images that did not correspond to the 
average of the seen exemplars in all our previous experiments, so for the sake of 
consistency, it was used again here. 
 
The dependent variable was image recognition confidence.  It was measured using a 9 
point Likert-type scale (1=definitely NOT seen in study phase; 9=definitely seen in 
study phase). 
 
Counterbalancing. 
In total, participants received training on 12 different face sets.  All participants saw 
exemplars from the same 12 face sets.  The only difference in the facial images used 
among participants was the particular exemplars chosen from each face set.  Three 
variations in exemplar sets existed for each face set.  In other words, the exemplars of 
each face set differed depending on whether the face was to be shown in the low, 
medium, or high similarity condition for any given participant.  Counterbalancing 
procedures ensured that, across participants, each face set was seen an equal number 
of times at each level of similarity and that each participant learned an equal number 
of face sets at each level of similarity.   
 
The experiment was designed so that the face stimuli set had three different versions 
allowing each face set to be presented at each level of similarity (low, medium, or 
high) across the three versions.  To balance the levels of name within each version, 
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half of the face sets at each level of similarity were assigned to have one name (same), 
the other half, two names (different).  To balance across participants, three more 
counterbalancing versions were made that duplicated the first three except for the 
assignment of same or different name was reversed.  Thus, any difference in 
participant responses between the same and different named faces could only be 
attributable to the effect of the name learning manipulation since there would be no 
difference in the actual face stimuli being presented.   
 
The 12 face sets were broken into two groups of 6, so the experimental procedure 
could be conducted twice through, once with each set.  The only other important 
counterbalancing in the learning phase that has not been described thus far is that the 
order of the two experimental blocks was reversed.  When block order was reversed, 
some small changes were made to reduce the impact of stimuli specific effects.  One 
thing that was changed was the particular name selected from the two possible names 
assigned to each face set.  For example, if the names assigned to Face Set 1 were Jerry 
and Mark, and Jerry was chosen as the name to be used in the same name condition, 
the reversed block order chose the other name, Mark, for use in the same name 
condition. 
Results 
Study Phase 
Table 3.1 shows mean accuracy of participant performance in the name learning study 
phase of the experiment.  Only the third sub-block performance is shown in this table 
as neither of the first two sub-blocks generated data. 
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0.85 (0.36) 0.73 (0.44) 0.63 (0.48)
0.97 (0.16) 0.95 (0.21) 0.98 (0.12)
Name
Diff erent
Same
Low Medium High
Similarity
 
Table 3.1. Mean accuracy of naming faces in the study phase of Experiment 6 
(standard deviations in parentheses). 
Table 3.1 suggests that participants had little trouble distinguishing faces from 
different face sets because they almost always responded with the correct name to 
faces in the same name condition.  They did, however, have some difficulty 
distinguishing between the exemplar pairs within a face set as would be required when 
naming faces in the different name condition.  In this condition, as one would expect, 
the smaller the difference between exemplar pairs of a given face set, the less accurate 
participants were at naming them.  Indeed, many participants were unable to correctly 
name the “twin” faces in the different name, high similarity condition more than 50% 
of the time.  Keep in mind that the accuracy predicted by chance performance is 
ambiguous because all letters of the alphabet were possible responses, but only nine 
letters corresponded to names used in the study phase.  Also consider that in the 
different name condition, if participants were guessing only between the two names 
associated with exemplars from the same identity set, they would be predicted to be 
correct 50% of the time due to chance alone. 
 
Test Phase 
Means of all experimental conditions are shown in Figure 3.8.  A 2 (Name) x 3 
(Similarity) x 3 (Exemplar Type) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on 
confidence ratings to detect any differences due to exemplar type, learning a face with 
one name or two, and the similarity among exemplar pairs of the same face in the 
study phase. 
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Figure 3.8. Mean recognition confidence rating (1=definitely never seen before, 
9=definitely seen before) to face images in Experiment 6 as a function of exemplar 
type at test (prototype, local average, and unseen), similarity of same-face exemplar 
pairs, and whether same-face exemplar pairs were learned with the same name or two 
different names.  Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
There was no main effect for name, F< 1.  Faces from identity sets learned 
consistently with the same name (M= 6.38, SD=1.07) were rated equally as high as 
faces from identity sets learned with two different names (M= 6.45, SD=0.96). 
There was no main effect of the similarity between pairs of exemplars from the same 
identity set, F< 1.  Overall, confidence ratings to test faces were approximately equal 
regardless of whether their identities had been learned from a set of high, medium, or 
low similarity exemplars.  In order, mean confidence ratings for the low, medium, and 
high conditions were 6.37, 6.38, 6.50 (SDs= 1.13, 1.02, and 1.12 respectively). 
 
The main effect of exemplar type was significant, F(2,94)=224.95, MSE=2.87, p<.001.  
Ratings to prototypes (M= 7.38, SD=.94) and local averages (M= 7.18, SD=1.03) were 
clearly higher than to unseen exemplars (M= 4.69, SD=1.37).  This was confirmed 
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using Bonferroni post hoc paired-samples t tests.  Prototypes were also rated slightly 
higher than local averages.  This difference failed to reach significance but only after a 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons was made (see Table B3 in Appendix 
B for exact statistics). 
 
None of the interaction effects were significant, all Fs< 1.1. 
 
Discussion 
Of all the main effects and interactions, none turned out significant except a main 
effect of exemplar type.  The prototype and the local average were both rated higher 
than the unseen exemplar.  There was a borderline overall prototype effect (prototype 
over local average).  This prototype effect was smaller than the ones observed in 
Experiments 4 and 5, but it was significant when distractors (i.e. unseen exemplars) 
were excluded from the data analysis.  However, considering half of the faces in this 
experiment were studied with the same name and half with different names, it is 
perhaps surprising that any sort of overall prototype effect was found without any 
qualifying interactions (particularly Name x Exemplar Type).  It is possible that the 
method of face-name learning used in this experiment was insufficient to promote 
categorical learning of the differently named faces.  Perhaps if a different method had 
been employed, then a weakening or absence of the prototype effect might have been 
observed for the different named faces.  That aside, the present results seem to suggest 
a more or less automatic process of image averaging that may rely mainly on 
similarity between one picture and the next without much heed from other contextual 
cues or identity information. 
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It may be worth noting that the low similarity condition was the only condition that 
suggested that the naming manipulation was affecting the strength of the prototype 
effect.  The only trend in the reverse direction of a prototype effect was found in the 
different name, low similarity condition.  For faces learned with two different names, 
participants showed better discrimination of exemplar pairs in the low than in the 
medium or high condition in the naming task in the study phase.  Because of the pilot 
testing, we know that exemplar pairs in the low condition are judged as belonging to 
two different individuals.  It is interesting, therefore, that despite appearing to be two 
different people, in the same name condition, low similarity faces showed a trend 
toward a prototype effect.  Perhaps less learning is required to provoke participants to 
treat two different people‟s faces as belonging to a single person than to provoke 
participants to treat extremely similar faces (e.g. twins) as belonging to two different 
people.  This idea raises the question of whether learning a face set with two different 
names could lower the prototype effect or if learning a face set with a single name 
could increase the prototype effect, or both.  Since this experiment found no 
significant effect of name, it is also possible that the manipulation would have no 
effect.  Even still, it would be worthwhile to test for prototype effects using the low 
similarity stimuli in a non-naming learning task such as those used in the experiments 
in Chapter 2.  If two different people‟s faces give rise to the prototype effect, then 
what implications would this have for our understanding of the origins of the 
prototype effect in face recognition and for the mechanisms involved in recognition 
memory in general?  This issue is considered in the General Discussion in Chapter 5.  
 
 183 
Experiment 7 
Given that the stimuli used in Experiments 4 and 5 were so similar, it was surprising 
that they produced such large overall prototype effects.  Even though there was not 
anything obviously different in the construction or appearance of the prototype, by 
virtue of being the average of a set, it may have tended to look more typical of faces in 
the general population than the seen exemplars (and also the local averages).  
Therefore, Experiment 7 was designed to test whether the prototype stimuli were rated 
highly in Experiment 4 and 5 because they were the average of a face identity set, or if 
they were rated highly due to some unintended property of the stimuli.  If ratings given 
to the prototype stimuli were influenced by some unintended property, then they 
should be rated highly (i.e. higher than seen exemplars) even when they are not the 
average of the seen exemplars shown in the study phase.   
 
The current experiment used identity sets taken from Experiments 4 and 5.  The 
recognition test phase remained essentially the same as well.  The crucial difference 
was that this time, participants studied only one seen exemplar from each identity set 
rather than all four.  Thus, the prototype of the identity set was no longer the average 
of the seen exemplars shown in the study phase.  Likewise, the local average was no 
longer the average of one of the pairs of seen exemplars.  In fact, none of the 
exemplars shown at test truly represented the prototypical image of an identity.  
Therefore, it was predicted that if the prototype effect in face recognition relies on the 
prototype stimulus being the central tendency (mean) of a set of varying experiences 
with a single individual‟s face, then the “pseudo prototype” stimuli in this experiment 
should not be recognized higher than the seen exemplar because they were not the 
central tendency of the studied exemplars. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 32 visitors to the University of Stirling.  The experiment was 
conducted during the university‟s Open Day event where prospective students and 
their friends and family members can get information about the different programmes 
and services the university has to offer.  Adults visiting the information table of the 
Psychology Department were asked if they would like to participate in a short 
experiment about face recognition.  Those who were interested were tested 
individually at one end of the table.  The experiment took about 3-5 min to complete.  
At the end of the session participants were debriefed and invited to ask questions.  
Participants were approximately16 – 65 years of age. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
A subset of face identity sets from Experiments 4 and 5 were used.  Six identity sets 
from each of Experiments 4 and 5 were selected for use in the current experiment. 
 
Equipment. 
Same as in Experiment 4 
 
Design 
The only independent variable in this experiment was the type of exemplar seen at 
test.  Although participants only studied one seen exemplar per identity set, they were 
tested on four in the subsequent recognition test phase.  The four levels of exemplar 
type were prototype, local average, seen exemplar, and unseen exemplar.  Importantly, 
these labels only refer to the exemplar type of an image as it was used previously in 
Experiments 4 or 5.  Therefore, the current usage of these labels only has meaning in 
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the context of Experiments 4 and 5.  For each of the identity sets used in this 
experiment, the prototype, the local average, the seen exemplar, and the unseen 
exemplar were the images that served in Experiments 4 or 5 as the prototype, the local 
average, the seen exemplar, and the unseen exemplar respectively.  Beyond that, the 
only other similarities are that the seen exemplar was indeed the image studied in the 
study phase and all other exemplar types were only presented during the test phase.  
Note that the prototype and local average did not actually correspond to the average of 
the studied exemplars, as in this case there was only one exemplar studied of each 
identity.  
 
The dependent variable was recognition confidence and was measured by a rating 
using a Likert type scale from 1-9 (1=definitely NOT seen in study phase; 9=definitely 
seen in study phase).  The task was to rate how confidently you believe the particular 
image, rather than the person‟s face in general, was presented in the study phase. 
 
Counterbalancing. 
Although there were a total of 12 identity sets used in this experiment, each participant 
only saw half of them.  The 12 sets were broken down into 2 groups of 6 sets each.  
Half the participants completed the experiment using the first group of stimuli, and the 
other half completed it using the second group of stimuli.  Also, within each identity 
set used, the particular seen exemplar shown in the study phase was counterbalanced 
across participants.  Since there were four potential seen exemplars in each set, 4 
counterbalancing groups were formed on that basis.  Taken together, this made a total 
of 8 counterbalancing conditions: 2 (stimuli group) x 4 (seen exemplar).  However, 
after 16 participants had been tested, the local average was switched from the more 
distal (i.e. less similar) local average to the more proximal one so that data could be 
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obtained for both types of images.  Ideally, this would have been a within-subjects 
factor, but this detail was overlooked in the initial design.  Similarly, since there were 
two local averages, the number of counterbalancing conditions doubled so that half of 
the time the local average more proximal (i.e. more similar) to the seen exemplar was 
presented and half of the time the local average more distal to the seen exemplar was 
presented.  The order of items presented in both the study and test phases was 
randomized for each participant. 
 
Procedure 
Study phase. 
A series of six images of faces was presented, and participants were asked to 
memorize each picture exactly as shown.  Participants were warned before the study 
phase began that after they had seen the faces, they would be asked to recognize the 
identical picture of each face from a series of similar pictures of the same person.  An 
example of a seen exemplar (not use elsewhere in the experiment) was presented on 
the screen followed by a display of the exemplar just shown plus the three other seen 
exemplars in that identity set.  The seen exemplar that was just shown had a red box 
around it to indicate that it was the target exemplar.  It was explained to participants 
that although the four images may appear to look like the same person, the images 
themselves are all slightly different from one another, and that they should keep this in 
mind while they are studying the images.  Another example of a set of four seen 
exemplars was shown at the bottom of the display.  The examples were given just to 
give participants some idea as to how much variability they should expect within a 
face identity and between different people‟s faces. 
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Each participant saw one seen instance per face set from six different face sets.  Faces 
were presented one at a time.  The study phase was self paced in that the face stimuli 
remained on the screen until participants pressed the space bar when they felt ready to 
move onto the next face.  There was an ITI of 500 ms during which a white screen was 
shown.   
 
Test phase. 
A series of 24 faces were presented, and participants rated their recognition confidence 
for each one.  The ratings were made using a scale of 1-9 (1=definitely NOT seen in 
study phase; 9=definitely seen in study phase).  Like the previous experiments in this 
chapter, the rating was made about the prior occurrence of the exact image rather than 
the person‟s face in general.  Participants were warned again that some images would 
look very similar to ones they saw in earlier, but if there was even a slight difference 
between how the image appeared at test from the study phase, they should consider it 
having not been seen in the study phase. 
Four versions of each identity shown in the study phase were rated in the test phase: 
the prototype, the local average, the seen exemplar, and the unseen exemplar.   
 
Just as in the study phase, the test phase was self paced, and images were presented 
one at a time.  There was an ITI of 500 ms during which a white screen was presented 
on the monitor. 
Results 
Table 3.2 provides the means and standard deviations of confidence ratings at each 
level of exemplar type.  The general pattern indicates that prototypes were rated 
similarly to the actually seen exemplars.  Local averages were rated somewhat lower 
than seen exemplars and prototypes, but these three conditions were all rated higher 
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than unseen exemplars.  Note, however, that confidence was low in all conditions 
especially for prototypes, local averages, and seen exemplars (a rating of 5= zero 
confidence). 
 
5.65 1.17
5.67 1.19
4.97 1.36
3.87 1.37
Exemplar Ty pe
Seen Exemplar
Prototype
Local Average
Unseen Exemplar
Mean Std.  Dev iation
 
Table 3.2. Mean recognition confidence rating (1=definitely never seen before, 
9=definitely seen before) to face images in Experiment 7 as a function of exemplar 
type. 
A repeated measures ANOVA conducted across the four levels of exemplar type 
confirmed that the type of exemplar had a significant main effect on confidence 
ratings, F(3,93)= 22.30, MSE= 1.03, p< .001.  Bonferroni paired-samples t tests (on all 
possible pairwise comparisons) revealed that participants rated the unseen exemplars 
lower than all other conditions, and the local averages lower than the seen exemplars 
(see Table B4 in Appendix B for exact statistical values).  There was also a strong 
trend for prototypes being rated higher than local averages, but this difference did not 
remain significant after the Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
 
Although they will not be reported in full, additional analyses were conducted to 
compare confidence ratings made by participants who saw either the distal or proximal 
local averages in the test phase (as noted in the counterbalancing section, half the 
participants rated only distal, and half rated only proximal local averages).  Note that 
since only one seen instance was studied, the distal local average refers to the local 
average of the opposite pair of instances.  To briefly summarize the main findings, 
whether participants rated the distal or proximal local average, it made no difference to 
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their confidence ratings to the seen, prototype, and unseen exemplar types.  However, 
there was a significant difference between ratings to the distal (M=4.37, SD=1.25) and 
proximal (M=5.56, SD= 1.24) local averages.  Also, comparing ratings among 
exemplar types made by participants in the distal and proximal groups separately 
found that distal local averages were rated significantly lower than prototype and seen 
exemplars but not differently to unseen exemplars.  Proximal local averages, on the 
other hand, were rated no differently than prototype and seen exemplars, but they were 
rated significantly higher than unseen exemplars. 
Discussion 
Results of Experiment 7 showed that when prototype stimuli from Experiments 4 and 
5 were reduced to the status of unseen, yet very similar, exemplars, they were not 
recognized more confidently than the actually seen exemplars.  This result stands in 
contrast to those of Experiments 4 and 5 which showed highly reliable prototype 
effects.  In fact, the current experiment found no difference among confidence ratings 
to seen exemplars, prototypes, or the proximal local average.  Results of Experiments 
4 and 5 showed a clear ordering of prototype, local average, seen exemplar, and 
unseen exemplar from highest to lowest mean rating.  However, the results of this 
experiment did converge with those of Experiments 4 and 5 in that the unseen 
exemplars were rated substantially lower than all other exemplar types (except the 
distal local average).  This last result is the easiest to explain because the unseen 
exemplar was the least similar to the seen exemplar.   
 
It was hypothesized that if prototype items had some unknown characteristic (other 
than being the average of an identity) that caused participants to rate them higher than 
other exemplar types, then those same prototype items would be rated highest at test 
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regardless of whether they actually were the prototype of a studied identity or not.  
This hypothesis was not supported since the prototype items, no longer true 
prototypes, were given nearly identical ratings to seen exemplars.  Therefore, there is 
more than just mere typicality driving the prototype effects observed thus far. 
 
On the other hand, the pattern of results did not exactly fit what one might have 
predicted on the basis of exemplar generalization either.  In the case where only one 
exemplar is studied for each identity, all else being equal, recognition should be 
optimal when the identical exemplar is presented and should decrease as similarity to 
the seen exemplar decreases.  Thus, the most straightforward prediction made by this 
account would have been that seen exemplars were rated higher than all other 
exemplar types.  Since this was not the case, one could still assume that, under this 
account, participants were not sensitive to the subtle image differences among 
exemplar types.  However, the prototype effects found in the previous experiments 
demonstrate that in fact participants‟ confidence ratings are sensitive to small image 
changes.   
 
The easiest framework that accommodates the current results with the previous results 
is an exemplar based framework assuming parallel activation of exemplar traces.  
When only one exemplar of an identity is studied, the similarity of prototype stimuli is 
high enough to produce activation levels comparable to seen exemplars (as measured 
by ratings).  However, when two or more exemplars of an identity are studied, the 
prototype, by virtue of being similar to all seen exemplars highly activates all of their 
traces in memory, while seen exemplars only highly activate their own trace (although 
they may activate traces of other seen exemplars of the same identity, but not to the 
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same degree as their own trace, or if the prototype was the probe).  Therefore, a 
prototype can be recognized via generalization from one similar studied exemplar, but 
recognition confidence increases when traces of two or more similar studied 
exemplars are available to support recognition of the prototype. 
 
Chapter Discussion 
The experiments presented in this chapter were designed to test predictions about the 
prototype effect based on prototype and episodic accounts of memory.  This was 
accomplished by manipulating the role of context and identity information in the 
learning and recognition of previously unfamiliar faces.  If faces of different identities 
are represented by prototype representations, then it was predicted that pairing 
exemplars with the same or different names at study would affect the strength of the 
prototype effect but contextual information would not.  In contrast, if faces are 
represented in a distributed fashion across a pool of episodic traces, then it was 
predicted that learning inconsistent contextual information would affect the strength of 
the prototype effect when context was reinstated at test but pairing exemplars with the 
same or different names at study would not.   
 
The tests of context and identity information were designed to be interpreted together, 
so that neither account would only predict null results.  However, as it turned out, 
neither the context nor the naming manipulation had a modulating effect on the 
prototype effect.  Thus, the overall pattern taken across Experiments 4-6 is not fully 
consistent with the predictions made by either the episodic account or the prototype 
account.  Although one might consider the pattern results as partially consistent with 
 192 
both accounts, since only null effects were observed, it does not make for a persuasive 
argument.   
 
Why did the observed results fail to match the predicted pattern of results of both 
prototype and episodic accounts of memory?  The easiest explanation is that one or 
both of the manipulations of context or identity information was not salient enough.  If 
participants are not required to associate the assigned context with the face, they may 
be very unlikely to do so.  Thus, the contextual content of both stored traces and 
retrieval probes alike may have been insufficient to produce an observable change in 
the prototype effect.  Likewise, perhaps participants needed more learning trials on the 
naming task.  Maybe high levels of naming performance can only be obtained after 
seeing the “twins” simultaneously on the screen for comparison. 
 
There is good reason to believe that if participants had been trained in the naming task 
until a certain performance criterion had been reached, results of the recognition 
ratings at test would have shown a decrease in the prototype effect.  Stevenage (1998) 
reported learned categorical perception of identical twins after training participants to 
name a large number of different photographs of each twin.  That is, she found that 
participants rated two images of the same twin as appearing more similar after name 
training compared to their initial pre-ratings of the same images before the name 
training.  Conversely, she also found that when comparing an image of twin A with 
one of twin B, participants rated the similarity between the two images lower after 
name training compared to before name training.   
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The implication of Stevenage‟s (1998) findings is that if participants learn the twins 
well enough in the naming task to produce categorical perception, then both the 
prototype account and the episodic account of memory would predict decreased 
prototype effects at test (in the different name small variation condition).  If the 
perceptual similarity of the exemplars is actually decreasing through learning, then 
separate prototype representations would be more likely to form.  Likewise, decreased 
exemplar similarity would also lead to decreased similarity to a prototype probe 
image, so a prototype presented in the test phase would not activate the traces of the 
stored exemplars as highly as it would have in the absence of categorical perception.  
In Experiments 5 and 6, it was unlikely that learning was sufficient to cause 
categorical perception of the “twin-like” faces.  But we were not investigating the role 
of categorical perception in recognizing identity prototypes.  If categorical perception 
had occurred, prototype and episodic accounts of the experimental results would have 
become even more difficult to disambiguate.  The influence of categorical perception 
on the strength of the prototype effect likely goes above and beyond influences 
stemming from the nature of the face representations themselves.  A reorganization of 
a multidimensional face space to reflect category learning can account for categorical 
perception without making any additional assumptions regarding the prototypical or 
episodic nature of representations encoded in the space. 
 
Concerns over the level of learning aside, it is very interesting that the basic prototype 
effect was observed consistently despite contextual and categorical influences in 
Experiments 4-6.  Particularly in Experiments 4 and 5, the differences in images of the 
same identity were extremely subtle, and yet participants showed a clear increase in 
confidence ratings to the unseen prototypes over the actually seen exemplars.  
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Experiment 7 tested recognition confidence of the same stimuli used in Experiments 4 
and 5 but only presented one exemplar in the study phase for each different identity.  
The important finding from this experiment was that the prototype (as in formerly a 
prototype in Experiments 4 and 5) was not rated any differently than the actually seen 
exemplar.  Thus, the prototype images were easily confusable with the seen 
exemplars.  But why were prototypes recognized even more confidently than the seen 
exemplars?  Results of Experiment 7 indicate that the effect does depend on the 
prototype being the central tendency of the studied exemplars, or at least that the 
prototype of a series of same-face exemplars is not rated higher in confidence than the 
seen exemplars through some process of generalization from one of the stored 
exemplars.   
 
Overall, the present chapter‟s results seem to suggest a more or less automatic process 
of image averaging that may rely primarily on similarity between one image and the 
next without much heed from other contextual cues or identity information.  In this 
way, the findings from this chapter are consistent with those from Chapter 2 which 
found that manipulations of familiarity, intentional learning instructions, and similarity 
of same-face exemplars had no observable effect on the strength of the prototype 
effect in face recognition.  The prototype effect in face recognition seems to be a 
robust effect that is difficult to destroy (or strengthen) using a variety of experimental 
manipulations and types of stimuli.  
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Chapter 4: Investigating Prototype Effects Using 
Natural Sources of Within-Identity Face Variation 
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Chapter Introduction 
No original images of real people‟s faces were used in any part of the experiments in 
Chapter 3.  Thus, the prototypes and their constituent exemplars depicted artificial 
identities.  One cannot exclude the possibility that the variation within exemplars of 
the same identity was not representative of natural variation.  These criticisms also 
apply to all of the experiments in Chapter 2 as well.  Therefore, in the experiments of 
the current chapter, real photographs of real people‟s faces were used to provide more 
realistic within-identity variation of a person‟s face.  The key question was: will the 
prototype effect be observed when the exemplars are natural, unaltered images of real 
people‟s faces?  This was the original question I started out with in the first 
experiment of this chapter.  Based on its results, follow-up experiments were 
conducted manipulating the degree of learning and name learning.  The introduction to 
Experiment 8 will discuss the inspiration for this chapter in more depth. 
 
Experiment 8 
In this experiment, one photograph and one video still of each target person‟s face 
were presented in the study phase.  Then, in the test phase, the photograph, the video 
still, the average morph of the photograph and still, and some new distractor faces 
were presented for recognition. 
 
At test, the question was “did you see this person before (in the experiment)? 
OLD/NEW.”  The initial reason this task was chosen was to shift the focus of 
recognition away from the fine details of the images.  There was a concern that the 
differences in image quality may make it easy to reject the prototype morphs as having 
been seen before in the experiment if an image recognition task was used.  Asking 
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“did you see this person before?” has higher ecological validity than the question, “did 
you see this exact image before?” because it mirrors the task of everyday face 
recognition more closely.  Understanding how we are able to recognize the people we 
know in everyday life and why we sometimes make mistakes is the fundamental goal 
of face recognition research.   
 
Using a standard OLD/NEW forced choice task would also be a rigorous test of the 
prototype effect in face recognition.  Picture-to-picture recognition performance is 
known to be quite high.  Therefore, one might expect participants to have a very high 
rate of OLD responses to the identical images shown in the test phase.  To use real 
images of real people and find that a previously unseen average morph of the two 
images has an even higher hit rate than the actually seen images would be a very 
convincing demonstration that the average variant of a person‟s face is the most 
recognizable one. 
 
This experiment does not make any contrasting predictions regarding prototype and 
exemplar accounts of memory.  However, if recognition occurs through generalization 
from a stored exemplar, then unseen morphs could never be better recognized than 
previously seen exemplars which match their stored representation near perfectly.  
Therefore, if the prototype effect is observed, it is good evidence that the two studied 
images of the same person‟s face are being recognized as one.  This could occur by 
means of an averaging process acting on the two studied images at the time of 
encoding, or by parallel activation of the stored representations of the two studied 
images at the time of retrieval. 
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The key question of this experiment was will the prototype effects observed previously 
using artificial sources of within-face variation be observed when the same-face 
exemplars are unaltered images of real people?  It was predicted that a prototype effect 
would be observed because the sources of within-face variation should be more 
realistic when learning a face from unaltered images.  Therefore, if anything, one 
might predict even stronger prototype effects using natural images than artificially 
generated ones. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory course at the University 
of Victoria participated in this study.  Each participant was tested individually in a 
single session lasting approximately 15 min.  At the end of each session, participants 
were fully debriefed and awarded partial course credit. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
Images were taken from the U.K. Home Office Police Information Technology 
Organization (PITO) database.  This collection of photographs and video stills of 
police officers was used previously by Bruce et al. (1999) in a lineup task.  Male 
police officers posed separately for a photograph and a short video clip.  For each 
officer, both the photograph and the video clip were taken at the same time, so their 
appearance in most respects was very similar.  Notably, the hair styles of the officers 
would have been almost identical at the time of the video and the photograph.  The 
original stimuli set contained a pair of images of each officer.  One was a photograph 
and the other was a video still taken from the clip.  I arbitrarily selected the image 
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pairs of 63 officers avoiding any pairs that contained an image where the angle of the 
head was not directly forward facing or where teeth were visible.  An example of a 
pair of images for one of the selected officers is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Example of stimuli used in Experiments 8, 9, and 10.  On the left is a 
relatively high quality photograph of the same officer shown on the right in a 
relatively low quality video still. 
Both the photos and the video stills were full colour and showed the face and neck.  
Expression of the face was neutral.  The main difference in the appearance of the 
photographs compared to the video stills was the quality of the image.  The 
photographs (now termed “High” or “High quality”) were of higher image quality and 
thus appeared crisper and showed more detail of the texture of the faces compared to 
the video stills (which will now termed be “Low” or “Low quality”).  The lower 
quality video stills often appeared brighter than their corresponding photographs.  This 
sometimes made the person‟s hair and skin tone look fairer in the video still compared 
to the photograph.  There also appeared to be some slight differences between the  
High and Low quality images as to how the light fell on the face, and Low quality 
images tended to have more shadowed regions than the High quality images. 
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The High and Low quality images of each officer were blended, or morphed, together 
using the Psycho-Morph software package.  All 63 “Morphed” images were the result 
of blending the High and Low image of 63 officers together by equal (50%/50%) 
proportions.  Morphing was achieved by manually plotting 175 landmarks on each 
face (see Chapter 1 General Methods for more details). 
 
The High, Low, and Morphed images were all cropped to remove the background 
around the face.  Hair, ears, chin, and upper neck remained in the image.  All images 
were sized to 275 x 375 pixels at a resolution of 72 dpi.  When presented on the 
monitor, the face portion of the image was approximately 11 cm wide by 16 cm high.  
Faces were centred on a white background.  See Figure 4.2 for an example of a High, 
Low, and Morphed image of one officer‟s face. 
 
 
Low Quality 50%/50% Morph High Quality  
Figure 4.2. Example stimuli from Experiments 8, 9 and 10 showing the high, morph, 
and low quality images of the same officer‟s face. 
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Apparatus. 
All aspects of the experiment were conducted using a Hi-Grade Notino3600 windows 
lap top with a 14” monitor at 1024 x 768 resolution.  The program E-Studio from the 
E-Prime software package (version 1.1) was used to control the presentation of stimuli 
and to record responses made using the laptop keyboard.   
 
Design  
The structure of this experiment probed whether participants remembered more 
strongly the High, Low, or Morphed image of a person‟s face having seen different 
versions earlier. 
 
The independent variable manipulated in this experiment was the type of image shown 
in the test phase.  More specifically, image type at test was manipulated within-
subjects and had three levels:  High quality, Low quality, and Morphed.  As a 
reminder, High quality stimuli were photographs taken with a camera, and Low 
quality images were video stills captured from short video clips.  Morphed images had 
been morphed, or blended, halfway between the High and the Low images for each 
officer‟s face. 
 
Recognition memory was compared across test image types to test the experimental 
hypothesis that if faces are stored and retrieved in such a way that enhances 
recognition of the average appearance of a particular person‟s face, then after having 
studied a High and Low quality image of each officer‟s face, participants will 
recognize the unstudied Morphed images better than the actually studied High or Low 
quality images  It is important to note that Morphed images of target faces were never 
shown in the study phase. 
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There were two dependent variables that measured face recognition performance: 
accuracy and confidence.  Accuracy was measured as the proportion of trials 
participants responded “OLD”.  Recognition confidence was measured by a three 
choice classification that participants made after each OLD/NEW response in the test 
phase.  The three choices were 1 (random guess), 2 (pretty sure), or 3 (totally certain).  
Confidence was recoded to become a 6 point scale by recoding 1, 2, and 3 as 3, 2, 1 
respectively for trials on which a NEW response was made and recoding as 4, 5, 6 
respectively for trials on which an OLD response was made.  Thus, for the purpose of 
analysis, 1 was certain the face had not been seen, and 6 was certain the face had been 
seen. 
 
Counterbalancing. 
The faces assigned to be targets and distractors were counterbalanced.  Since each 
target was presented in three different versions at test, faces were divided into four 
groups for the purpose of counterbalancing.  One group would serve as the target list, 
while the other three would be High quality, Low quality, and Morphed distractor 
groups.  The only other counterbalancing balanced the order of the High quality, the 
Low quality, and Morphed image types during the test phase.  In the end, there were 
24 counterbalancing conditions which worked out to two faces and two participants 
tested per counterbalancing condition. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to counterbalancing conditions.  The experiment 
was divided into separate study and test phases.  Instructions were given for each 
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phase separately immediately before that phase began.  Instructions for the test phase 
were delivered immediately after completion of the study phase. 
 
Study phase. 
In the study phase, participants were shown a series of 30 images of faces and asked to 
rate the typicality of each face from 1 to 7 on a Likert type scale with 1 being low 
typicality and 7 being high typicality.  Participants entered their responses by pushing 
the appropriate number on the laptop keyboard.  It was mentioned to participants that 
although all of the images in the upcoming series were different from one another, 
some images may be of the same person‟s face.  Participants were also warned to 
study each face closely as their recognition memory of those faces would be tested in 
the next phase of the experiment.  Thus, learning in the study phase was intentional, 
but the typicality task was included to encourage participants to engage more with the 
faces by giving them something specific to do while they viewed the faces.  No data 
was recorded or analyzed for this part of the experiment.  
 
The study phase was self-paced.  Images remained on the screen until participants 
pressed a number key on the keyboard to indicate their typicality rating for the current 
face.  A blank white screen was then displayed for 100 ms before the next face in the 
series was presented.   
 
Each participant saw 6 of the target officers‟ faces in the study phase (1 High + 1 Low 
= 2 images/officer; 2 images x 6 officers = 12 target images).  A set of 12 morphed 
images of filler officers‟ faces were presented once each in the study phase.  They 
were used as filler faces to ensure participants would not reject the Morphed images in 
the test phase simply because they had not seen any morphed images in the study 
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phase.  Six more fillers (3 High and 3 Low) were also added to the study set.  The 
same set of fillers faces was used for all participants. 
 
Test phase. 
In the test phase, a new series of face images was shown.  Half of these were seen in 
the previous study phase (targets); half had not been shown in the study phase 
(distractors).  Participants were asked to decide, as quickly as possible, if each face, 
presented one at a time, in the series was OLD (this person was seen before at some 
point in experiment) or NEW (never been shown before in experiment).  They were 
instructed to respond as quickly as possible by pressing either the “Z” or “L” key on 
the keyboard to make an OLD or NEW response respectively (response keys were 
swapped for half of the participants).  It was emphasized that an OLD response should 
be given as long as the person‟s face was shown before even if the particular image of 
that face was not shown before. Participants were told that they would see the same 
“old” faces from the study phase more than once in the test phase, and some of those 
images would be identical to those shown in the study phase and some would be 
different images taken of the same person.  The “different” images would likely differ 
in image quality compared to the image(s) shown of the same person earlier in the 
experiment.  Since the same officers‟ faces were being shown more than once in the 
test phase, participants were told that even if they did not recognize the person‟s face 
the first time it was presented, they still might recognize a different picture of that 
person later on in the test phase.  In that circumstance, it may be difficult to decide if 
that person had actually been presented in the original study phase.  Recognition may 
simply be due to the presentation of that same face earlier in the test phase.  Because 
responses were to be made as quickly as possible, participants were told to simply 
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respond “OLD” to any face they recognized from any point earlier in the experiment 
regardless of whether they remembered seeing it in the study phase specifically or not.   
 
In addition to making an OLD/NEW judgement, participants were asked to classify 
how confident they were that the OLD/NEW response they just gave was correct.  
After each OLD/NEW response was entered, participants classified their confidence as 
1 (random guess), 2 (pretty sure), or 3 (totally certain).  Participants classified their 
confidence aloud, and the experimenter recorded the appropriate number using a pen 
and paper.  Participants were under no time constraints when classifying their 
confidence. 
 
The format of each trial was as follows.  A face image appeared on the screen.  The 
image remained on the screen until the participant entered an OLD/NEW response on 
the keyboard.  The key press triggered a prompt instructing participants to classify 
their confidence as 1, 2, or 3.  Descriptions of each classification number were 
provided on the screen.  The participant then spoke their numbered response aloud to 
the experimenter.  Participants pressed the space bar at this point to advance to the 
next trial. 
 
The test phase consisted of 78 trials.  The first 6 were practice trials.  The remaining 
72 trials were the test trials.  Practice and test trials were identical in format, but 
stimuli for the practice trials were taken from a separate subset of faces.  All 
participants received the same practice trials although the order of the trials was 
randomized per participant.  Test trials followed without interruption after the practice 
trials.  Test trials were also presented in a random order; the only constraint due to 
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counterbalancing the order of presentation of test image type for each target officer‟s 
face. 
 
Of the six practice trials, 3 were OLD (1 Morphed, 1 High, and 1 Low) and 3 were 
NEW (1 Morphed, 1 High, and 1 Low).  The three OLD faces were faces from the 
morphed filler set shown in the study phase.  The three NEW faces were also taken 
from the police set, but were never used in any other part of the experiment. 
 
Images of 6 officers were used as critical targets and 6 more as filler targets in the test 
trials.  OLD is the correct response to a target face.  Each target was shown one time in 
three different versions (1 Morphed, 1 Low, and 1 High) throughout the series.  Thus, 
there were a total of 36 target test trials.  In the remaining 36 trials, a face that had 
never been presented before was presented.  On these distractor trials the correct 
response would be NEW.  There were 12 High, 12 Low, and 12 Morphed distractors 
presented throughout the test series.   
 
Results 
Three repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to probe for recognition 
differences due to the type of image shown in the test phase.  Separate ANOVAs were 
conducted on mean scores of the confidence ratings, the proportion of OLD responses, 
and on the d‟ of the OLD/NEW responses.  It is important to consider false alarm rates 
so that comparisons of recognition accuracy can be made.  Utilizing d‟ as a measure of 
performance is particularly informative in this experiment because one might expect 
differences in old/new discrimination using stimuli differing in image quality.  An 
alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. 
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All test trials. 
Although it was not one of the measures of recognition of primary interest, reaction 
time data were analyzed to compare the speed of OLD/NEW responses across the 
different quality test images.  Mean reaction times (in ms) on correct response trials 
were similar for Morph, High, and Low quality target images and were, in order, 1372, 
1370, and 1350 (SDs= 460, 399, 383 respectively).  A repeated measures ANOVA on 
reaction times for the three image types confirmed that these differences were not 
significant. 
 
Table 4.1 reports the means and standard deviations of participants‟ confidence ratings 
and the proportion of OLD responses to the Morph, High, and Low quality image 
types.  Overall, there was no difference in recognition confidence ratings of Morph, 
High quality, and Low quality target images, F(2, 94)=0.60, p=.55.  Likewise, when 
they were presented as distractors, Morph, High, and Low quality images also showed 
no differences in confidence ratings, F(2,94)=0.96, p=.39. 
 
Analyses of OLD/NEW responses produced results consistent with those of 
confidence ratings just described.  The proportion of target trials that participants 
responded OLD to did not differ across image types, F(2, 94)=0.82, p=.45.  Distractor 
responses also did not differ across image types, F(2,94)=0.30, p=.74.  Unsurprisingly, 
d‟ scores among Morphed (M=2.44, SD=1.25), High (M=2.53, SD=0.95), and Low 
(M=2.54, SD=1.06) quality images were not significantly different, F(2,94)=0.15, 
p=.86. 
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5.26 .60 .87 .15
5.30 .66 .89 .14
5.37 .53 .90 .12
2.50 .68 .22 .17
2.40 .58 .21 .14
2.55 .59 .23 .16
Image Ty pe
Morph
High
Low
Target
Morph
High
Low
Distractor
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Conf idence Rating
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Proportion OLD
 
Table 4.1. Mean confidence rating (1= sure unseen, 6= sure seen) and proportion of 
old responses (with standard deviation) to targets and distractors of different image 
types across all test trials in Experiment 8. 
In summary, analysis of recognition across all trials of the experiment did not reveal 
any differences among Morphed, High, and Low quality test images.  However, 
participants‟ ability to recognize a given officer may have been affected by prior 
presentations of the same officer‟s face earlier in the test phase.  Because analyzing 
data across all test trials may obscure important patterns of results found only on the 
very first presentation of an officer‟s face, the analyses were repeated using first trial 
data only.  To see how learning during the test phase may have affected the prototype 
effect, the third trial data were also separately analyzed for comparison with the first 
trial results.  
 
First presentation only. 
Confidence Ratings 
Analysis of first presentation data only found a trend, but no significant difference 
among confidence ratings of target Morphed, High, and Low image types, 
F(2,94)=2.34, p=.10.  The trend was for High and Low image types to be rated slightly 
more confident than Morphed images.  The distractors also did not show any 
differences among image types, F(2, 94)=0.45, p=.64 (See Table C1 in Appendix C 
for the individual condition means for both targets and distractors).   
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Proportion of OLD Responses 
Individual condition means of the proportion of OLD responses to the first 
presentation of a face are listed in Table C2 in Appendix C for both targets and 
distractors.  The repeated measures ANOVA performed on the OLD/NEW target data 
found no significant effect of image type, F(2,94)=2.14, p=.12.  Again, there was a 
trend for High and Low quality images to be recognized more often than Morphed 
images.  The ANOVA on recognition of distractor image types showed no difference 
among Morphed, High, and Low quality images, F(2,94)=0.41, p=.66. 
d’ 
The repeated measures ANOVA performed on d‟ scores for the first presentation only 
detected a significant main effect of image type, F(2, 94)=3.18, p=.046.  As shown in 
Figure 4.3, the pattern was that Morphed (M=2.37, SD=1.85) images were recognized 
less than Low (M=3.08, SD=1.18) quality images.  Although present, the recognition 
advantage for High (M=2.85, SD=1.16) quality images over Morphed images was 
weaker compared to that of Low over Morphed.  However, post hoc Bonferroni t tests 
did not reveal any significant differences among the three conditions. 
 
Third presentation only. 
Confidence Ratings 
Individual condition means of confidence ratings to the third presentation of a face are 
listed in Table C1 in Appendix C for both targets and distractors.  A repeated measures 
ANOVA of third presentation data found no significant difference among confidence 
ratings of target Morphed, High, and Low image types, F(2, 94)=0.90, p=.41.  
Analysis of distractor faces also found no significant difference among image types, 
F(2,94)=0.58, p=.56. 
Proportion of OLD Responses 
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Individual condition means of the proportion of OLD responses to the third 
presentation of a face are listed in Table C2 in Appendix C for both targets and 
distractors.  The repeated measures ANOVA performed on the OLD/NEW data of 
target images found no significant effect of image type, F(2,94)=0.66, p=.52.  In 
comparison to the first presentation, the trend in the pattern of means was reversed 
with Morphed images now having a slight advantage over High and Low quality 
images.  As in all other distractor comparisons reported from this experiment, the 
ANOVA yielded no differences among image types, F(2,94)=0.66, p=.52. 
d’ 
The repeated measures ANOVA performed on d‟ scores for the third presentation did 
not reveal any significant differences among Morphed (M=3.34, SD=1.51), High 
(M=3.25, SD=1.59), and Low (M=3.03, SD=1.57) quality image types, F(2,94)=0.48, 
p=.62 (Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean discrimination scores for faces in Experiment 8 on their first or third 
presentation in the test phase as a function of the type of test image.  Error bars 
represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
First vs. third presentation. 
Comparing the pattern of means for the confidence ratings, the proportion OLD, or the 
d‟ between first and third presentation of an officer‟s face suggested two things.  The 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
3.5 
4 
First Third 
Presentation 
d' 
Morph 
High 
Low 
Image Type 
 211 
first was that recognition was higher by the third presentation compared to the first 
trial.  There also seemed to be a tendency for participants‟ recognition to increase 
more from first to third presentation for Morphs compared to High and Low quality 
images.  A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare responses on the 
first and third trials by analysing both presentation and image type as independent 
variables.  Three separate ANOVAs were carried out on the confidence ratings, the 
proportion of OLD responses, and the d‟ scores respectively.  All three ANOVAs 
found a main effect of presentation.  Participants rated their confidence more highly on 
the third presentation of an officer‟s face compared to the first presentation, 
F(1,47)=7.74, MSE=0.57, p=.008  Analysis of the proportion of OLD responses found 
the same pattern, F(1,47)=6.02, MSE=0.04, p=.02; d‟ scores followed the same pattern 
as well (see Figure 4.3), F(1,47)=10.55, MSE=1.32, p=.002.  None of these analyses 
found a main effect of image type.  However, the interaction between presentation and 
image type was significant in the analysis of confidence ratings, F(2,94)=3.51, 
MSE=0.66, p=.03.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired samples t tests detected just one 
significant difference among all of the pair wise comparisons; Morphs were more 
confidently recognized on the third presentation of an officer‟s face compared to the 
very first, t(47)=3.20, SD=1.31, p=.037.  The Presentation x Image Type interaction 
did not quite reach significance in the proportion of OLD responses and d‟ scores 
analyses, but the pattern of means was very similar in all three analyses.  
 
Discussion 
Contrary to what was predicted, no prototype effect was observed.  The analysis of all 
test trials found no recognition differences among Morphed, High, and Low quality 
images.  On the very first presentation of an officer‟s face, responses showed a 
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borderline reverse prototype effect as Morphs were more poorly recognized than either 
the High or Low images.  By the third and final presentation of an officer‟s face, this 
pattern of means had reversed with Morphs now being best recognized, but this trend 
towards a prototype effect did not approach significance. 
 
Failing to observe the prototype effect in this experiment came as a great surprise.  
Why did participants respond so strongly to the prototype of a series of artificially 
constructed exemplars but not to the prototype of naturally occurring exemplars?  Is 
the prototype effect in face recognition merely limited to laboratory experiments that 
use image manipulation techniques to simulate the changes in appearance that a single 
face undergoes from moment to moment and encounter to encounter? 
 
It seems unlikely that natural sources of within-face variation were, for some reason, 
resistant to the mechanisms underlying the prototype effect in face recognition.  A 
more likely explanation for the results of this experiment is that the differences 
between the two images of each person in the stimuli set were too large to give rise to 
a prototype effect at least after only one viewing.  Since familiarity with a face can aid 
generalization to new exemplars of the same face (Megreya & Burton, 2007), the next 
experiment increased the amount of exposure participants had to the exemplars in the 
learning phase. 
 
Experiment 9 
In Experiment 8, the prototype effect failed to be observed using natural images of real 
peoples‟ faces.  However, the particular images used did contain other sources of 
variation on top of what one normally considers natural within-identity face variation.  
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For example, variation due to the different cameras like contrast and brightness 
changed the appearance of the image a lot.  It has already been demonstrated that 
participants do not always judge the two images of the same police officer as the same 
person even when the two images are side by side (Megreya & Burton, 2007).  
Megreya and Burton argued that the unfamiliarity of the participants with these faces 
is largely responsible for these failures in matching.  In fact, they showed that after 
viewing a short video clip of each officer, participants were much better able to match 
the two views of the same officer‟s face.  
 
If participants do not always judge the two images of an officer as the same person, 
then when seen separately, they may be unlikely to engage a prototyping mechanism 
at least upon the initial encounters.  Familiarity with a face helps it to be recognized in 
unfamiliar viewing conditions and also after it has undergone novel transformations in 
laboratory settings.  Therefore, this experiment repeated Experiment 8, but this time 
participants were given additional exposure to half of the faces in the study phase.  By 
building up a stronger memory for the individual images of an officer, participants 
may be better able to perceive the shared identity between them, and this may change 
how the officer‟s face is represented in memory. 
 
In the study phase, two different images of each target face were shown.  As a 
reminder, there was a high quality and a low quality image of each face.  The high and 
low quality images were presented once each in the lower familiarity condition and 
three times each in the higher familiarity condition. 
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The key question of Experiment 9 was if participants are given more opportunity to 
learn, and thus form associations, between the two images of each officer, will the 
prototype effect now emerge where it did not in Experiment 8? 
Method 
 
Participants 
Forty-eight first and second year undergraduate Psychology students at the University 
of Stirling participated in this study.  Data from all 48 students were collected and 
analysed.  All other information was the same as in Experiment 8. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli. 
The same stimuli used in Experiment 8 were used in this experiment. 
 
Apparatus. 
Same as Experiment 8 
 
Design 
This experiment was designed to investigate whether the level of preexposure to a 
person‟s face will differentially affect how strongly participants recognize it from a 
High, Low, or Morphed quality image.  The two independent variables manipulated in 
this experiment were the type of image shown in the test phase and the number of 
repetitions of each face image during the study phase.  Type of test image was 
manipulated just as it was in Experiment 8.  Again, it had three levels:  High quality, 
Low quality, and Morphed.  In this experiment, all target faces at test had been 
presented in the study phase in both their High and Low image forms.  Consequently, 
all target Morphs in the test phase will also be the average or prototype image of an 
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officer‟s face.  Furthermore, all target High and Low images in the test phase will have 
been seen before in the study phase.  Remember though that targets were never 
presented as Morphed images in the study phase.  The second IV that manipulated the 
number of repetitions was termed familiarity because varying the amount of exposure 
to a face should alter how familiar it is to participants.  Familiarity had two levels: low 
(1x) and high (3x).  For example, in the low familiarity condition, an officer‟s face 
was presented once in a High quality image and once in a Low quality image.  
Together, both IVs produced a 3 (Test Image) x 2 (Familiarity) completely within 
subjects factorial design. 
 
The same two dependent variables that measured face recognition performance in 
Experiment 8 were also used in the current experiment.  These were accuracy and 
confidence.  Accuracy was measured as the proportion of trials participants responded 
OLD.  Recognition confidence was measured by a three choice classification that 
participants made after each OLD/NEW response in the test phase.  The three choices 
were 1 (random guess), 2 (pretty sure), or 3 (totally certain).  Confidence was recoded 
to become a 6 point scale by recoding 1, 2, and 3 as 3, 2, 1 respectively for trials on 
which a NEW response was made and recoding as 4, 5, 6 respectively for trials on 
which an OLD response was made.  Refer to Experiment 8 Design subsection for 
further details.   
 
Counterbalancing. 
Counterbalancing of stimuli across conditions of the experiment was achieved using 
the same stimuli rotating method as Experiment 8.  Again, target and distractor faces 
were counterbalanced.  Just like Experiment 8, the order of the test image types (High, 
Low, or Morphed) was counterbalanced.  However, an additional counterbalancing 
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measure was put into place to control for the effect of the order of the High and Low 
image of each face in the study phase.  This scheme led to 48 counterbalancing 
conditions. 
 
Procedure 
The procedural format was very similar to that used in Experiment 8.  Therefore, only 
aspects of the procedure that were different in the current experiment will be 
described. 
 
Study phase. 
Participants were shown a series of 72 images of faces and were asked to watch the 
sequence and to try to remember the faces.  Participants were informed that some 
pictures would repeat, and sometimes different pictures of the same person's face 
would be presented.  Participants were told to attend closely to each face as their 
recognition memory would be tested in the next phase of the experiment. 
 
Participants did not make any responses in this phase of the experiment.  Each image 
remained on the screen for 1200 ms followed by a blank white screen for 100 ms.  
Presentation of the next face in the sequence proceeded automatically after the 100 ms 
blank screen of the previous trial.  Viewing of the entire sequence took approximately 
2 min to complete. 
 
Each participant saw 6 officers‟ faces in the low familiarity condition (High and Low 
quality image 1x each) and 6 officers‟ faces in the high familiarity condition (High and 
Low quality image 3x each).  A set of 12 morphed images of filler officers‟ faces were 
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presented once each in the study phase.  Six of these were presented one time, and the 
other 6 were presented three times. 
 
Test phase. 
Participants entered OLD/NEW responses using the “A” and “L” keys.  Confidence 
classifications were entered using the 1, 2, and 3 keys.  After one of the three number 
keys was pressed, a blank white screen was presented for 600 ms.  Each target was 
presented as a morph, a high, and a low quality image at some point during the test 
phase.  There were an equal number of target and distractor trials of each image type.  
No other changes were made to the test phase from that of Experiment 8. 
 
Results 
To probe for recognition performance differences due to image type, familiarity, and 
order of images in the study phase, separate repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted on means of the proportion of OLD responses, d‟ scores, and confidence 
ratings.  All statistical tests used an alpha level of .05. 
 
Firstly, an ANOVA of the entire data set, including all three presentations of a face, 
was conducted.  While there were no main effects of image or order, there was, as 
expected, a main effect of familiarity, F(1, 47)=88.65, MSE=0.06, p<.001.  More 
familiar faces (M=.89, SD=.11) were called “old” more often than less familiar faces 
(M=.70, SD=.13). 
 
Of the two-way interactions, only one was significant.  The interaction was between 
the type of image shown at test and the familiarity of that face, F(2, 94)=5.76, 
MSE=0.03, p=.004.  Figure 4.4 displays the pattern of means for this interaction.  At 
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lower familiarity, recognition was higher for the Morphed images compared to High 
and Low quality images which were recognized equally well.  In contrast, after extra 
repetition in the study phase, High quality images were recognized better than 
Morphed and Low quality images which were about equal.  At higher familiarity, 
recognition of all types of images was increased, but the increase was largest for the 
High quality images.  Thus, the pattern of means indicated a weak trend of a prototype 
effect for the lower familiarity faces, but not even a hint of a prototype effect for the 
more familiar faces.  Bonferroni post hoc paired-samples t tests revealed no significant 
differences among image types of lower familiarity faces.  However, among higher 
familiarity faces, High quality images were recognized better than both Morphs and 
Low quality images (see Table C3 in Appendix C for exact statistics). 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean proportion of old responses to target faces in Experiment 9 as a 
function of the type of image at test and the level of familiarity.  In the low and high 
familiarity conditions, images were presented in the study phase once and three times 
respectively.  Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Loftus & 
Masson, 1994). 
The three-way Image x Familiarity x Order interaction just reached significance, F(2, 
94)=3.10, MSE=0.04, p=.0496.  Figure 4.5 shows the interactive pattern of condition 
means.  For higher familiarity faces, order in the study phase did not appear to have an 
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effect on the pattern of means of the different image types.  Faces from both orders 
(HL and LH) were best recognized from a High quality image at test if they had been 
repeated three times at study.  In contrast, at lower familiarity, order at study did have 
an impact on the effect of test image.  In both orders, the Morphed image and the 
image that was presented first in the study phase were recognized more often than the 
image that was presented second at study.  Recognition rates were similar for the 
Morphs and the first image shown in study for lower familiarity faces (although 
Morph was slightly higher in HL and slightly lower in the LH condition).  This is an 
important finding because it suggests that the weak trend towards a prototype effect in 
the two-way interaction was actually an advantage for Morphs specifically over the 
second image shown in the study phase, rather than over the previously seen images in 
general. 
 
Simple effects and Fisher‟s LSD (protected t tests) were calculated to tease apart the 
Image x Familiarity x Order three-way interaction and probe for differences among the 
means.  When the data is broken down by familiarity, a repeated measures ANOVA 
confirms that order at study had no effect on recognition of higher familiarity faces, 
but there was an overall effect of image type, F(2,94)=6.39, MSE=0.02, p=.003.  
Indeed, Fisher‟s LSD revealed that High quality images were recognized significantly 
better than Morphed, t(94)=2.41, p=.018.  High quality images were just short of being 
significantly better than Low quality images as well (p=.055).  The ANOVA on the 
lower familiarity faces detected no recognition differences due to image type or study 
order on their own, but it did find a significant Image Type x Order interaction, 
F(2,94)=3.29, MSE=0.05, p=.04.  At lower familiarity, the simple effect of test image 
was not significant when the order at study was LH, but it was significant when the 
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order at study was HL, F(2,188)=3.65, MSE=0.05, p=.03.  Fisher‟s LSD revealed that 
when familiarity was low and the order at study was HL, the Low quality image was 
recognized worse than both the Morphs, t(188)=2.59, p=.01, and the High quality 
image, t(188)=1.99, p=.048. 
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Figure 4.5. Mean proportion of old responses in Experiment 9 as a function of the type 
of image at test, the level of familiarity, and the order of the high and low quality 
images at study.  HL refers to the order first the high, then the low quality image (and 
vice versa for LH).  The single error bar represents the smallest possible significant 
difference between any two means and is based on the 95% within-subjects confidence 
interval which is appropriate for comparing the pattern of means across all conditions 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Distractors. 
A repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion of OLD responses to distractors 
across the three image types Morph, High, and Low detected a weak nonsignificant 
trend of High quality distractors being correctly rejected more than Low quality 
images.  The mean proportion of OLD responses to Morphed distractors (M=.26, 
SD=.16) was just slightly higher than High (M=.25, SD=.19) and lower than Low 
(M=.30, SD=.17) quality distractors. 
 
To summarize the results from the analyses of the proportion OLD data, more familiar 
faces were best recognized as a High quality image (Morph and Low equal) while less 
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familiar faces were best recognized from either the Morphed or the image that was 
seen first in the study phase (rather than the second).  Importantly, no significant 
prototype effects were observed.  Furthermore, increasing participants‟ familiarity 
with the faces did not promote the occurrence of the prototype effect.  In fact, it 
actually decreased the prototype effect as recognition increased more for High quality 
images than for Morphed images. 
 
Subsidiary Analyses. 
Additional analyses were conducted to detect prototype and familiarity effects that 
might have been missed by combining data across all three presentations of an 
officer‟s face in the test phase.  Data from the first presentation and the third 
presentation were analyzed separately in two repeated measures ANOVAs that 
included familiarity, test image, and order in the study phase.  A third ANOVA was 
conducted that added presentation (first or third) as a fourth independent variable.  In 
general, the proportion of OLD responses on the first and third presentation showed a 
similar pattern of results to the main analyses conducted on responses to all three 
presentations.  Participants were more likely to respond OLD to a target face on the 
third and final presentation that target (M=.80, SD=.14) compared to the very first time 
the target was presented (M=.76, SD=.13).  However, this difference was not 
significant (p=.07).  There was also a trend for the recognition of Morphs and Low 
quality images to improve more from the first to the third presentation compared to the 
High quality images which showed no improvement (see Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6. Mean proportion of old responses to target faces in Experiment 9 as a 
function of the type of image at test and whether it was the first or third presentation of 
a given person‟s face in the test phase.  Error bars represent 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Distractors. 
Participants were slightly more likely to correctly reject a distractor face in the third 
and final block of test trials (M=.25, SD=.19) than the first (M=.29, SD=.17).  
Although neither the main effect of trial block nor the Trial Block x Distractor Image 
Type interaction were significant, the trend for higher performance on distractors was 
driven by an improvement in correct rejection of Morph distractors compared to High 
or Low quality distractors. 
 
Measures of recognition accuracy and recognition confidence. 
To simply summarize the analyses of d‟ scores and confidence ratings, exact statistics 
will only be reported if there was a change in the significance or the pattern of means 
compared to the corresponding effect in the proportion OLD analysis.  Likewise, a 
description of the pattern of means will only be given for effects that showed a 
different pattern in the proportion OLD analysis.  The analyses of d‟scores and 
confidence ratings were also broken down and analyzed in the same manner as in the 
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proportion OLD analyses to probe for differences in recognition accuracy between the 
first and third presentation of an officer‟s face.   
 
d‟ all presentations. 
The repeated measures ANOVA reported for the proportion of OLD responses was 
repeated on the d‟ scores to measure recognition performance taking false alarm rates 
into account. 
 
In addition to the main effect of familiarity, the main d‟ analysis also found a 
significant main effect of test image, F(2,94)=3.59, MSE=2.00, p=.03.  According to 
Bonferroni paired samples t tests, High quality images (M=2.18, SD=0.88) were 
significantly better recognized than Low quality images (M=1.80, SD=0.84), 
t(47)=2.63, SD=1.01, p=.04.  The mean d‟ value of Morphed images (M=2.04, 
SD=0.89) fell midway between, but was not statistically different from, those of High 
and Low quality images. 
 
As in the proportion OLD analysis, the two-way Test Image x Familiarity interaction 
was significant.  In addition, a trend of the two-way Test Image x Order interaction 
was detected, F(2,94)=2.49, p=.08.  The trend was for High quality images to do a lot 
better, Low quality images to do a lot worse, and Morphed images to do about equally 
well in the study order HL compared to LH.  The trend was not for a crossover 
interaction though.  Regardless of study order, performance, from highest to lowest, 
was High, then Morphed, and then Low quality images.  Thus, the pattern of the 
overall interaction trend showed that differences among test image types were much 
stronger in the HL study order compared to LH order.  Lastly, the three-way Test 
Image x Familiarity x Order interaction did not quite reach significance in this 
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experiment, F(2,94)=2.86, p=.06.  Even still, the pattern of means in this interaction 
stayed reasonably the same as in the proportion OLD analysis. 
 
d‟: first and third presentations. 
The repeated measures ANOVA including presentation (first or third) as a fourth 
independent variable found a significant increase in recognition accuracy by the third 
presentation (M=2.43, SD=0.98) in the test phase compared to the first (M=2.06, 
SD=1.03), F(1,47)=4.80, MSE=8.29, p=.03.  In all other respects, the results were 
comparable to those of the proportion OLD analyses of first and third presentations. 
 
Confidence ratings. 
Analysis of confidence ratings showed a similar pattern of results as the proportion 
OLD and the d‟ analyses.  The main effect of familiarity was significant as was the 
two-way Familiarity x Test Image interaction, and the three-way Familiarity x Test 
Image x Order interaction.  All of these effects showed the same pattern of means as 
the proportion OLD analysis, so they will not be discussed further.  No other main 
effect or interactions were significant. 
 
Confidence ratings: first and third presentations. 
The repeated measures ANOVA on confidence ratings including presentation (first or 
third) as a fourth independent variable found the same pattern of means as the analyses 
of proportion OLD did on the first and third presentations did.  Therefore, these results 
will not be reported. 
 
Confidence ratings: distractors 
A repeated measures ANOVA on confidence ratings to distractors across the three 
image types Morph, High, and Low revealed a nonsignificant trend of High quality 
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distractors being more confidently rejected than Low quality images.  Mean 
confidence ratings to Morphed distractors (M=2.62, SD=0.63) fell midway between 
High (M=2.57, SD=0.76) and Low (M=2.78, SD=0.69) quality distractors. 
 
Discussion 
Although the pattern of results was quite complex, some general conclusions can be 
made.  Increasing the number of repetitions in the learning phase did indeed increase 
face recognition accuracy in the test phase.  However, there was very limited support 
for the hypothesis that additional learning will lead to stronger prototype effects.  In 
fact overall, the results suggested the opposite.  While less familiar faces were best 
recognized from either the Morph or the image that was seen first in the study phase 
(rather than the second), more familiar faces were best recognized as a High quality 
image (Morph and Low equal). 
 
Comparing patterns between the first and third presentation data, some small 
differences were found.  As in Experiment 8, there was a slight morph advantage on 
the third but not the first presentation.  It looks as though this is partially due to the 
Morph and Low quality images improving more across the three presentations 
compared to the High quality especially for the lower familiarity faces.  Although all 
of these differences were nonsignificant, they were the only results that did support the 
hypothesis that additional learning would lead to increased prototype effects.  The 
surprise twist here was that the only trend toward a strengthening of the prototype 
effect due to increasing the degree of learning was for learning during the test phase 
rather than the study phase.  This will be discussed further in the discussion section at 
the end of this chapter. 
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Seeing the exemplar pairs more times in the learning phase turned out to benefit the 
recognition of High quality images more than the Low quality or Morphed images.  It 
is possible that the High quality images contained more facial information relevant to 
face processing and discrimination than Low quality images did; and therefore, a High 
quality image at test may contain more retrieval cues than a Low quality image at test. 
 
Also note that there was a trend towards a prototype effect for lower familiarity faces.  
However, further analysis showed that the advantage for Morphed images was limited 
to when they were compared with the second image presented in the initial passive 
view phase of the experiment but not the first image.  The Morph and the first image 
shown in the study phase were recognized approximately equally as well.  Why the 
ordering of image types at study had this effect on recognition remains unclear.  
However, the pattern does bring to mind the phrase “you never get a second chance to 
make a first impression.”  Perhaps the memory formed the first time you encounter a 
person‟s face contributes more than the second to either the stored prototype 
representation of that face or to the retrieved content activated upon subsequent 
encounters with that face.  Of course, this would imply that if different face identities 
are stored as composite or summary representations, they may not necessarily 
correspond to the central tendency of the variation experienced for a given identity. 
 
To sum up, no prototype effects were found regardless of how many repetitions of the 
exemplars participants saw during the study phase.  The familiarity manipulation not 
only failed to induce a prototype effect, but it also increased the recognition of High 
quality images at test (after additional repetitions in the study phase).  However, there 
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was a weak trend for a prototype advantage by the third and final presentation of a 
face in the test phase compared to the first presentation.   
 
Experiment 10 
In Experiment 9, participants were given more exposure to the faces in the learning 
phase to help them associate the two studied exemplars of each face as belonging to 
the same person.  It was hoped that additional familiarity with the exemplars might 
produce the prototype effect that was absent from the results of Experiment 8.  
However, the familiarity manipulation did not produce a prototype effect.  In fact, if 
anything, it weakened it. 
 
Perhaps if participants are not encouraged to form an association of identity between 
the two images, they will not do so.  Arguably, the photograph and the video still of 
each officer are not obviously of the same individual.  If the learning phase does not 
have an identity related component to it, then a connection between the two images 
may be unlikely to form.  It is also possible that, without influences to the contrary, 
participants might form even more distinct representations of each of the two images 
after viewing additional repetitions. 
 
Therefore, in this experiment, participants were provided with explicit cues about the 
identity of each face.  This was achieved using the same naming task as in 
Experiments 5 and 6 (Chapter 3).  Although manipulating whether the exemplars of 
each face were learned with one name or two different names had no effect on the 
strength of the prototype effect in Experiments 5 and 6, there were several reasons 
why it was worth trying the naming task again with the stimuli and recognition task 
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used in Experiments 8 and 9.  One reason is that in the experiments in Chapter 3, the 
prototype effect was observed, but there was a failure to alter the magnitude of the 
effect.  In the two previous experiments in this chapter, there was a failure to observe 
even the basic prototype effect.  Thus, the naming manipulation may affect the pattern 
of results differently in the present case.  Also, the task at test in this experiment was 
to recognize the person‟s face, not merely the specific image of the face.  Therefore, 
manipulating identity related information during learning in the study phase may have 
a different effect in a task requiring judgements specific to the identity rather than 
specific to a particular image.  At any rate, the stimuli lent themselves well to a 
naming experiment since the stimuli can be learned as same or different people quite 
conceivably.   
 
The key question of this experiment was will the prototype effect now emerge if 
participants learn to associate the two images of each face with the same name but not 
with two different names? 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight first and second year undergraduate students enrolled in the Psychology 
programme at the University of Stirling participated in this study.  All details 
regarding participation are the same as in Experiment 9. 
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Materials 
Stimuli. 
Images were the same as in Experiment 8.  Male first names were chosen arbitrarily by 
the experimenter, but an effort was made to choose names that started with different 
letters of the alphabet.   
 
Apparatus. 
Same as Experiment 8. 
 
Design 
There were two independent variables in this experiment.  The first was the type of 
image shown in the test phase, termed image type, and it had three levels: High 
quality, Low quality, and Morphed (see Experiment 8 for details about these terms).  
The second IV, termed name, was whether the two images of each officer had been 
learned with the same name or with two different names in the learning phases of the 
experiment.  Thus, the name IV had two levels: same name or different name.  The 
end result was a 3 (Test Image) x 2 (Name) completely within subjects factorial 
design. 
 
Two dependent variables were used to measure face recognition in the test phase.  The 
first DV measured the proportion of OLD responses in the Old/New forced choice 
task, and this data was also converted into d‟ scores to measure how well participants 
could discriminate between targets and distractors.  The second DV was recognition 
confidence and was measured using a confidence classification that was made about 
each Old/New response.  The confidence scale was from 1-3 (but was recoded as a 1-6 
scale for the purpose of data analysis as described in Experiment 9).  In fact, the 
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design and procedure of the test phase of this experiment was exactly the same as the 
test phase in Experiment 9 except that participants were not asked to make their 
Old/New responses as quickly as possible, and the reaction time data were not 
analyzed. 
 
Counterbalancing. 
Names were counterbalanced such that each participant saw an equal number of 
officers with the same name as with two different names.  Furthermore, across all 
participants, each officer was shown an equal number of times with the same name as 
with two different names.  Names were put into pairs and assigned to a target face in 
each target set.  The name in the pair used as the same name was reversed for half the 
participants.   
 
The only other counterbalancing feature in the learning phases was the order of the 
High and Low quality images for each officer presented in the initial viewing phase.  
The learning trials were put into two blocks to achieve this.  The High and Low 
images of each officer were put into separate blocks, and there were equal numbers of 
High and Low images within each block.  In phase two, the guess the name task, the 
block order was randomized for each participant.   
 
Targets and distractors were counterbalanced by dividing the total critical items set of 
48 officers into 4 target sets of 12 officers each and rotating these sets around 
conditions.  To be clear, the 4 conditions (A-D) were A: target, B: morphed distractor, 
C: high quality distractor, and D: low quality distractor.  Four sets were needed 
because each target was presented three times at test, thus necessitating 3 times as 
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many distractors to balance the number targets without repeating any of the 
distractors. 
 
Because all three types of images of each officer were presented once each at some 
point throughout the test phase, the order of the three image types (Morph, High, and 
Low) was counterbalanced.  Test trials were organized into three blocks and stimuli 
were rotated around the blocks.  This meant that, across participants, the Morph, High, 
and Low images of each officer were each shown an equal number of times in the first 
block, the second block, and the third block.   
 
Procedure 
The experiment was divided into three parts.  The first two were learning phases and 
the third and final part of the experiment was the recognition test phase.  In all three 
parts, participants had unlimited time to make their responses, and images remained on 
the screen until a response key was pressed.  Faces were always presented one at a 
time and positioned approximately in the centre of the display.  Trial order was 
randomized for each participant within the constraints of any blocking done for 
counterbalancing purposes.   
 
1. Face and name viewing. 
In this phase, participants passively viewed images of faces with their associated name 
printed below it.  All 12 target officers were shown in this phase, and each officer was 
shown in both a High and Low quality image.  Half of the officers were given the 
same name across both images, and half of the officers were given two different 
names.  In addition to the critical faces, there were several filler faces of morphed 
quality (50/50% of High and Low images).  Their purpose was to provide participants 
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with some exposure to morphed images, so that the Morphs in the test phase would not 
stand out as being obviously different in quality from the images seen in the learning 
phases.  There were 9 different officers‟ faces used as fillers.  Six were all given 
different names.  The other 3 were presented twice each and given the same name in 
both occurrences. 
 
2. Multiple choice name learning. 
In this phase, participants were presented with a series of faces each with three names 
printed below.  One name was the correct name (the name shown with that image in 
the previous phase) and the other two were names given to the images of other officers 
in the set.  Participants were asked to select the correct name by pressing the key on 
the keyboard that corresponded to the initial letter of that name.  The three names 
always started with different letters.  Pressing a letter key on the keyboard triggered a 
feedback message indicating if the response was correct or incorrect.  If the response 
was incorrect, the feedback also displayed the correct name.  All of the same items 
from the passive viewing phase were shown in this phase. 
 
3. Recognition test: Old/New face + confidence. 
In the test phase, half the items in the series were OLD (target faces) and half were 
NEW (distractor faces).  Participants were instructed to respond OLD if the face had 
been shown earlier in the experiment or NEW if the face was being shown for the very 
first time.  Participants were asked to base their judgements according to whether they 
thought the same person had been presented earlier rather than the exact same image.  
Therefore, it would be correct to respond OLD to an image that had never been seen 
before as long as it was judged to belong to one of the people shown earlier.  The “z” 
and “/” keys were pressed on the keyboard to indicate an OLD or NEW response 
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respectively (response keys reversed for half of the participants).  Pressing a response 
key triggered a prompt screen which asked for a confidence rating of 1, 2, or 3 with 
the following descriptions: 1. random guess, 2. pretty sure, and 3. very certain.  Thus, 
participants made an Old/New decision followed by a confidence rating on that 
decision for each image in the test series. 
 
The test phase began with six practice trials.  Half the faces in the practice trials were 
new faces and half were seen before as filler faces in the learning phases.  At some 
point during the test phase proper, all 12 target faces were shown in three different 
image types (Morph, High, and Low).  Distractor faces were also of three different 
image types and in equal numbers to match the number of image types of target faces. 
 
Results 
Study Phase 
Participants were more accurate at selecting the correct name in the study phase when 
the High and Low quality images of the same officer‟s face were seen initially with 
the same name (73% correct) compared with two different names (61% correct).  
Chance performance on this task was 33%.   
 
Test Phase 
Figure 4.7 shows the mean pattern of d‟ scores in each of the individual conditions.  
Separate repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on participant means of the 
proportion of OLD responses, the d‟ scores on the OLD/NEW responses, and the 
confidence ratings.  The ANOVAs probed for recognition differences due to whether 
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images of the same officer were learned with the same name or two different names 
and the type of image shown in the test phase. 
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Figure 4.7. d‟ in Experiment 10 as a function of image type and whether the face was 
learned with one name or two different names in the study phase.  Error bars represent 
95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
The analysis of the proportion of OLD responses did not reveal any significant 
differences among condition means.  Both the main effect of name and test image 
were nonsignificant (both p‟s > .7).  However, the Test Image x Names interaction did 
show a weak trend, p=.12.  The trend was for Low quality images to be the least 
recognized of the three image types for faces that were studied with two different 
names.  Also, there was a trend for Low quality images to be recognized more often 
when they belonged to faces studied with the same name compared to two different 
names. 
 
Distractors of differing image quality were not rejected equally as well however, 
F(2,94)=8.40, MSE=0.02, p<.001.  Low (M=.36, SD=.19) quality distractors were 
falsely recognized more often than either the Highs (M=.27, SD=.15) or the Morphs 
(M=.25, SD=.17) which did not differ.  Post hoc t test using Bonferroni adjustment for 
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multiple comparisons confirmed this pattern (see Table C4 in Appendix C for exact 
statistics). 
 
The d‟ analysis did find a main effect of image type, F(2,94)=8.01, MSE=1.02, 
p=.001.  Low (M=1.12, SD=0.83) quality images were recognized less accurately than 
Morphs (M=1.66, SD=1.02) or Highs (M=1.57, SD=1.01) which were equal.  
Bonferroni post hoc t tests confirmed this pattern (see Table C5 in Appendix C for 
exact statistics).  The main effect of names showed no effect, and the trend in the 
Name x Test Image interaction weakened, p=.21 (relative to the same interaction in 
the proportion old analysis). 
 
The pattern of results looks quite similar in the data using recognition confidence as 
the dependent variable.  Morph and High quality images seemed to be recognized 
more confidently for faces previously studied with two different names compared to 
the same name.  In contrast, Low quality images still seemed to show some advantage 
in the same name condition compared to the different name condition.  However, the 
ANOVA failed to detect any significant differences.   
 
Subsidiary analyses 
First presentation. 
Analyzing the first presentation only data in a separate repeated measures ANOVA of 
name and test image on the proportion of OLD responses also yielded no significant 
differences among condition means.  There were nonsignificant trends in both of the 
main effects.  The trends were as follows: 1. Faces studied with the same name were 
recognized more than those studied with different names.  2: High quality images were 
recognized more than Morphs and Low quality images which were similar. 
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Repeating the analysis of first presentation data using d‟ as the dependent variable did 
find a significant main effect of image type, F(2, 94)= 3.78, MSE=3.98, p=.03.  Post 
hoc Bonferroni t tests revealed that High quality images were better recognized than 
Low quality images, but no other comparisons of High, Low, and Morphed images 
were significant (see Table C6 in Appendix C for exact statistics).   
 
Repeating the analysis of first presentation data using recognition confidence as the 
dependent variable did find a significant main effect of image type, F(2, 94)= 3.44, 
MSE=1.39, p=.04.  However, post hoc paired-samples t tests failed to detect any 
significant differences among test image types after a Bonferroni adjustment for 
multiple comparisons was made, but the trend was for High quality images to be 
recognized more confidently than Low quality images. 
 
One thing to note is that on the first presentation of an officer‟s face the Name x Test 
Image interaction in the ANOVAs on the proportion OLD, d‟, or confidence ratings 
did not approach significance (all p‟s>.4).  In fact, the pattern of condition means was 
qualitatively different on the first presentation compared to the pattern produced by 
collapsing across all presentations.  Learning an officer‟s face with the same name led 
to increased recognition of the Morph and Low quality images but had no effect on 
High quality images.   
 
Third presentation. 
Analyzing the third presentation only data in three separate repeated measures 
ANOVA of name and test image on the proportion of OLD, d‟, and confidence ratings 
respectively found only one significant effect.  This was a main effect of test image 
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and was found in the d‟ analysis, F(2, 94)= 4.50, MSE=4.37, p=.01.  Post hoc 
Bonferroni t tests indicated that Morphs were better discriminated from distractors 
than Low quality images were, t(47)=2.95, SD=1.95, p=.015.  Morphs were better 
discriminated than High quality images were, but this difference just missed 
significance, p=.051.  The qualitative pattern of test image means was fairly consistent 
across all three dependent variables with Morphs being better recognized than High 
and Low quality images which were equal.  Names had no effect on recognition on its 
own nor did it have an interactive effect with test image.  However, a weak trend for 
better recognition of High quality images in the different name condition compared to 
the same name condition was observed across all three analyses of third presentation 
data.  Figure 4.8 summarizes the effect of image type on recognition on the first and 
third presentations using the proportion of old responses as an example. 
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Figure 4.8. Mean proportion of old responses in Experiment 10 on the first and third 
presentation of a face in the test phase as a function of the type of test image. 
First vs. third presentation. 
Three more repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to probe for recognition 
differences between the first and third presentations of an officer‟s face in the test 
phase.  The three ANOVAs analyzed proportion old responses, d‟, and confidence 
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ratings in turn.  Each of these ANOVAs analyzed the effects of presentation, test 
image, and names on recognition responses.  A fourth repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the proportion of old responses to distractor images to compare false 
alarm rates in the first block of test trials to the third block.  All post hoc comparisons 
were made using paired samples t tests with a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple 
comparisons. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the change in the proportion of old responses from the first to third 
presentation in the test phase across all levels of name and image type.  Old responses 
to targets showed no overall improvement whatsoever from first to third presentation.  
There was also no main effect of test image.  However, the influence of these variables 
was revealed by a significant interaction between presentation and test image, F(2, 
94)=3.98, MSE=.12 , p=.02.  Comparing third presentation responses to first 
presentation, Morphs were recognized more on the third, Highs less on the third, and 
Lows showed no change.  Post hoc testing confirmed that the effect of presentation 
differed between Morphs and High quality images, t(47)= 2.85, SD=.48, p=.019.  
There was also a nonsignificant trend for an interaction between names and 
presentation, p=.06.  Faces learned with the same name were better recognized on the 
first presentation at test relative to faces learned with two different names, but this 
trend disappeared and even slightly reversed on the third presentation at test.  Results 
from the ANOVA on confidence ratings were entirely consistent with those of the 
ANOVA on the proportion of old responses just described, and thus, to avoid 
redundancy, they will not be reported in full. 
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Figure 4.9. Mean difference between the proportion of old responses in the first and 
third presentations (3rd – 1st) of a face in the test phase of Experiment 10 as a function 
of image type and whether the face was learned with one name or two different names 
in the study phase.  Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
The d‟ ANOVA indicated a nonsignificant trend towards better overall discrimination 
in the third block of trials than the first block.  It also detected a significant main effect 
of test image, F(2, 94)= 5.05, MSE= 3.62., p=.01.  Post hoc tests found that this 
difference was due to Morphs being recognized better than Low quality images, t(47)= 
3.28, SD= 1.25, p=.006.  Again there was a significant interaction between test image 
and presentation, F(2, 94)= 3.47, MSE= 4.73, p=.04.  The pattern was that Morphs and 
Low quality images showed an improvement on the third presentation relative to the 
first, but High quality images showed a small decline.  Although post hoc testing 
revealed no significant differences, the trend of Morphs improving more than High 
quality images bordered on significance, p=.057.  The d‟ analysis will not differ from 
the proportion of old responses for any effects involving name, so the Names x 
Presentation trend was observed as described earlier. 
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Considering the d‟ and proportion old analyses together, it seems that a reduction in 
the false alarm rate was at least partly responsible for improvements in discrimination 
observed in the data from the third presentation.  An ANOVA on the proportion of old 
responses to distractors indicated that false alarm rates were affected by both the 
quality of the distractor image and whether the distractor was presented in the first or 
third block of test trials.  The main effect of image type was significant, F(2, 94)= 
6.73, MSE=.06, p<.01.  Post hoc testing revealed that Morphed distractors were judged 
falsely as old less often than Low quality distractors, t(47)= 3.40, SD=.25, p=.004; 
High quality distractors were also judged as old less often than Low quality 
distractors, t(47)= 2.49, SD=.27, p=.049; but Morph and High quality distractors 
showed no difference.  There was also a significant overall decline in the amount of 
old responses given to distractors in the third block of test trials compared to the first 
block, F(1, 47)= 4.95, MSE=.05, p=.03.  The interaction between trial block and image 
type was not significant.  However, inspection of the pattern of conditions means 
suggests that only Morph and Low quality distractors showed a notable reduction in 
false alarms from the first to third block of test trials (5.73%, 0.52%, and 10.43% 
reductions for Morph, High and Low quality distractors respectively). 
 
In summary, recognition performance tended to be higher on trials near the end of the 
test phase compared to the beginning.  This was demonstrated most clearly by the 
morphed images which received higher hit rates and confidence ratings to targets and 
a reduced false alarm rate to distractors.  Improvements on Low quality images were 
mainly due to a reduction in false alarms to distractors rather than improved 
recognition of targets.  In contrast, performance actually decreased for High quality 
images, and this was mainly due to decreased hits and confidence ratings to targets 
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with false alarms showing almost no change between trials in the first and third blocks 
of the test phase. 
 
Order of images in study phase. 
A separate repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to check if the order of the 
High and Low images in the initial passive viewing phase had any impact on Old/New 
judgements.  Order did not have any significant effect on the first trial at test or 
throughout the test phase (all p‟s >.05). 
 
Discussion 
Consistent with the results of Experiments 8 and 9, Experiment 10 also did not 
produce a clear overall prototype effect.  Even when participants learned to associate 
both the High and Low image of each officer‟s face with the same name, they still 
were no better at recognizing the average Morph compared to the individual exemplars 
they learned in the study phase. 
 
The naming manipulation did not have any clear influence on recognition in the test 
phase.  Overall, a face learned with the same name was about as well recognized as a 
face learned with two different names.  There was a trend, however, for Low quality 
images to be better recognized after being learned with the same name in the study 
phase compared to all other conditions.  The implication here might be that if 
recognition can be achieved from a close match to stored representations of the High 
quality image, additional activation from representations of the Low quality image 
would make little difference to the recognition judgement.  In contrast, if the Low 
quality image is more difficult to recognize, additional activation from stored 
representations of the High quality image may sometimes make the difference 
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between a recognition failure and a correct response.  This recognition benefit for Low 
quality images learned with the same name could be offset by a recognition benefit for 
High quality images in the different name condition which might promote more 
attention during the learning phase.  Since High quality images benefited the most 
from additional exposures in the study phase in Experiment 9, it is conceivable that the 
increased attention in the different name condition due to the greater difficulty of the 
task compared to the same name condition could have led to a larger recognition 
benefit for High quality images at test compared to Morphs and Low quality images.  
The end result would be no overall effect of the naming manipulation, but an 
interaction between naming condition and the type of image shown at test.  This is 
essentially what was found except the interaction was only observed as a trend in the 
data. 
 
Also of interest was the finding that although there was no sign of a prototype effect 
on the first presentation of an officer‟s face (in fact there was a trend in the reverse 
direction), on the third presentation, the prototype Morphs tended to be better 
recognized than the High and Low quality seen exemplars.  This pattern of results was 
found in Experiment 8 and also as a trend in Experiment 9.  Compared to performance 
on the first presentation, Morphs were better recognized on the third presentation, but 
recognition of High quality images seemed to actually get worse.  Participants were 
not much better at recognizing Low quality targets on the third presentation, but they 
did get better at rejecting Low quality distractors in the final block of test trials.  The 
effect of presenting an image first or last in the test phase will be discussed further in 
the chapter discussion.   
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Chapter Discussion 
In light of the previous two chapters, the experimental findings presented in this 
chapter came as quite a surprise.  In all three experiments, there was a failure to 
demonstrate the basic prototype effect. 
 
The approach to studying natural sources of within-face variation in this chapter set up 
an interesting situation.  It is already known that the prototype effect is quite reliable 
from the previous experiments and from the literature (Bruce et al., 1991; Busey & 
Tunnicliff, 1999; Cabeza et al., 1999), so there was good reason to expect it would be 
found in this situation too.  On the other hand, in the line-up task used by Bruce et al. 
(1999), participants were rather poor at matching the video still and the photograph of 
the same person together (reminder: Bruce et al. used the same set of stimuli as was 
used in Experiments 8-10).  This implies that the photo and the still are at least not 
obviously judged to be the same person by an unfamiliar observer.  This raises the 
question of whether or not a prototype mechanism should be operating in this situation 
if there is no judgement of shared identity between the still and the photo and no other 
type of top-down information to indicate such a relationship.   
 
In Experiment 8, I aimed simply to demonstrate the basic prototype effect using 
natural variants of the same person‟s face.  When this failed, I had to consider that to 
an unfamiliar viewer, exemplars of the same identity may not have been similar 
enough to produce the prototype effect.  If part of what is important to obtaining the 
prototype effect is the perception of shared identity among exemplars, then trying to 
increase participants‟ likelihood of perceiving the high and low quality images as the 
same person‟s face was the next logical step for follow-up experiments to take.  
Attempts were made using two different methods.  The first method was to make 
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participants more familiar with the faces.  The second method was to teach 
participants to associate a name with each face.   
 
In Experiment 9, additional exposure to half of the studied faces in the learning phase 
was provided.  The rationale was that participants would be more likely to perceive the 
shared identity of the high and low quality images if they were exposed to them a 
greater number of times.  Once participants were made slightly more familiar with a 
face, the prototype effect might then emerge.  However, Experiment 9 provided no 
evidence whatsoever in support of this hypothesis.  Additional familiarity with the 
images presented in the learning phase, if anything, tended to reverse the standard 
pattern of the prototype effect.  This result led me to consider that if the two studied 
exemplars were not initially perceived as the same individual, then merely presenting 
the images a greater number of times may do little to change this.  In fact, there is 
evidence from the categorization literature to support this.  In the absence of category 
feedback in the learning phase, participants cannot accurately identify the number of 
categories in the training set, and have difficulty learning categories except for 
categories that are composed of minimal distortions (Homa & Cultice, 1984).  Homa 
et al. (2001) further showed that prior observational learning does not facilitate 
category learning at least when the categories are not readily discernable from the 
start.  Therefore, unless participants receive some feedback about which images depict 
the same person, simply increasing the number of exposures may not help participants 
learn the different identities.  
 
In Experiment 10, instead of just repeating the same images more times, I tried to 
explicitly teach participants that the high and low quality image were the same 
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person‟s face.  I did this by using a face-name association task similar to the one used 
in Experiments 6 and 7.  For half of the faces, the high and low quality images both 
were given the same name.  Images of the other half of faces were learned with two 
different names so that I could test whether the naming manipulation did have an 
effect on recognition later in the test phase.  To be clear, if the prototype effect was not 
observed in Experiments 8 and 9 because the high and low quality images of the same 
face were not perceived as the same identity, then learning to associate the images 
with the same named identity might lead the prototype morph to be better recognized 
than the actually seen images at test.  However, the obtained pattern of results from 
this experiment did not support that hypothesis.  Whether the images of the same 
person‟s face were learned with one name or two, recognition of the morph, in relation 
to the seen exemplars, remained approximately constant.  One possible explanation for 
the lack of naming effect is that participants learned the exemplar-name pairs in 
relative isolation from one another.  Exemplar A might have been successfully 
associated with the name Bill and Exemplar B with the name Bill as well, but this did 
not cause Exemplars A and B to form an association with each other via the shared 
association with the name Bill.  Similarly, one could know two different people named 
Bill and have no trouble keeping them straight despite their mutual association with 
the name Bill. 
 
There was one more important finding from these experiments which was 
unanticipated.  Although only a trend in Experiments 9 and 10, Experiment 8 found 
that the prototype morph was recognized more confidently when it was the third image 
of a person‟s face to be presented at test rather than the first image (each face was 
presented as a high, low, and morphed image in some order within the test series).  
 246 
While recognition of all image types showed a general improvement on the third 
presentation (except for recognition of high quality target images in Experiment 10 
which tended to decrease), the improvement was most dramatic for morphed images.  
This finding was quite puzzling.  Why did additional learning in the study phase not 
show an increase in the prototype effect (perhaps even a decrease) but learning from 
earlier trials in the test phase did show at least a very strong trend in that direction?  I 
cannot offer a good explanation from these data alone, but learning in the study phase 
and the test phase likely had different effects on recognition.  However, there was a 
small confound in the experimental design.  To be clear, whether a morph, high, or 
low quality image was shown on the third trial was systematically related to which 
image types had been presented on the previous two test trials.  For example, if a 
morph was presented on the third trial, then a high and a low image were presented on 
the first two test trials in some order.  In contrast, if a high image was shown on the 
third test trial, then a morph and a low image were presented on the first two trials.  
Therefore, improvement on the morph when tested on the third trial relative to the 
first, could have related to having seen the high quality image earlier in the test phase.  
Participants might simply learn a face better from the high quality image, or the 
pattern of results reflects a more complex interplay between the current test image and 
the previously seen test images. 
 
There is one more factor that needs to be considered in the interpretation of findings 
from this chapter.  That is that Experiments 8-10 all used a slightly different task at 
test than the experiments in the previous chapters did.  The task was to judge whether 
the test image was one of the same people shown earlier rather than the same exact 
image.  Cabeza et al. (1999) found that these two slightly different tasks both produced 
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the same pattern of results (i.e. the prototype effect).  This finding was one of the main 
reasons it was anticipated that either task would produce the prototype effect.  
However, because the image qualities were quite salient in the stimuli that were used, 
a person recognition task was chosen.  Based on the present results, the possibility is 
raised that image recognition and person recognition tasks may both be capable of 
producing prototype effects, but they may be unlikely to occur in person recognition 
when the exemplars of the same person‟s face differ a lot in image quality. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 
 249 
Main Objectives 
The goal of the present work was to increase our understanding of how representations 
of faces are built from varying instances.  The prototype effect was used as a tool to 
investigate the nature of our internal face representations.  How is information derived 
from varying experiences with a face stored and retrieved in such a way that promotes 
recognition of the prototype?  A closer examination of the prototype effect may reveal 
important clues about the representations and processes underlying human face 
recognition.  At the very least, I aimed to highlight the importance of challenging our 
assumptions about the way memory works and the implications alternative theoretical 
perspectives may have for the field of face recognition. 
 
The current thesis reported the results of 10 experiments.  The general procedure for 
most of the experiments was as follows.  At least two exemplars of each identity were 
presented in the study phase followed by a recognition task in the test phase.  Among 
the images presented in the test series was a seen exemplar, the unseen prototype, and 
an unseen exemplar of each of the identities learned in the study phase.  In the 
experiments of Chapters 2 and 3, at test, participants rated how confident they were 
that the exact image had been shown before in the study phase.  Experiments in 
Chapter 4 used the more standard OLD/NEW face recognition task in the test phase.  
This task required participants to judge whether or not the test image depicted one of 
the people shown earlier in the experiment regardless of whether the exact same image 
had been seen earlier or not.  The key comparison of interest was between recognition 
of the seen exemplar and the unseen prototype.  The prototype effect was considered 
present if the recognition of unseen prototypes was higher than that of seen exemplars.  
Prototype effects were tested using four different types of stimuli: PROfit composites 
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(Chapter 2), PCA generated images (Chapter 3), morphed images (Chapter 3), and 
natural/unaltered images (Chapter 4).  Experiments differed in terms of the variables 
manipulated to test potential sources of influences on the strength of the prototype 
effect.  These manipulations tested important predictions based on different accounts 
of recognition memory to shed light on the origin of the prototype effect in face 
recognition. 
Main Findings 
The main finding of the majority of experiments presented in the current thesis is that 
the prototype effect in face recognition is a robust effect and is unaffected by a number 
of experimental manipulations (Chapters 2 and 3).  Across several experiments, the 
consistent result was that after studying a set of images of the same person‟s face, 
participants were best at recognizing the average image of that face.  Despite having 
never been presented in the study phase, the average image was more confidently 
recognized even compared to an image that really had been in the study phase.  
Unexpectedly, all of the strategic attempts to modulate the basic prototype effect were 
unsuccessful.  So it came as a great surprise that when I tried instead to generalize my 
findings by using natural images of real people‟s faces, the prototype effect 
disappeared (Chapter 4). 
 
It was ironic that all the things I thought might disrupt the prototype effect had no 
effect, but the one thing I thought would not alter the effect, the use of natural images, 
destroyed it near completely.  Thus, we are left with two big questions.  First, why 
were consistent prototype effects observed in the face of manipulations such as 
familiarity and name learning in the experiments of Chapters 2 and 3?  Second, why 
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did the prototype effect in face recognition go away when the stimuli switched from 
artificially constructed variations of each identity to natural images of real people? 
Prototype Effects: The Role of Other Variables 
 
Familiarity 
Overall, familiarity did not change the direction or strength of the prototype effect in 
face recognition (Chapter 2).  Although there was also some evidence that increased 
familiarity with the exemplars in the study phase aids their later recognition more than 
a morphed average, this was only true when recognizing the higher, but not the lower, 
quality seen exemplar (Experiment 9).  Thus, the interactive effect of familiarity with 
the type of image shown in the test phase in Experiment 9 more likely reflected the 
effect of familiarity on the recognition of exemplars differing in image quality rather 
than how it differentially affected the recognition of seen exemplars vs. unseen 
prototypes.  Therefore, it can be concluded that familiarity, as manipulated in the 
experiments of the current thesis, had roughly the same impact on the recognition of 
prototypes as it had on seen exemplars. 
 
The method of familiarization is of critical importance when interpreting the role of 
familiarity in prototype recognition.  Essentially, familiarity was manipulated by 
controlling how many times the seen exemplars of each face were presented in the 
learning part of the experiment.  No matter whether a face was in the higher familiarity 
condition or the lower familiarity condition, participants always saw the same number 
of different exemplars of each face.  The only difference was that in the higher 
familiarity condition, the same exemplars were repeated multiple times, but in the 
lower familiarity condition, the exemplars in the study phase were only shown once 
each.  This is important because as we become familiar with a new person‟s face in 
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everyday life, we experience a wide range of variation in the appearance of their face.  
Being exposed to a greater number of different variants of a person‟s face is quite 
different than being exposed to the same variants a greater number of times.  As Bruce 
(1994) points out, “experience of variations . . . within an individual may actually help 
rather than hinder the encoding process, just as an increase in the sample size in any 
analysis makes it more likely to reveal genuine differences between samples” (p. 24).  
Furthermore, it is well established in the categorization literature that categorization of 
novel patterns to newly learned categories improves with increases in the number of 
different exemplars studied in the category (e.g. Homa et al., 1973; Homa, Sterling, & 
Trepel, 1981; Homa & Vosburgh, 1976).  By extension, one would expect that the 
greater number of variable experiences a viewer has with a person‟s face, the more 
likely it will be recognized under different viewing conditions.   
 
If variability is important to the process of face familiarization, why then did I choose 
to manipulate the number of exemplar repetitions rather than the number of different 
exemplars?  The reason was quite simple.  It is difficult to conceive of any plausible 
account of memory that would NOT predict that encoding more exemplars of the same 
category (i.e. an individual‟s face) would increase recognition of the category‟s 
prototype more than a previously seen exemplar.  In fact, increasing category size not 
only increases classification performance of non-studied exemplars but also decreases 
old/new discrimination performance in recognition memory tasks (Omohundro, 1981).  
Since it had already been demonstrated that the prototype effect can be observed after 
minimal learning (Homa et al., 2001), an account must be capable of predicting a 
prototype effect at least under some circumstances to be considered plausible.  
However, the only type of account that would not predict a stronger prototype effect 
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after learning more exemplars from the same category would be, by necessity, 
incapable of predicting a prototype effect in the first place.  Therefore, if familiarity 
had been manipulated by increasing the number of different exemplars of each face, 
then it would not have advanced our understanding of the prototype effect or our 
understanding of how we become familiar with new people‟s faces. 
 
It could be argued that the method of manipulating familiarity merely increased 
participants‟ familiarity with the individual exemplars shown in the study phase rather 
than with the different identities of the faces per se.  This is a valid criticism.  
However, in this particular situation, it was a more meaningful method of investigating 
the representations underlying the prototype effect in face recognition.  By varying the 
number of exemplar repetitions, the participants‟ level of experience with a limited 
number of specific exemplars was increased.  Because the prototype was never 
presented before the recognition test phase, participants had no prior experience with 
the prototype stimulus.  Thus, the familiarity manipulation only varied the 
participants‟ experience with the seen exemplars, while leaving the novelty of the 
prototype unchanged.  The finding that the unseen prototype was recognized more 
confidently than the seen exemplar even after participants were repeatedly exposed to 
the seen exemplars in the learning phase, was a powerful demonstration of the 
prototype effect in face recognition.   
 
The following subsection will focus on how the process of familiarization relates to 
theories about the way we store and represent the identity of different faces in 
memory.  Multiple trace theories of memory will not be considered in depth because 
they are capable of predicting almost any result given the right circumstances.  
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Instead, I will introduce Burton et al.‟s (2005) proposal of an averaging mechanism 
which improves the representation of a face as it becomes familiar.  Implications of 
their approach to the interpretation of prototype effects, particularly across levels of 
familiarity, will be discussed.   
 
Theories of familiarization  
How might our representations of a face change as we become more familiar with it?  
The most obvious account is that the more experience we have with a particular face, 
the more numerous and various the collection of exemplars (or episodic traces) of that 
face becomes.  This would not only increase the chance of any given novel exemplar 
of a face being highly similar (i.e. above threshold) to at least one of the stored 
exemplars of the same identity, but would also increase the number of similar 
exemplars contributing to the strength of the familiarity signal produced in response to 
the probe.  If one makes no initial assumptions about the nature of memory 
representations, this account of familiarity seems arguably to be the most 
straightforward and intuitive explanation. 
 
However, implicit in a great deal of discussions within the face recognition literature is 
the assumption that each known face is represented by a unitary structure (or by a 
small number of different views) stored in memory.  For example, any face-space 
model of recognition memory that represents each face as a point in multidimensional 
space assumes that, regardless of the number of times a person‟s face has been 
experienced, only a single representation of it will be stored (Valentine, 1991).  
Assuming one representation exists in memory for each known face, it follows 
naturally to ask how this representation might change as a face becomes more familiar.  
For example, it is a widely held view that the internal features become more precisely 
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encoded or are somehow made more salient in the representations of more familiar 
faces.  A related possibility is that participants may base their recognition judgements 
more on the internal vs. external features of the face to a greater extent as the face 
becomes more familiar (Burton et al., 2003).   
 
Most models of face recognition are models of familiar face recognition and largely 
ignore the process of familiarization of newly learned faces (e.g. Bruce & Young, 
1986; Burton & Bruce, 1993; Valentine, 1991).  However, Burton et al. (2005) have 
helped to fill this theoretical gap in the literature by offering a detailed explanation of 
how we form stable representations of familiar faces.  Burton et al. proposed that the 
benefits of familiarity are achieved by refining the face representations through a 
process of exemplar averaging.  They developed an artificial system to simulate the 
effect of level of experience on recognizing faces across large variations in image 
quality.  Images of 50 different celebrities‟ faces were collected off the internet and 
were morphed to a common shape.  One image (shape-free) was set aside for use as a 
test image.  A prototype representation of each person‟s face was made by taking the 
mean intensity for each pixel across images of the same identity.  The number of 
images contributing to each average was varied between 1 (a single image) and 19.  
PCA was then conducted on these average prototypes, and this generated 50 
eigenfaces which the test images were projected onto.  It was considered a hit (i.e. 
correct recognition) if the nearest neighbour of the test image was the average of the 
same person‟s face.  An exemplar version of the system was also developed for 
comparison purposes.  It used the same images as the averaging system except no 
averages were constructed.  Instead, the PCA was conducted on the set of individual 
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images.  Nearest neighbour and summed similarity matches were made between the 
test image and the images that the PCA was ran on.   
 
The important findings from Burton et al.‟s (2005) simulations were as follows.  First, 
systems based on image averaging consistently outperformed systems based on the 
individual images.  The summed similarity version of the exemplar-based system 
showed the worst performance, so only findings from the nearest neighbour systems 
will be summarized.  Second, as the number of images used per face increased, so did 
the hit rate.  Thus, it seems that an average representation will be better able to support 
accurate face recognition if it is built up from a greater number of images.  Note also, 
that when the system learned only one image per face, hit rates were only 13% 
(chance= 2%).  But as the number of images increased from 3-9, the advantage of the 
prototype system over the exemplar-based system remained fairly stable (~6% 
difference).  Hit rates peaked at approximately 75% when image averages were 
composed from 19 different images of the same person‟s face.  Thus, it seems that 
storing faces as averages or as instances are both plausible representational strategies 
that might underlie our poor ability at recognizing unfamiliar faces and our incredibly 
accurate recognition of familiar faces.  Since Burton et al.‟s focus was on 
demonstrating how an average prototype can provide a powerful, robust representation 
of a face, they do not specify what exactly caused their exemplar-based system to 
perform more accurately when there were higher numbers of images per face in the 
learning set.  In particular, it was not mentioned how the number of images per face 
affected the eigenfaces generated by the PCA conducted on the sets of individual 
images which affects the similarity relations among images encoded in the space. 
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Burton et al. (2005) highlighted several characteristics of image averages which make 
them a good candidate for representing familiar faces.  Since even unfamiliar faces can 
be recognized quite accurately when there is no change in image between study and 
test, what we gain by becoming familiar with a faces is a reduced sensitivity to 
properties of the image which are not related to the identity of the face.  Burton et al. 
argued that inconsistencies among images of the same face will be removed from the 
representation as a natural consequence of the averaging process.  Thus, the ratio of 
relevant to irrelevant identity information will be higher (on average) in an average 
image than in any given one of its constituent images.  Of course, as the number of 
images increases, the contribution each image makes to the average representation 
decreases, so the average will come to reflect more what the image have in common 
and less what they do not have in common.  If one assumes that internal features 
exhibit less variation across a large number of encounters than external features, then 
an averaging process might also explain why the internal features of a face become 
more important to recognition as it becomes more familiar. 
 
To gain support for their proposal that an identity is represented by the average of all 
its seen images (i.e. exemplars), Burton et al. (2005) tested how well human 
participants could identify celebrities from their image averages.  Participants 
performed faster in a name verification task and were also more likely to respond with 
the correct name (or another piece of identifying information) when presented with an 
average image of a celebrity (81% hits) compared to one of the individual images that 
the average was made from (77% hits).  Thus, Burton et al. did observe a prototype-
like effect in face identification using familiar faces.  However, face learning was 
uncontrolled, so the average image could not be constructed to correspond to the exact 
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mean of the participant‟s previous experiences with a given person‟s face.  
Furthermore, none of the individual or averaged images was expected to have been 
seen before by participants.  Therefore, performance was being compared between two 
unseen images of a face rather than between an unseen average and a seen exemplar 
image, as was the case in all of the experiments in the current work (with the 
exception of Experiment 6).  
 
Burton et al. (2005) also used human participants to test the hypothesis that the more 
images per face being averaged together, the more identifiable the resulting image will 
become.  The reasoning here is that identification performance is a function of the 
degree of match between the probe image and its corresponding identity representation 
stored in long term memory.  Participants were, in fact, faster to correctly verify the 
name of face from an average image when the average was built from more images.  
The authors suggested that experiencing a greater number of varying images improves 
the quality of the average representation. 
 
Essentially the same reasoning was used to account for the prototype effects found in 
the current experiments within a prototype framework of representation (Experiments 
1-6).  Participants were more confident that they had seen the unseen prototype image 
of a person‟s face even compared to the images that they actually had seen earlier in 
the experiment.  If participants formed an image average representation of each 
studied identity, then the prototype image was more confidently recognized because it 
approximated the prototype representation stored in memory. 
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It was also found that repeating the exemplars in the study phase produced no change 
in the strength of the prototype effect (Chapter 2).  At first this may seem entirely 
consistent with Burton et al.‟s (2005) account of face learning.  Repetition of 
exemplars should not change the mean value for the identity which corresponds to the 
abstracted prototype.  Thus, the degree of match between the test image and the 
abstracted prototype representation should not change across levels of familiarization 
for either the prototype or exemplar test images.  But repeating the exemplars in the 
study phase led to dramatic increases in rated confidence for prototypes, seen, and 
unseen exemplars alike.  It is reasonable to assume that additional repetitions may 
produce a prototype representation that is a slightly closer approximation of the “true 
mean” of a pair of images because random noise in the encoding process will tend to 
average out.  However, I would expect this to have very minimal effects on confidence 
ratings and would likely only become a factor in circumstances where encoding was 
made difficult (e.g. brief exposure, adding random noise to images).  Therefore, if the 
prototype effect in face recognition is due to storing an average representation for each 
identity, then the effect of familiarity gained through repeated exposure to the training 
images cannot be fully accounted for by a refinement of the underlying face 
representation. 
 
Nor can the effect of additional repetitions be accounted for by an increase in the 
likelihood that images of the same identity will be averaged into a prototype 
representation.  This was the reasoning used in Chapter 2 to predict a stronger 
prototype effect following additional repetitions, but the results of those experiments 
showed no such change.   
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To explain how repetition of exemplars increased the confidence ratings to the 
prototype but not the strength of the prototype effect, I will assume that whatever is 
causing the small advantage for prototypes over seen exemplars after minimal 
exposure is also responsible for the same effect observed after additional learning.  
Furthermore, I will also assume that the large difference in confidence ratings between 
faces that were and were not in the familiarization training had a different underlying 
cause (than the prototype effect).  The prototype account of the prototype effect is that 
the prototype stimulus is recognized best because it has the highest degree of match 
with the prototype representation in memory.  Thus, the relative degree of match 
between prototype and seen exemplar probes to their prototype representation in 
memory should not be altered by repeating the studied exemplars (because repetition 
does not alter the average value).  If repetition actually improved the prototype 
representation, then this improvement must have affected the recognition of prototypes 
and seen exemplars equally.  It is not obvious what sort of cognitive model would 
function in this manner.  However, a detector-based model like Morton‟s (1969) 
logogen model might account for the pattern of results by assuming that every 
presentation of a person‟s face slightly increases the resting activation of the detector 
for that person‟s face.  Thus, increasing the number of repetitions of a face in the study 
phase will increase the likelihood that a test face will be identified as the repeating 
face (or judged as old).  Of course, this is not a very satisfying explanation because 
with repeated exposure to a face, the probability that the detector for that face will 
reach threshold in responses to other people‟s faces will also increase. 
 
Recent work by Megreya and Burton (2007) demonstrated that familiarity increases 
participants‟ ability to match two different images of the same person‟s face and also 
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to discriminate between images of two similar looking people‟s faces.  This evidence 
suggests that as one becomes more familiar with a person‟s face, it will be less likely 
to be confused with other people‟s faces.  McClelland and Chappell (1998) developed 
a model of single-item recognition to account for the effects of repetition on 
recognition memory.  In their model, as one becomes familiar with something, they 
acquire more precise knowledge of what properties it does and does not have.  Their 
approach involves estimating the likelihood of observing a set of features assuming 
that the probe is an instance of a particular stored item.  The stored representations 
themselves are probability estimates that become more precise through experience.  
Therefore, after repeated exposures, a representation of item x will be more likely to 
be activated by an item x probe, but less likely to be activated by a probe of a different 
item.  Importantly, as repeated exposure to item x increases, recognition of a probe of 
a similar item will at first increase and then gradually decrease.  How many exposures 
are needed before the false alarm rate will peak and reverse depends on how similar 
the distractor item is to the target item x.  This may provide a clue to why participants 
falsely recognize the prototype more after repeated exposure.  The idea that items 
could be represented as a vector of probability estimates is intriguing, but their model 
does not generalize easily to representations of items such as individual faces which 
vary subtly from one encounter to the next.  However, their approach to the problem 
may be promising if it can be adapted or extended to model learning in face 
recognition. 
 
McClelland and Chappell‟s (1998) model does do a good job at accounting for 
prototype effects found using word lists.  Studies of false recognition of words 
semantically related to words in a preceding study list have manipulated the frequency 
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of studied words.  Hall and Kozloff (1970) varied frequency of a critical target word in 
the study list from 1 to 7.  They found that false recognition of the critical lure (a word 
chosen to be similar to the target word) first increased and then decreased after 
reaching a peak at a presentation frequency of 3.  In a related study, Hall and Kozloff 
(1973) showed that increasing the number of different associate words, instead of the 
number of repetitions of the same associate word, steadily increased false recognition 
without any decline.  Although, recognizing words in a task like this would be 
different than recognizing faces, the findings of Hall and Kozloff may have some 
implications to the current investigation.  If, under certain circumstances, it is true that 
as the number of repetitions of an exemplar increases, recognition of a similar, but 
otherwise unseen, exemplar will increase to a point and then decrease, then there are at 
least some grounds for the suggestion that familiarity might have a nonmonotonic 
effect on the prototype effect.  Assuming that the unseen prototype is similar to the 
studied exemplars, it would be falsely recognized at low levels of repetition because it 
activates traces of the studied exemplars with sufficient strength.  At higher levels of 
repetitions, representations of the exemplars become more highly differentiated, and 
thus, the prototype stimulus is no longer a close enough match for generalization to 
occur. 
 
Hintzman and Curran (1995) found similar results when the targets and critical lures 
differed only in terms of the plurality of a base word (e.g. bell vs. bells).  Again, 
repetition of the target word in the study phase increased false recognition of the 
critical lure up to a frequency of 3, and then gradually decreased as frequency was 
increased beyond this point.  But this gradual decline of false alarms was very slight, 
and even after 20 presentations of the target word in the study list, participants were 
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still poor at rejecting the critical lure (false alarm rate ~50%).  Even when participants 
were made aware before the study phase that they would need to remember whether 
the study word was singular or plural in order to distinguish it from the lures at test, 
participants showed very little improvement past a study list target frequency of 3.   
 
The findings of Hintzman and Curran (1995) as well as those of Hall and Kozloff 
(1970) are generally consistent with what was found about the effect of repetition on 
the recognition of unseen exemplars in Experiments 1-3.  An interesting consequence 
of increasing participants‟ familiarity with the studied exemplars was that the seen 
exemplars, the prototypes, and even the unseen exemplars were all rated more 
confidently as having been seen before.  While one might anticipate increased 
recognition of the prototype after familiarization training, it was very surprising that 
unseen exemplars, falling outside the range of experienced variation, were also rated 
higher.  In general, after familiarization training, participants went from being 
uncertain as to whether the unseen exemplar had been seen before to guessing with 
low confidence that it had been seen before.  In other words, participants were actually 
worse at correctly rejecting the unseen exemplar when they were made more familiar 
with the studied exemplars.  So just like experiments using word associates, 
participants made more correct rejections of the unseen exemplar (or critical lure) 
when the studied exemplar had been shown only once in the study phase compared to 
when the studied exemplar was repeated (although correct rejection was best when the 
unseen item was unrelated to study items).  Because only two levels of familiarity 
were tested, one cannot be sure of what shape the function relating the number of 
repetitions to false recognition of the unseen exemplar would take.  Hintzman and 
Curran‟s finding suggests that because the unseen exemplar shares the same basic 
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features with the studied exemplar, performance on the unseen exemplar might show 
very little change one way or the other after only a few repetitions of the studied 
exemplar.  However, Hintzman and Curran did discover a way to get participants to 
achieve near perfect discrimination, and this will be discussed later in the next section. 
 
Intentional vs. incidental learning. 
Comparable prototype effects were found regardless of whether participants were 
warned at the start of the study phase of the recognition test that would follow or not 
(Experiments 1 and 2).  This finding does not support Bruce et al.‟s (1991) finding that 
the prototype effect tends to be weaker when the exemplars in the study phase were 
learned using an intentional memorization task compared to an incidental learning 
task.  However, the current results are not entirely inconsistent as Bruce et al. also 
noted that intentional learning might only weaken the prototype effect when the 
exemplars of the same identity were easily discriminable.   
 
If intention does play a role in prototype recognition, it is not likely to have any effect 
beyond what could be achieved by other means of increasing (or decreasing) attention 
to the details of the images.  Bruce (1994) argued that any manipulation that draws 
attention toward the variation among exemplars of the face has the potential to 
decrease the strength of the prototype effect provided that these differences were 
discernable in the first place.  Bruce reported results from an experiment that used 
internal feature-shifting to create within-identity exemplars.  This technique causes the 
length of the chin and forehead to vary among exemplars of the same face, but the 
length of the nose only varies among exemplars of different identities.  When 
participants were asked to make judgements about the length of the chin in the study 
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phase, the strength of the prototype effect was reduced compared to when participants 
were asked to make judgements about the length of the nose.  Similarly, Neumann 
(1977) found that the basic instruction “try to remember each face exactly as shown” 
led to a prototype effect in face recognition (prototype compared to unseen exemplar), 
but adding “so that if I later show you an identical face you will be able to recognize 
it, but if I show you a very similar face you will be able to reject it” led to reverse 
prototype effect.  Adding to the basic instruction information as to which dimensions 
the faces would vary on also produced a reverse prototype effect, but adding 
information about the dimensionality did not influence the prototype effect when the 
elaborated version of the basic instruction was given. 
 
The same-face exemplars used in the current experiments were likely too similar to 
allow the intention of the participant to disrupt the mechanisms underlying the 
prototype effect.  Even still, it is interesting that despite instructions to memorize each 
exemplar separately in the study phase and to make a judgement about the prior 
occurrence of the specific image in the test phase, participants were unable to reject 
the prototype.  Since the learning task was devoid of category feedback, it seems as 
though the visual similarity alone resulted in participants being incapable of 
selectively recognizing an exemplar of a face in isolation from other similar 
exemplars.  The implication here is that an intent to form distinct memories for two 
separate events (or exemplars) will not affect our ability to do so provided they are 
highly similar.  Note that even though participants were aware of how subtle the 
differences between the actually studied images and their unseen counterparts would 
be, they nonetheless were still fairly confident that the prototype image was in fact the 
exact image they had seen before.  Note also that it was not the case that the prototype 
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was completely indistinguishable from its two studied exemplars.  If it had been, 
participants would have been equally confident about the prior occurrence of both seen 
exemplars and prototypes, but they were even more confident about the prototypes. 
 
Similarly, Hintzman and Curran (1995) found that only when participants were forced, 
rather than strongly encouraged, to judge on a trial-by-trial basis whether the study list 
word was singular or plural could they achieve near perfect discrimination of target 
and critical word pairs (e.g. target = bells, critical lure = bell).  The words bell and 
bells are clearly distinguishable, but nonetheless highly confusable in memory.  
Attempting to remember the exact form of the word will not lead participants to 
correctly reject the lure; however, making a specific judgment about the discriminating 
feature will dramatically improve performance.  Participants on this task likely used 
information about the discriminating feature in a similar way to how participants 
might have used information gained by judging the length of the chin in the 
experiment reported by Bruce (1994). 
 
Naming 
Whether exemplars of the same facial identity were all learned with the same name or 
with two different names during the learning phases, made no difference to the 
strength of the prototype effect in three separate experiments.  This was true when 
prototype effects were observed (Experiments 5 and 6) and when they were not 
observed (Experiment 10).  Although it is difficult to conclude based on null results 
that the prototype effect in face recognition cannot be influenced by naming learning, 
at the very least, it seemed to be the case that it is not easily influenced.  The 
implications of this are actually very important.  In particular, the naming experiments 
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helped bridge the gap between the categorization literature and the face recognition 
literature. 
 
Homa et al. (2001) investigated whether category formation is a necessary prerequisite 
for false recognition of the category prototype.  In their study, the stimuli were faces, 
but the categories were three “families” of similar looking faces rather than categories 
of three different identities.  Any two faces from the same family may or may not have 
resembled the same individual, but they would have at least looked quite similar.  
They found that participants who were trained to classify faces into one of three 
families were just as likely to falsely recognize the unseen category prototype as one 
of the training faces as participants who were simply shown the training faces and told 
to remember them.  Participants who merely viewed the training faces were unaware 
of the three families of faces and did not acquire category knowledge.  If it is true that 
unseen prototypes are falsely recognized because they correspond to an abstracted 
prototype of a category, then why would the unseen prototype also be falsely 
recognized when no categories had been learned?  Thus, recognition of the unseen 
prototype should not be taken as evidence of an earlier abstraction process.  The 
important implication of this to my experiments is that it may not have mattered 
whether or not participants associated two studied exemplars with the same name.  
They may have been just as likely to judge the unseen prototype as old in either case. 
 
Based on their findings, Homa et al. (2001) concluded that classification training (with 
feedback) may improve a participant‟s ability to correctly classify the unseen 
prototype as a member of a learned category, but is unlikely to improve the 
participant‟s ability to correctly reject it as being one of the training exemplars.  This 
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would explain why no effect of naming was found in Experiments 5 and 6.  
Experiment 10 was a little different in that participants were asked to judge if a test 
face was one of the same people shown in the study phase rather than the same image.  
But since the name of the face was not requested, it is not entirely clear whether 
predictions based on a recognition or a categorization task are more appropriate.  
Given that name learning had no impact on how well participants recognized a target 
from its prototype image, results suggest participants treated the task as one of 
recognition memory. 
 
Context 
Using cartoon bodies to provide an associated context for learning faces did not 
influence the participants‟ confidence of having studied the unseen prototype image 
relative to other image types including the actually seen exemplars (Experiment 4).  
Applying a consistent context to the four exemplars of the same identity did not 
increase the strength of the prototype effect relative to applying varied contexts.  
Therefore, no evidence was found that shared context facilitates any sort of abstraction 
mechanism that may be operating on exemplars of the same identity during the study 
phase.  A similar result was reported in an unpublished study by Bonner, Bruce, and 
Burton (2003) who found no effect of consistent vs. varied semantic information on 
learning new faces.  In their experiment, over 3 days of training, they familiarized 
participants with a set of previously unfamiliar people‟s faces using short video clips 
alongside an auditory dialogue containing either three or nine pieces of fictitious 
semantic information about each face.  In the consistent condition, faces were 
presented with the same nine pieces of semantic information which were given each 
time the clip was shown on each of the three days.  In the varied condition, faces were 
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presented with three pieces of semantic information on the first day, a different three 
on the second day, and another different three on the third day.  Consistency of the 
semantic information during learning did not influence participants‟ ability to judge 
whether two images were of the same person or two different people in a simultaneous 
face matching task involving the familiarized targets and similar looking distractors.  
Face matching, particularly on trials where only the internal features were visible, was 
used as an index of familiarity because participants should get better at this task as 
they become more familiar with a person‟s face.  It is possible that if context does play 
a role in face recognition, it has more to do with judgements of memory rather than 
our ability to recognize the same identity across variable viewing conditions or to 
learn to differentiate identical twins.  For example, context might affect how well we 
can remember who a person is, but it may be unlikely to affect our ability to perceive 
the diagnostic elements of a face‟s identity. 
 
Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Masson (2007) found that providing an associated context 
picture with each face image during learning affected the subjective experience of 
recognizing faces.  In a remember/know test (see Tulving, 1985), participants were 
more likely to report consciously remembering a target face from the study phase if it 
was presented with the same studied context at test compared to a context studied with 
a different face or a new context.  Conversely, when target faces were presented with a 
new context, participants were more likely to report merely “knowing” the face had 
been seen before than they were to report consciously remembering it.  Furthermore, 
the false alarm rate was higher for distractor faces presented with one of the studied 
contexts compared to a new context.  Thus, participants may sometimes attribute their 
memory of the context picture to their memory of the face.  However, memory 
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judgements were not simply based on memory for the face plus memory for the 
context because it was only when the face and context had been studied together that 
conscious recollection of target face was enhanced.  This might explain why 
participants in Experiment 4 were more confident that the image had been seen before 
when it was presented with the same context at study and test despite context having 
no effect on the prototype effect.  Reinstating the studied context at test may have 
increased participants recognition for the identity of the test image, but it may not have 
affected their ability to discriminate subtle differences among images of the same face.  
This again implies that participants cannot detangle their memory for a particular 
image of a face from the memory of that person‟s face in general.   
 
Similarity of Studied Exemplars 
Due in part to the lack of effect of other manipulated variables on the strength of the 
prototype effect, the results discussed so far have been taken as suggestive of an 
underlying mechanism driven primarily by exemplar similarity.  The role of exemplar 
similarity in learning new faces was investigated in Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 2 as 
well as in Experiment 6 in Chapter 3.  In the experiments of Chapter 2, similarity of 
the studied exemplars was termed “distance.”  Distance referred to the distance 
between same-face exemplars in terms of the position of the internal features along the 
vertical axis of the face outline.  Exemplars in a near pair were more similar to one 
another than exemplars in a far pair.  I thought that additional learning might affect the 
prototype effect differently depending on the discriminability of exemplars of the 
same identity.  However, no such interaction was found.  As for the effect of similarity 
on the strength of the prototype effect, the interpretation is a bit more complicated.  
Overall, similarity of the studied exemplars did not affect recognition of the average 
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prototype relative to exemplars that were close to the average.  But similarity did have 
an effect on recognition of seen exemplars.  Seen exemplars were given higher 
recognition ratings when they were more similar to the other exemplar of the same 
face presented in the study phase.  Prototype and exemplar-based models alike can 
easily account for this finding either by distance from the stored prototype or by the 
summed similarity to stored exemplars or episodic traces.  Thus, prototype and 
exemplar-based models predict that the recognition of both prototypes and seen 
exemplars would increase with increasing similarity of studied exemplars for the same 
reasons just given.  Because of this, inferring the role of similarity in prototype 
abstraction from changes in the strength or direction of the prototype effect in face 
recognition is often problematic. 
 
The results from Experiments 1-3 conflict with those of Cabeza et al. (1999) who 
found that similarity of studied exemplar did affect the strength of the prototype effect 
using a similar feature shift manipulation.  Increasing the similarity of studied 
exemplars increased recognition of the prototype, but had inconsistent effects on seen 
and unseen exemplars.  However, similarity was severely confounded with the 
distinctiveness of studied exemplars.  In their study, the range of internal feature shifts 
covered the whole length of the face which made the studied exemplars at medium 
similarity to look a bit strange, and at low similarity, they looked very bizarre.  Not 
only would this make lower similarity exemplars more memorable, but it would also 
draw participants‟ attention to the variation in feature placement (most noticeably, size 
of chin/forehead).  As Bruce (1994; Bruce et al., 1991) has also noted, manipulations 
that increase attention to the subtle details of the images will likely decrease the 
strength of the response to the prototype image.  Bruce et al. found strong prototype 
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effects for stimuli using a feature shift variation size somewhere in between that used 
in the near condition and that used in Cabeza et al.‟s large variation size.  Although the 
size of the feature shift used by Bruce et al. (in the bimodal condition) was larger than 
what was used here (Experiments 1-3), the internal features did not approach the 
borders of the face.  They also noted that in unpublished experiments using variation 
sizes larger than those they reported, the prototype effect did not weaken.  Thus, using 
a feature shift manipulation, similarity of studied exemplars may not have a strong 
effect on the prototype effect unless exemplars are made so dissimilar that they may 
not appear like plausible faces. 
 
Results of Experiment 6 did not reveal any clear role of similarity on the strength of 
the prototype effect.  Actually, similarity did not produce any significant effects at all.  
However, when exemplar pairs were learned with two different names, there was a 
trend towards a weakening of the prototype effect.  In fact, in the different name 
condition, there was no sign of the prototype effect at medium similarity and even a 
slight trend for a reversal of the effect at low similarity.  Even still, participants‟ mean 
rating to prototypes learned from low similarity exemplars with two different names 
was just over 7 on a 1-9 scale (5=0% confident; 9=100% confident that the image was 
one of the studied images).  Pilot testing of the stimuli ensured that low similarity 
exemplars were perceived as two different people‟s faces when viewed side-by-side.  
This is important because if one uses the prototype effect in face recognition as a tool 
to probe the nature of memory representations of individual faces, then a finding that 
prototype effects can be observed using exemplars of different identities may severely 
limit the conclusions one can draw using such an approach.   
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Other studies have also found that unseen prototypes based on studied images of two 
or more different identities are, at the very least, difficult to reject as having been one 
of the studied images.  For example, Cabeza et al. (1999) found that prototypes built 
from four studied images of different identities were given a confidence rating of 
approximately 5 (i.e. almost no confidence) by participants using a 0-9 scale similar to 
the one used in Experiment 6 (1-9 scale).  Busey and Tunnicliff (1999) found a 
significant prototype effect for a 50% morph between two studied images of different 
people‟s faces, but only when the two faces being averaged belonged to similar, but 
not dissimilar, looking people.  Importantly, however, both of these studies reported an 
effect of exemplar similarity.  The prototype effect weakened or disappeared when the 
similarity of studied exemplars was decreased
4
.  I did not find a significant effect of 
similarity on the magnitude of the prototype effect (Experiment 6), but there was a 
trend in that direction at least in the different name condition.  Furthermore, the 
prototype effect found by Solso and McCarthy (1981) using a feature swapping 
technique is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that prototype effects should only be 
observed when the prototype is the central tendency of the studied exemplars from the 
same identity and not when they are from different identities.   
 
Considering the results from Experiments 1-7 altogether, participants clearly showed 
the ability to discriminate seen exemplars from unseen exemplars of the same identity 
that are outside the range of variation of the studied exemplars.  Because the unseen 
exemplars were often very similar to the studied exemplars, this implies that 
                                                 
4
 Cabeza et al. tested 6 levels of similarity between studied exemplars.  There was no difference in 
recognition confidence ratings between prototypes and seen exemplars at levels 6 (highest similarity), 5, 
3, and 2.  There was a prototype effect at level 4 and a reverse prototype effect at level 1 (lowest 
similarity).  Only level 6 similarity exemplars were judged as belonging to the same identity.  
Exemplars of levels 3, 2, and 1 were judged as different people‟s faces while exemplar in levels 4 and 5 
were not confidently judged as belonging to either the same or different identities.  Thus, the pattern of 
prototype effects was more complicated than, say, a linear function of exemplar similarity. 
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participants can remember the images they studied quite precisely.  On the other hand, 
there is something about the way exemplars of the face are being stored or retrieved 
that also leads to false recognition of the prototype and other exemplars of the same 
face that lie within the range of experienced variation.  In fact, recognition confidence 
at test was highest for the unseen exemplar that was the furthest possible distance (in 
an image space) away from the individual studied exemplars while still remaining 
within their range of variation.  It is surprising that such reliable differences in 
confidence ratings were observed between prototype and seen exemplars even when 
these images were very difficult to distinguish.  Particularly in Experiments 4 and 5, 
participants often commented, when viewing example stimuli side-by-side, that they 
could not see any differences between the seen exemplars and the prototype or the 
local averages.  Furthermore, Experiment 7 demonstrated, using stimuli from 
Experiments 4 and 5, that participants could not distinguish the prototype image from 
a seen exemplar image from memory when only the one seen exemplar was presented 
in the study phase.  And yet these two experiments (4 and 5) yielded the largest 
prototype effects out of all the experiments conducted.  Bruce (1994) also noted that in 
some of Bruce et al.‟s (1991) prototype experiments, differences between images were 
barely perceivable, and yet they had a huge impact on recognition memory. 
 
In conclusion based on the results reported in present work (Chapters 2 and 3) and in 
previous studies described in this section, the prototype effect in face recognition is 
observable when the prototype stimulus is nearly perceptually indistinguishable from 
the studied exemplars and also over a much larger range of similarity values than has 
been assumed in the past.  Although prototypes built from studied exemplars of 
different identities do not always yield a significant prototype effect (i.e. higher 
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recognition of prototype images than seen exemplars), it is clear that they are difficult 
to correctly reject, and their false alarm rate (or rated confidence) is always more 
similar to the hit rate for seen exemplars than the false alarm rate to unseen exemplars 
even when the unseen exemplar is closer to a seen exemplar than the prototype is 
(provided the unseen exemplar falls outside the range of the seen exemplars). 
 
Learning Identity From Natural Images of Faces 
In previous studies, the prototype effect in face recognition has been found using 
Identikit and Mac-a-Mug faces (Bruce et al., 1991; Solso & McCarthy, 1981) as well 
as morphed photographs (Busey & Tunnicliff, 1999; Cabeza et al., 1999).  Variations 
on identities constructed by feature swapping (Solso & McCarthy, 1981), feature 
displacement (Bruce et al., 1991; Cabeza et al., 1999), and morphing between two or 
more images of different people‟s faces (Busey & Tunnicliff, 1999; Cabeza et al., 
1999) have all been shown to be capable of producing prototype effects under the right 
experimental conditions.  Although the prototype effect in face recognition has been 
demonstrated using realistic, high quality, colour images, none of these previous 
studies have tested how the effect generalizes to the circumstance where the prototype 
is the average of a set of unaltered images of a real person‟s face. 
 
Given that prototype effects can occur to an average morph between two studied 
images of different identities (Busey & Tunnicliff, 1999) and to the average of a set or 
pair of highly varying exemplars based on an artificial identity (Bruce, 1994; Bruce et 
al., 1991; Cabeza et al., 1999), one would expect similar effects should be found using 
natural variations of real identities.  However, this was not what was found in 
Experiments 8-10.  Instead, no clear recognition advantage was found for a 50% 
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morph of two different images of the same person‟s face relative to the actually seen 
images.  The average morph was not necessarily recognized worse than both of the 
seen exemplars, but it definitely did not show a clear advantage like that of prototypes 
in Experiments 1-6. 
 
How did the variation in the natural images (Chapter 4) differ from the artificial 
variation used to construct identity face sets in Chapters 2 and 3?  The natural images 
contained a lot of variation due to having been taken with different cameras (i.e. one 
was a photograph and one was a video still).  This was not true of any of the artificial 
variants because they were all derived from images taken under highly standardized 
conditions.  Thus, to recognize the high and low quality images of the same face, 
participants would have to overcome extraneous sources of image variation such as 
differences in contrast, brightness, graininess, and blurriness as well as small changes 
in expression and head angle.  It was assumed that if the prototype effect was tapping 
a mechanism whose purpose was to form representations of individual faces from 
instances that vary on these dimensions, then one might observe even stronger 
prototype effects using natural images of identities than what had already been found 
using artificially generated exemplars.  As it was not the goal to study the effect of 
“image quality” per se, it was not anticipated that the changes in image quality among 
the stimuli would have had the potential to destroy the recognition advantage found 
for prototype images in the previous experiments. 
 
The failure to find a strong prototype effect using natural identity variants in Chapter 4 
suggests one of two things.  It is possible that the prototype effect in face recognition 
does not tap the means by which we form stable representations of individual faces.  
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The reasoning is based on evidence from one of Busey and Tunnicliff‟s (1999) 
experiments that used a very similar methodology but found that 50% morphs of two 
studied images of different (but similar looking) people‟s faces had a higher hit rate 
than the actually studied images despite never having been seen previously.  The 
studied images in their experiment were taken under standardized conditions.  
Therefore, it seems reasonable to question whether the mechanisms being tapped by 
the prototype effect truly do operate by combining instances of the same face while 
keeping instances of different identities distinct in memory (again this could occur 
during encoding or retrieval).  Alternatively, our face recognition system might have 
an imaged-based front end to it (Bruce, 1994).  The prototype effect then could be 
tapping the mechanisms that build individual face representations, but if these 
mechanisms represent faces based on an analysis of low-level image properties (e.g. a 
PCA based approach), they may not be able to easily separate the superficial 
properties of the image from the more important identity-related information contained 
in the face until more variation of the face has been experienced (Burton et al., 2005). 
 
Therefore, it is possible that when learning a previously unfamiliar face from a small 
number of natural images (in the present experiments only two), the image differences 
between the two images are too great to easily engage an abstraction mechanism that 
would produce an average of the two images (either during encoding or retrieval).  
Similarly, anything that makes a specific image more distinctive or memorable will 
likely facilitate its subsequent recognition.  If superficial properties of the image (i.e. 
not identity related) often increased the memorability of an image, then the average 
morph will not have shared these properties.  In contrast, artificially generated 
exemplars and their prototypes should share these properties more evenly because they 
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are derived from the same original images.  Thus, certain image properties could 
potentially increase the recognition of a studied exemplar, and these properties would 
not be shared by an average morph unless the other studied exemplar(s) (those of the 
same average) also shared these same properties.  Since artificial variants generated 
from the same images are more likely to share any such properties than are natural 
variants taken from different images, the natural images used in Chapter 4 were more 
likely to be at an advantage over their prototype than were the artificial exemplars 
used in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Thus, the high and low quality images of the same face might be less likely to be 
stored or retrieved in a way that promotes recognition of the average image compared 
to the images used in Experiments 1-6.  Also some superficial properties or details of 
the high or low images may have made them more memorable which is a slightly 
different issue than the likelihood (or the extent to which) they will be stored or 
retrieved separately or together.  Furthermore, high quality images may have differed 
from low quality images in terms of their memorability.  Memorability of a face can 
be assessed by asking participants to rate how easy they think it would be to remember 
that face (Vokey & Read, 1992).  Memorable faces often have distinctive elements or 
features which make the face easier to encode and retrieve.  Faces high in 
memorability have been found to be characterized by small, local, distinctive features 
(O‟Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin, & Abdi, 1994).  These memorability related cues 
are more likely to be captured by information in higher spatial frequencies (Busey, 
2001) which likely contained more information in the high quality images.  This may 
explain why, overall, high quality images tended to be recognized better than low 
quality images.  And if a subjective sense of memorability is involved in the rejection 
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of distractor images as Vokey and Read (1992) suggested by providing “negative 
evidence”, then this would also explain why low quality distractors had much higher 
false alarm rates than high quality distractors.  
 
Task Demands 
In the experiments of Chapters 2 and 3, an exemplar or image recognition task was 
used.  Indeed, this is the standard task used to assess recognition prototype effects.  In 
Chapter 2 experiments, the rating task used at test was identical to the one used by 
Bruce et al. (1991, Experiments 7 and 8).  In this task, participants are asked to rate the 
familiarity of each test image on a 10 point confidence scale (e.g. 0= definitely not a 
seen picture; 9= definitely a seen picture), and they are told to make their judgements 
about the exact image rather than the face in general.  Because of the concern that 
asking participants to rate familiarity using a scale that measures confidence would 
needlessly complicate the interpretation of the results, in Chapter 3 experiments, 
participants were simply asked to rate their recognition confidence of having seen the 
identical image in the study phase using the same scale as before.   
 
It may seem counterintuitive to use an image recognition task when the goal is to learn 
about face recognition not picture recognition.  This approach rests on the implicit 
assumption that whatever mechanism causes the prototype to be falsely recognized as 
a seen image will also cause it to be correctly recognized as a seen person‟s face if the 
task was one of face identity recognition.  Cabeza et al. (1999) tested this assumption 
directly by comparing image recognition confidence on the same 10 point scale 
described above to an old/new task where participants rated how sure they were that 
they had seen the same person‟s face before in the previous study phase.  Results from 
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the two tasks were compared in an experiment using identity variants produced by 
feature shifting (similar to the method in Chapter 2) and in another experiment using a 
morphing technique that created variants across three levels of similarity.  In both 
experiments, the two tasks produced the same pattern of results; that is, both tasks 
indicated higher recognition of the prototype compared to seen exemplars of the same 
face. 
 
In the experiments of Chapter 4, natural images of faces and an old/new face identity 
recognition task were used to generalise the results from experiments in Chapters 2 
and 3 using a method with greater ecological validity.  However, unlike the previous 
experiments, no clear recognition advantage for prototypes was observed using the 
more natural stimuli and recognition test.  The evidence from Cabeza et al.‟s (1999) 
experiments suggest that the old/new face task and the image confidence rating task 
are equivalent in that they both tap the same mechanism and produce similar patterns 
of results.  Bruce (1994) also maintained that studies of prototype effects using a test 
of picture recognition as a measure of face recognition probe the same representations 
that underlie face identification in everyday life.  Although she slightly qualifies her 
claim by emphasizing that image recognition tasks in prototype studies tap these 
representations to the same extent as standard old/new face recognition tasks when 
target faces are studied and tested using a different image.  Results from an experiment 
(see end of Chapter 2) that was not included in the current thesis provided a clue 
which suggests that the claim that the two tasks are equivalent warrants further 
investigation.  This was the only experiment in which no prototype effect was 
observed apart from the experiments of Chapter 4.  It too used a face identity task.  
Stimuli were PROfit faces similar to those in Experiments 1-3, but there were some 
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differences not just regarding the stimuli, but also the details of the task.  Based on the 
evidence at hand, it seems unlikely that using an old/new face identity task would have 
made a large difference to the observed pattern of results, but the possibility cannot be 
entirely ruled out. 
 
Implications to Our Understanding of Face Recognition 
One problem with the current approach of using the prototype effect to investigate 
how we represent newly learned faces in memory is that its generalization to face 
recognition in everyday life may be limited.  There are several differences in the tasks 
and stimuli that make comparisons between the laboratory experiments reported here 
and everyday life quite difficult.  Beyond the suspicious lack of a prototype effect 
using natural (vs. artificial) images (Chapter 4), the use of static images may have had 
some important consequences.  Although this criticism holds true for the majority of 
face recognition research using static images as stimuli, it is of particular relevance to 
the current work because of the contrast between representing faces as episodes or 
abstractions.  Like in many other studies of face recognition, static images of faces 
were used in the experiments because they are the easiest type of stimulus to control in 
terms of their properties and in their presentation to participants.  However, in 
everyday life, we often see faces as a continuous stream of visual information, not as 
discrete episodes or exemplars.   
 
Indeed, it is under naturalistic conditions, while viewing continuous motion in faces 
that we are most likely to experience a more or less full range of variation that would 
be needed to generalise to future encounters with the same person‟s face.  Not only 
does a dynamic face provide a large range of within-identity variation, but it also 
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provides very strong top-down support to guide the abstraction of identity information.  
When viewing static images, the visual system cannot draw the connections among 
exemplars of an unfamiliar face.  However, when viewing a continuous stream of 
visual input from a face, the identity is already known to be unchanging, so abstraction 
can proceed without the hindrance of trying to judge the likeness of one instance to the 
next.   
 
Curiously, in the literature regarding episodic theory of memory, the issue of how we 
break experiences into discrete episodes is largely ignored.  Ironically, the theory that 
attempts to explain all acts of memory in terms of the storage and retrieval of events 
has very little to say about what actually constitutes an event.  This problem has been 
partially sidestepped in the vast majority of experiments by using word stimuli which 
due to their static and discrete nature, map much more easily onto the concept of an 
episode than do live faces. 
 
Homa et al.‟s (2001) finding that participants were just as likely to judge the unseen 
category prototype as old as a studied exemplar regardless of whether participants 
were even aware of the experimental categories suggests another limitation of the 
current approach.  Whatever mechanisms underlie the prototype effect in recognition 
may not be the same mechanisms that underlie the prototype effect in categorization or 
concept formation.  This would be more problematic for a prototype account than an 
exemplar-based account because the prototype account is that the unseen prototype is 
falsely recognized because it corresponds to a representation of a category‟s central 
tendency abstracted from experiences with category members.  Therefore, if the 
unseen prototype is falsely recognized as old when no category prototypes had been 
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abstracted, then a pure prototype view is clearly inadequate.  An exemplar view can 
better accommodate this finding because it does not posit that false recognition of 
category prototypes is due to representing categories as abstracted prototypes.  It is the 
similarity of the prototype to the exemplars encoded in memory that matters most, and 
many exemplar models will compute recognition based on the summed similarity of a 
probe (e.g. category prototype) to all exemplars stored in memory regardless of 
category membership.  Therefore, if we want to understand how we represent faces, 
then measuring how confident participants are that an image was shown earlier in the 
experiment is very different from measuring their recognition of an image as a specific 
familiar person.  The prototype view has difficulty explaining the prototype effect 
under circumstances where abstraction is unlikely, and while the exemplar view can 
explain this, the explanation it provides suggests that the prototype effect in 
recognition does not tap into the same processes that would be used to identify a face 
(recognize the identity). 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Future directions for investigating the prototype effect in face recognition  
Beyond the current work, there has been very little research focussing on the degree of 
learning in prototype face recognition.  Since Homa et al. (2001) found an effect of 
repetition on old/new judgements of category prototypes, it would be informative to 
follow up on his findings using categories that are more like different identities rather 
than different “families” as in their study.  Homa et al. found that the prototype effect 
strengthened as the number of repetitions of studied exemplars increased, but only for 
categories constructed using a feature swapping technique.  In the feature swapping 
method, the prototype was actually a composite of the most common features among 
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its exemplars.  In contrast, they observed weaker prototype effects following 
additional repetitions for face families made by slightly distorting the features of the 
face so that the prototype did not share any totally identical features with its category 
members.  However, in the later ill-defined type of category, the category members 
themselves also did not share identical features with each other, so this may also have 
caused the pattern of results they observed.  Therefore, future research should test for 
an effect of repetition using categories based on exemplars that are re-combinations of 
a fixed set of similar features.  The prototype at test would be either a composite of the 
most frequent feature values or a morphed average of the studied exemplars.  
Although comparing recognition between two different types of images is 
problematic, comparing differences in recognition across levels of study repetitions 
could lead to a better understanding of why increased learning of certain types of 
perceptual categories lead to recognition prototype effects and some do not.  
 
To understand how the prototype effect might reveal important information about how 
we learn faces in more naturalistic situations, future research should move away from 
presenting faces as discrete instances.  Since it has been argued that viewing a 
dynamic face may provide ideal conditions for abstraction of an average identity 
prototype (see Bruce, 1994; Burton et al., 2005), presenting faces in video clips would 
provide a more meaningful approach to the problem of how we form stable 
representations of familiar faces.  Prototypes could be made by image averaging the 
individual video frames.  Likewise, using 3D face stimuli made from 3D scans of 
peoples‟ faces would help address the issue of whether we can abstract anything more 
from 3D images relative to 2D images as well as how averaging and generalisation 
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may operate between different viewpoints.  Since 3D scans can be morphed just like 
2D images, extending the current research in this way should not be problematic.  
 
Beyond Probing With Prototypes: the Potential of Face Adaptation 
What other approaches could be used to probe the underlying nature of face identity 
representations?  Studies of adaptation effects may have more potential to reveal 
important information that could deepen or change our understanding of how faces are 
represented.   
 
Exposure to an obviously distorted exemplar of a face can influence subsequent 
judgements about that face.  Most commonly, participants are asked to make 
judgements regarding the veridicality or normality of a face image after being exposed 
to a distorted image of the same person‟s face earlier in the experiment.  The basic 
finding is that exposure to an extreme distortion of a person‟s face makes participants 
more likely to judge an exemplar that is slightly distorted (distorted in the same 
direction at a lower magnitude) as being a veridical image of the person.  This 
adaptation effect has been demonstrated using famous faces on immediate tests of 
recognition and also following 5 min (Carbon & Leder, 2005) or 24 h delays (Carbon 
et al., 2007) between exposure and test.  One interpretation of this effect is that it 
reflects the updating of existing face representations to include new information from 
our most recent encounters with a face.   
 
However, many studies have demonstrated similar effects using unfamiliar faces (e.g. 
Rhodes, Jeffery, Clifford, & Leopold, 2007; Robbins, McKone, & Edwards, 2007; 
Webster & MacLin, 1999).  These adaptation effects have not been interpreted as due 
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to updating a stored memory representation for three good reasons.  First, unfamiliar 
faces are assumed to have no “face” representation (e.g. a FRU in the Bruce and 
Young 1986 model).  Webster and MacLin asked participants to judge whether they 
thought images of faces had been distorted or not.  Despite having never seen the 
original images, participants‟ judgements were strongly influenced by exposing them 
to a highly distorted face before they made their judgements.  Second, the adaptor 
image that participants are exposed to need not be the same identity as the test face. 
The magnitude of the adaptation effect is similar when the exposure and test faces are 
the same identity (based on the same original image) compared to when they are 
different identities (although transfer is sometimes found to be slightly higher when 
adapting to the same identity or a similar face, this has not been consistently 
observed).  Thus, even if participants were given an opportunity to form some sort of 
face representation based on a verdical image of an unfamiliar target, they would not 
be expected to update that representation to include an extremely distorted image of a 
different person‟s face.  Third, unfamiliar face adaptation effects are short lived, 
lasting only a few seconds (Rhodes et al., 2007).  Adaptation effects from exposure to 
highly distorted unfamiliar faces are thought to be due to a more general recalibration 
of the perceptual system rather than adjustments to representations of individual faces. 
 
It is not clear how adaptation effects found using familiar and unfamiliar faces differ.  
To what extent does adaptation to a distorted familiar face transfer to the perception of 
unfamiliar faces and vice versa?  Studying face adaptation effects could reveal a lot 
about how we form representations of familiar faces and also how we maintain and 
update existing face representations.  A closer examination of decay rates could also 
be illuminating.  If strong evidence that identity specific adaptation can be observed 
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after delays as long as one day or more, and if the strength of the effect decreases over 
time, then this would pose a serious challenge to a pure prototype account of face 
representation.  If adaptation effects found using familiar faces reflect a permanent 
change to the underlying representation, then how could the change weaken without 
storing any information about this change or the exemplar that caused it?  For 
example, one might assume that the abstraction mechanism makes an adjustment to a 
prototype representation every time a new exemplar is encountered, and the amount of 
adjustment is proportional to the number of exemplars the existing prototype has been 
based on.  Even this assumption is beyond the scope of current prototype based 
models which maintain that the mean alone is sufficient to represent a person‟s face.  
Similarly, one could further assume that the contribution of each exemplar to its 
prototype is a function of its recency.  Thus, some record of the exemplars (or the 
changes they produced) would need to be retained so that their contribution could be 
reduced from the prototype over time.  Of course, a simpler explanation is that all 
exemplars are stored and prototypes are computed ad hoc at the time of retrieval with 
the most recent exemplars weighted more heavily.  A hybrid prototype + exemplar 
model could also provide a reasonable account.  Exposure to a distorted image of a 
known face could cause a permanent change to the prototype, but a trace of the 
distorted image would also be laid down and would decay over time.  Over short 
delays, adaptation effects might reflect the joint activation of the prototype and the 
trace of the distorted image making the test image of the same identity appear slightly 
distorted in the opposite direction. 
 
If it is assumed that this type of adaptation effect is due to changes in the 
representations of individual faces, then this methodology provides a framework for 
 288 
testing hypotheses about the properties of such representations and the process by 
which they are updated.  To understand what adaptation effects reveal about the 
perception and recognition of identity in faces, future adaptation studies must examine 
the relationships between the degree of learning (i.e. familiarity), similarity between 
exposure and test images, and variables that modulate retinotopic adaptation (e.g. size, 
spatial location etc.).  In addition to investigating how these variables affect the 
strength of adaptation, it is also important to map the rate of decay as a function of the 
duration of delay between the exposure and test phases. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
What does it mean to form a representation of an individual face in memory?  To 
assume such a representation exists is common place among researchers of face 
recognition.  Although to some this may not seem like a contentious assumption to 
make, I argue otherwise.  It is often the most basic assumptions we make about the 
nature of memory that decide not only the methodologies we use to investigate it, but 
even the types of questions we, as cognitive psychologists, think are meaningful to 
ask.  And as our assumptions drive the questions to which we seek answers, so too will 
our assumptions drive the answers that we find.  The more we narrow our views, the 
more we will find the same answer again and again.  Even when all evidence points in 
the same direction, do not forget to try looking down another; it just may take you 
even farther. 
 
The interpretation of prototype effects as being indicative of the abstraction of 
category prototypes was popularized by Posner and Keele (1968, 1970), and is still 
very influential in current thinking about face recognition.  Various forms of exemplar 
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models have been proposed in the more general literature to account for this effect, but 
they have not received much attention in the area of face recognition specifically.  To 
be fair, the prototype vs. exemplar distinction is not of obvious relevance to all of the 
questions face recognition researchers seek answers to.  However, it is extremely 
important to any question concerning the nature of identity representation in faces.  
The case of the prototype in face recognition exemplifies this.  What causes this effect 
is an interesting question in itself.  I am not the first to point out that we really do not 
know (cf. Bruce, 1994; Bruce et al., 1991; Cabeza et al., 1999).  Nonetheless, I will 
attempt to draw some conclusions from the present work based on assumptions I think 
are reasonable. 
 
Information about the faces of many different individuals is stored in memory, and this 
information can be accessed when needed.  The experiments showed that faces are 
stored or retrieved in a way that facilitates recognition of the central value of a set of 
varying exemplars of similar appearance.  Moreover, it is the range of experienced 
variation that seems to be particularly important because changes in recognition 
responses due to the type of exemplar shown at test were most obviously characterized 
by a reduction in the perceived “oldness” of an unseen image that was outside the 
range of variation of the studied exemplars.  This pattern was observed even when the 
unseen exemplars were highly similar to the seen exemplars.  Because the range, not 
simply the average value, of variation seems to be most important, a purely prototype 
account of the prototype effect in face recognition is not plausible.  At least over the 
time frame tested here, some information reflecting the range of experienced variation 
must be retained in memory.  If prototypes were abstracted, they were not the only 
representations used to perform the task.  On the other hand, evidence from the present 
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work clearly demonstrated that information from multiple exemplars was being 
combined in memory, if not during encoding, then at the time of retrieval.  It is in this 
way, that we can say a representation of a face is formed or built up out of varying 
instances.  Assuming from the start some sort of pre-existing representation of an 
individual face, will lead to unfounded claims about how we represent different 
identities, how we become familiar with a face, and of course, how we make 
recognition judgements about pictures of faces presented in experiments.   
 
It was surprising that no prototype effects were found using natural variations of 
identities.  This result highlighted the possibility that the prototype effect in face 
recognition is not due to an averaging mechanism that operates specifically on 
exemplars of the same identity.  Although such a mechanism may operate in this way 
under the right conditions, it is an oversimplification to describe it in this way.  
Exemplars of the same identity often are likely to be stored or retrieved in 
combination.  But it is not because they belong to the same identity.  Sometimes 
studying exemplars of two different identities may produce a prototype effect (Busey 
& Tunnicliff, 1999), and sometimes studying two exemplars of the same identity will 
not produce a prototype effect.  The differences between the high and low quality 
exemplars that were used here leads one to surmise that superficial image properties, 
at least for unfamiliar faces, place heavy constraints on which images of shared 
identity will give rise to a prototype effect.  Future research is needed to understand 
the role of identity in prototype recognition that goes above and beyond lower level 
image similarity.  Furthermore, a deeper understanding of how memories formed from 
viewing the variation of faces in continuous motion are different than those formed 
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from viewing static images may be the key to understanding why humans are so 
incredibly good at recognizing familiar faces. 
 292 
 
 293 
Reference List 
 
 
Angeli, A., Davidoff, J., & Valentine, T. (2001). Distinctiveness induces categorical 
perception of unfamiliar faces. Perception, 30, Supplement, 58. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as 
determinants of graded structure in categories. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11(4), 629-654. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1987). The instability of graded structure: Implications for the nature 
of concepts.  In U. Neisser (Ed.), Concepts and conceptual development: 
Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization (pp. 101-140). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bartlett, J. C., Hurry, S., & Thorley, W. (1984). Typicality and familiarity of faces. 
Memory & Cognition, 12(3), 219-228. 
Bartlett, J. C., & Searcy, J. (1993). Inversion and configuration of faces. Cognitive 
Psychology, 25, 281-316. 
Barton, J. J. S., Keenan, J. P., & Bass, T. (2001). Discrimination of spatial relations 
and features in faces: Effects of inversion and viewing duration. British Journal 
of Psychology, 92(3), 527-549. 
Baudouin, J. Y., Gilibert, D., Sansone, S., & Tiberghien, G. (2000). When the smile is 
a cue to familiarity. Memory, 8, 285-292. 
Beale, J. M., & Keil, F. C. (1995). Categorical effects in the perception of faces. 
Cognition, 57(3), 217-239. 
 294 
Benson, P. J., & Perrett, D. I. (1991). Perception and recognition of photographic 
quality facial caricatures: Implications for the recognition of natural images. 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 3(1), 105-135. 
Benton, A. L. (1980). The neuropsychology of facial recognition. American 
Psychologist, 35(2), 176-186. 
Bonner, L., Burton, A. M., & Bruce, V. (2003). Getting to know you: How we learn 
new faces. Visual Cognition, 10(5), 527-536. 
Bradshaw, J. L., & Wallace, G. (1971). Models for the processing and identification of 
faces. Perception & Psychophysics, 9(5), 443-448. 
Bruce, V., & Young, A. W. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Journal of 
Psychology, 77, 305-327. 
Bruce, V. (1979). Searching for politicians: An information-processing approach to 
face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 31(3), 
373-396. 
Bruce, V. (1982). Changing faces: Visual and non-visual coding processes in face 
recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 73(1), 105-116. 
Bruce, V. (1994). Stability from variation: The case of face recognition. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology a: Human Experimental Psychology, 
47(1), 5-28. 
Bruce, V., & Burton, M. (2002). Learning new faces.  In M. Fahle & T. Poggio (Eds.), 
Perceptual Learning (pp. 317-334). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 295 
Bruce, V., Doyle, T., Dench, N., & Burton, M. (1991). Remembering facial 
configurations. Cognition, 38(2), 109-144. 
Bruce, V., Henderson, Z., Newman, C., & Burton, A. M. (2001). Matching identities 
of familiar and unfamiliar faces caught on CCTV images. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7(3), 207-218. 
Bruce, V., Henderson, Z., Greenwood, K., Hancock, P. J. B., Burton, A. M., & Miller, 
P. (1999). Verification of face identities from images captured on video. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 5(4), 339-360. 
Bruce, V., & Valentine, T. (1985). Identity priming in the recognition of familiar 
faces. British Journal of Psychology, 76 (3), 373-383. 
Bruck, M., Cavanagh, P., & Ceci, S. J. (1991). Fortysomething: Recognizing faces at 
one's 25th reunion. Memory & Cognition, 19(3), 221-228. 
Bruyer, R., Lafalize, A., & Distefano, M. (1991). Age decisions on familiar and 
unfamiliar faces. Behavioural Processes, 24, 21-35. 
Bruyer, R., Leclere, S., & Quinet, P. (2004). Ethnic categorisation of faces is not 
independent of face identity. Perception , 33, 169-179. 
Bruyer, R., Mejias, S., & Doublet, S. (2007). Effect of face familiarity on age decision. 
Acta Psychologica, 124(2), 159-176. 
Burton, A. M., & Bruce, V. (1993). Naming faces and naming names: Exploring an 
interactive activation model of person recognition. Memory,1, 457-480. 
Burton, A. M., Bruce, V., & Hancock, P. J. B. (1999). From pixels to people: A model 
 296 
of familiar face recognition. Cognitive Science: a Multidisciplinary Journal, 
23(1), 1-31. 
Burton, A. M., Jenkins, R., Hancock, P. J. B., & White, D. (2005). Robust 
representations for face recognition: The power of averages. Cognitive 
Psychology, 51(3), 256-284. 
Burton, A. M., Wilson, S., Cowan, M., & Bruce, V. (1999). Face recognition in poor-
quality video: Evidence from security surveillance. Psychological Science, 
10(3), 243-248. 
Busey, T. A. (2001). Formal models of familiarity and memorability in face 
recognition.  In M. J. Wenger & J. T. Townsend (Eds.), Computational, 
geometric, and process perspectives on facial cognition: Contexts and 
challenges (pp. 147-191). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Publishers. 
Busey, T. A., & Tunnicliff, J. L. (1999). Accounts of blending, distinctiveness, and 
typicality in the false recognition of faces. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25(5), 1210-1235. 
Buttle, H., & Raymond, J. E. (2003). High familiarity enhances visual change 
detection for face stimuli. Perception & Psychophysics, 65(8), 1296-1306. 
Cabeza, R., Bruce, V., Kato, T., & Oda, M. (1999). The prototype effect in face 
recognition: Extension and limits. Memory & Cognition, 27(1), 139-151. 
Cabeza, R., & Kato, T. (2000). Features are also important: Contributions of featural 
and configural processing to face recognition. Psychological Science, 11(5), 
 297 
429-433. 
Campanella, S., Chrysochoos, A., & Bruyer, R. (2001). Categorical perception of 
facial gender information: Behavioural evidence and the face-space metaphor. 
Visual Cognition, 8(2), 237-262. 
Campanella, S., Hanoteau, C., Seron, X., Joassin, F., & Bruyer, R. (2003). Categorical 
perception of unfamiliar facial identities, the face-space metaphor, and the 
morphing technique. Visual Cognition, 10(2), 129-156. 
Carbon, C., & Leder, H. (2005). Face adaptation: Changing stable representations of 
familiar faces within minutes? Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 1(1), 1-7. 
Carbon, C., Strobach, T., Langton, S. R. H., Harsanyi, G., Leder, H., & Kovacs, G. 
(2007). Adaptation effects of highly familiar faces: Immediate and long lasting. 
Memory & Cognition, 35( 8), 1966-1976. 
Clutterbuck, R., & Johnston, R. A. (2002). Exploring levels of face familiarity by 
using an indirect face-matching measure. Perception, 31, 985-994.  
Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in 
immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 17-22. 
Deffenbacher, K. A., Vetter, T., Johanson, J., & O'Toole, A. J. (1998). Facial aging, 
attractiveness, and distinctiveness.  Perception, 27(10), 1233-1243. 
Elio, R., & Anderson, J. R. (1981). The effects of category generalizations and 
instance similarity on schema abstraction. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 7(6), 397-417. 
 298 
Ellis, H., Shepherd, J., & Davies, G. (1975). An investigation of the use of the photo-
fit technique for recalling faces. British Journal of Psychology, 66(1), 29-37. 
Ellis, H. D., Shepherd, J. W., & Davies, G. M. (1979). Identification of familiar and 
unfamiliar faces from internal and external features: Some implications for 
theories of face recognition. Perception, 8(4), 431-439. 
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, M., & Tanaka, J. N. (1998). What is 'special' about 
face perception? Psychological Review, 105(3), 482-498. 
Franks, J. J., & Bransford, J. D. (1971). Abstraction of visual patterns. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 90(1), 65-74. 
Freire, A., Lee, K., & Symons, L. A. (2000). The face-inversion effect as a deficit in 
the encoding of configural information: Direct evidence. Perception, 29(2), 
159-170. 
Ganel, T., & Goshen-Gottstein, Y. (2002). The perceptual integrality of sex and 
identity of faces: Further evidence for the single-route hypothesis. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 28, 854-867. 
Ganel, T., Valyear, K. F., Goshen-Gottstein, Y., & Goodale, M. A. (2005). The 
involvement of the "fusiform face area" in processing facial expression. 
Neuropsychologia, 43, 1645-1654. 
Gillund, G., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1984). A retrieval model for both recognition and 
recall. Psychological Review, 91(1), 1-67. 
Goffaux, V., Hault, B., Michel, C., Vuong, Q. C., & Rossion, B. (2005). The 
respective role of low and high spatial frequencies in supporting configural and 
 299 
featural processing of faces. Perception, 34(1), 77-86. 
Goffaux, V., & Rossion, B. (2007). Face inversion disproportionately impairs the 
perception of vertical but not horizontal relations between features. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33(4), 995-
1002. 
Goldman, D., & Homa, D. (1977). Integrative and metric properties of abstracted 
information as a function of category discriminability, instance variability, and 
experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 3(4), 375-385. 
Gruppuso, V., Lindsay, D. S., & Masson, M. E. J. (2007). I'd know that face 
anywhere. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(6), 1085-1089. 
Haig, N. D. (1986). Exploring recognition with interchanged facial features. 
Perception, 15(3), 235-247. 
Hall, J. W., & Kozloff, E. E. (1970). False recognitions as a function of number of 
presentations. American Journal of Psychology, 83(2), 272-279. 
Hall, J. W., & Kozloff, E. E. (1973). False recognitions of associates of converging 
versus repeated words. American Journal of Psychology, 86(1), 133-139. 
Hancock, P. J. B., Bruce, V., & Burton, A. M. (2000). Recognition of unfamiliar faces. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(9), 330-337. 
Hannigan, S. L., & Reinitz, M. T. (2000). Influences of temporal factors on memory 
conjunction errors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14(4), 309-321. 
 300 
Harmon, L. D., & Julesz, B. (1973). Masking in visual recognition: Effects of two-
dimensional filtered noise. Science, 180(4091), 1194-1196. 
Hayes-Roth, B., & Hayes-Roth, F. (1977). Concept learning and the recognition and 
classification of exemplars. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 
16(3), 321-338. 
Henderson, Z., Bruce, V., & Burton, A. M. (2001). Matching the faces of robbers 
captured on video. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15(4), 445-464. 
Hill, H., & Bruce, V. (1996). The effects of lighting on the perception of facial 
surfaces. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 22(4), 986-1004. 
Hintzman, D. L. (1986).  Schema abstraction in a multiple-trace memory model. 
Psychological Review, 93(4), 411-428. 
Hintzman, D. L. (1988). Judgments of frequency and recognition memory in a 
multiple-trace memory model. Psychological Review, 95(4), 528-551. 
Hintzman, D. L., & Curran, T. (1995). When encoding fails: Instructions, feedback, 
and registration without learning. Memory & Cognition, 23(2), 213-226. 
Hole, G. J. (1994). Configurational factors in the perception of unfamiliar faces. 
Perception, 23(1), 65-74. 
Homa, D. (1978). Abstraction of ill-defined form. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 4(5), 407-416. 
Homa, D., Cross, J., Cornell, D., Goldman, D., & Schwartz, S. (1973). Prototype 
 301 
abstraction and classification of new instances as a function of number of 
instances defining the prototype. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 101(1), 
116-122. 
Homa, D., & Cultice, J. C. (1984). Role of feedback, category size, and stimulus 
distortion on the acquisition and utilization of ill-defined categories. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10(1), 83-94. 
Homa, D., Goldhardt, B., Burruel-Homa, L., & Smith, J. C. (1993). Influence of 
manipulated category knowledge on prototype classification and recognition. 
Memory & Cognition, 21(4), 529-538. 
Homa, D., Smith, C., Macak, C., Johovich, J., & Osorio, D. (2001). Recognition of 
facial prototypes: The importance of categorical structure and degree of 
learning. Journal of Memory and Language, 44(3), 443-474. 
Homa, D., Sterling, S., & Trepel, L. (1981). Limitations of exemplar-based 
generalization and the abstraction of categorical information. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 7(6), 418-439. 
Homa, D., & Vosburgh, R. (1976). Category breadth and the abstraction of 
prototypical information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning & Memory, 2(3), 322-330. 
Hosie, J. A., Ellis, H. D., & Haig, N. D. (1988). The effect of feature displacement on 
the perception of well-known faces. Perception, 17(4), 461-474. 
Inn, D., Walden, K. J., & Solso, R. L. (1993). Facial prototype formation in children. 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 31(3), 197-200. 
 302 
James, T. W., Humphrey, G. K., Gati, J. S., Menon, R. S., & Goodale, M. A. (2000). 
The effects of visual object priming on brain activation before and after 
recognition. Current Biology, 10(17), 1017-1024. 
Jones, T. C., Bartlett, J. C., & Wade, K. A. (2006). Nonverbal conjunction errors in 
recognition memory: Support for familiarity but not for feature bundling. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 55(1), 138-155. 
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its 
alternatives. Psychological Review, 93(2), 136-153. 
Kemp, R., McManus, C., & Pigott, T. (1990). Sensitivity to the displacement of facial 
features in negative and inverted images. Perception, 19(4), 531-543. 
Kemp, R., Pike, G., White, P., & Musselman, A. (1996). Perception and recognition of 
normal and negative faces: The role of shape from shading and pigmentation 
cues. Perception, 25(1), 37-52. 
Lander, K., & Metcalfe, S. (2007). The influence of positive and negative facial 
expressions on face familiarity. Memory, 15(1), 63-69. 
Le Grand, R., Mondloch, C., Maurer, D., & Brent, H. (2001). Early visual experience 
and face processing. Nature, 410, 890. 
Leder, H., & Carbon, C. (2006). Face-specific configural processing of relational 
information. British Journal of Psychology, 97, 19-29. 
Leder, H., & Bruce, V. (1998). Local and relational aspects of face distinctiveness. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental 
Psychology, 51(3), 449-473. 
 303 
Leder, H., & Bruce, V. (2000). When inverted faces are recognized: The role of 
configural information in face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 53(2), 513-536. 
Leder, H., Candrian, G., Huber, O., & Bruce, V. (2001). Configural features in the 
context of upright and inverted faces. Perception, 30(1), 73-83. 
Lee, K. J., & Perrett, D. I. (2000). Manipulation of colour and shape information and 
its consequence upon recognition and best-likeness judgments. Perception, 
29(11), 1291-1312. 
Levin, D. T., & Beale, J. M. (2000). Categorical perception occurs in newly learned 
faces, other-race faces, and inverted faces. Perception and Psychophysics, 62, 
386-401. 
Lewis, M. B., & Johnston, R. A. (1999). A unified account of the effects of 
caricaturing faces. Visual Cognition, 6(1), 1-41. 
Liu, C. H., Seetzen, H., Buton, A. M., & Chaudhuri, A. (2003). Face recognition is 
robust with incongruent image resolution: Relationship to security video 
images. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 9(1), 33-41. 
Loftus, G. R., & Masson, M. E. J. (1994). Using confidence intervals in within-subject 
designs. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 1(4), 476-490. 
Masson, M. E. J., & Loftus, G. R. (2003). Using confidence intervals for graphically 
based data interpretation. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
57(3), 203-220. 
Matthews, M. (1978). Discrimination of identikit constructions of faces: Evidence for 
 304 
a dual processing strategy. Perception & Psychophysics, 23, 153-161. 
McClelland, J. L., & Chappell, M. (1998). Familiarity breeds differentiation: A 
subjective-likelihood approach to the effects of experience in recognition 
memory. Psychological Review, 105(4), 724-760. 
McKone, E., Kanwisher, N., & Duchaine, B. C. (2007). Can generic expertise explain 
special processing for faces? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(1), 8-15. 
McKone, E., Martini, P., & Nakayama, K. (2001). Categorical perception of face 
identity in noise isolates configural processing. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(3), 573-599. 
Mckone, E., & Peh, Y. (2006). Memory conjunction errors for realistic faces are 
consistent with configural processing. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13(1), 
106-111. 
Medin, D. L. (1989). Concepts and conceptual structure. American Psychologist, 
44(12), 1469-1481. 
Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory of classification learning. 
Psychological Review, 85(3), 207-238. 
Megreya, A. M., & Burton, A. M. (2006a). Unfamiliar faces are not faces: Evidence 
from a matching task. Memory & Cognition, 34(4), 865-876. 
Megreya, A. M., & Burton, A. M. (2006b). Recognising faces seen alone or with 
others: When two heads are worse than one. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
20(7), 957-972. 
 305 
Megreya, A. M., & Burton, A. M. (2007). Hits and false positives in face matching: A 
familiarity-based dissociation. Perception & Psychophysics, 69(7), 1175-1184. 
Metcalfe, J. (1990). Composite holographic associative recall model (charm) and 
blended memories in eyewitness testimony. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 119(2), 145-160. 
Mondloch, C. J., Le Grand, R., & Maurer, D. (2002). Configural face processing 
develops more slowly than featural face processing. Perception, 31(5), 553-
566. 
Morton, J. (1969). Interaction of information in word recognition. Psychological 
Review, 76(2), 165-178. 
Moscovitch, M., & Moscovitch, D. A. (2000). Super face-inversion effects for isolated 
internal or external features, and for fractured faces. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 17(1), 201-219. 
Murray, J. E., Yong, E., & Rhodes, G. (2000). Revisiting the perception of upside-
down faces. Psychological Science, 11(6), 492-496. 
Nachson, I., Moscovitch, M., & Umilta, C. (1995). The contribution of external and 
internal features to the matching of unfamiliar faces. Psychological Research, 
58, 31-37. 
Neumann, P. G. (1974). An attribute frequency model for the abstraction of 
prototypes. Memory & Cognition, 2(2), 241-248. 
Neumann, P. G. (1977). Visual prototype formation with discontinuous representation 
of dimensions of variability. Memory & Cognition, 5(2), 187-197. 
 306 
Nosofsky, R. M. (1984). Choice, similarity, and the context theory of classification. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10(1), 
104-114. 
Nosofsky, R. M. (1986). Attention, similarity, and the identification-categorization 
relationship. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115(1), 39-57. 
Nosofsky, R. M. (1988). Exemplar-based accounts of relations between classification, 
recognition, and typicality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 14 (4), 700-708. 
Nosofsky, R. M. (1991). Tests of an exemplar model for relating perceptual 
classification and recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 17(1), 3-27. 
O'Donnell, C. (2003). Investigating face familiarisation. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Stirling, United Kingdom. 
 O'Toole, A. J., Deffenbacher, K. A., Valentin, D., & Abdi, H. (1994). Structural 
aspects of face recognition and the other-race effect. Memory & Cognition, 22, 
208-224. 
Omohundro, J. (1981). Recognition vs. classification of ill-defined category 
exemplars. Memory & Cognition, 9(3), 324-331. 
Palmeri, T. J., & Gauthier, I. (2004). Visual object understanding. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 5(4), 291-303. 
Palmeri, T. J., & Nosofsky, R. M. (2001). Central tendencies, extreme points, and 
prototype enhancement effects in ill-defined perceptual categorization. The 
 307 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology a: Human Experimental 
Psychology, 54(1), 197-235. 
Payne, D. G., Elie, C. J., Blackwell, J. M., & Neuschatz, J. S. (1996). Memory 
illusions: Recalling, recognizing, and recollecting events that never occurred. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 35(2), 261-285. 
Phillips, R. J., & Rawles, R. E. (1979). Recognition of upright and inverted faces: A 
correlational study. Perception, 8(5), 577-583. 
Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1968). On the genesis of abstract ideas. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 77(3), 353-363. 
Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1970). Retention of abstract ideas. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 83 (2), 304-308. 
Reed, S. K. (1972). Pattern recognition and categorization. Cognitive Psychology, 
3(3), 382-407. 
Reinitz, M. T., Lammers, W. J., & Cochran, B. P. (1992). Memory-conjunction errors: 
Miscombination of stored stimulus features can produce illusions of memory. 
Memory & Cognition, 20(1), 1-11. 
Reinitz, M. T., & Hannigan, S. L. (2001). Effects of simultaneous stimulus 
presentation and attention switching on memory conjunction errors. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 44(2), 206-219. 
Reinitz, M. T., Morrissey, J., & Demb, J. (1994). Role of attention in face encoding. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(1), 
161-168. 
 308 
Rhodes, G., Brake, S., & Atkinson, A. P. (1993). What's lost in inverted faces? 
Cognition, 47(1), 25-57. 
Rhodes, G., Brennan, S., & Carey, S. (1987). Identification and ratings of caricatures: 
Implications for mental representations of faces. Cognitive Psychology, 19(4), 
473-497. 
Rhodes, G., Hayward, W. G., & Winkler, C. (2006). Expert face coding: Configural 
and component coding of own-race and other-race faces. Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review, 13(3), 499-505. 
Rhodes, G., Jeffery, L., Clifford, C. W. G., & Leopold, D. A. (2007). The timecourse 
of higher-level face aftereffects. Vision Research, 47(17), 2291-2296. 
Rhodes, G., Jeffery, L., Watson, T. L., Clifford, C. W. G., & Nakayama, K. (2003). 
Fitting the mind to the world: Face adaptation and attractiveness aftereffects. 
Psychological Science, 14, 558-566. 
Rhodes, G., & Moody, J. (1990). Memory representations of unfamiliar faces: Coding 
of distinctive information. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 19(2), 70-78. 
Robbins, R., McKone, E., & Edwards, M. (2007). Aftereffects for face attributes with 
different natural variability: Adapter position effects and neural models. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
33(3), 570-592. 
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering 
words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 21, 803-814. 
 309 
Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross-cultural 
psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 1-49). London: Academic Press. 
Rossion, B. (2002). Is sex categorization from faces really parallel to face recognition? 
Visual Cognition, 9, 1003-1020. 
Rossion, B., Schiltz, C., Robaye, L., Pirenne, D., & Crommelinck, M. (2001). How 
does the brain discriminate familiar and unfamiliar faces? A pet study of face 
categorical perception. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13(7), 1019-1034. 
Roth, E. M., & Shoben, E. J. (1983). The effect of context on the structure of 
categories. Cognitive Psychology, 15(3), 346-378. 
Ryu, J., & Chaudhuri, A. (2006). Representations of familiar and unfamiliar faces as 
revealed by viewpoint-aftereffects. Vision Research, 46(23), 4059-4063. 
Schacter, D. L., Verfaellie, M., & Anes, M. D. (1997). Illusory memories in amnesic 
patients: Conceptual and perceptual false recognition. Neuropsychology, 11(3), 
331-342. 
Schacter, D. L., Verfaellie, M., & Pradere, D. (1996). The neuropsychology of 
memory illusions: False recall and recognition in amnesic patients. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 35(2), 319-334. 
Schooler, J. W., & Tanaka, J. W. (1991). Composites, compromises, and charm: What 
is the evidence for blend memory representations? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 120 (1), 96-100. 
Schweinberger, S. R., Burton, A. M., & Kelly, S. W. (1999). Asymmetric 
dependencies in perceiving identity and emotion: Experiments with morphed 
 310 
faces. Perception & Psychophysics, 61(6), 1102-1115. 
Schweinberger, S. R., & Soukup, G. R. (1998). Asymmetric relationships among 
perceptions of facial identity, emotion, and facial speech. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24(6), 1748-
1765. 
Searcy, J. H., & Bartlett, J. C. (1996). Inversion and processing of component and 
spatial-relational information in faces. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 22(4), 904-915. 
Sergent, J. (1984). An investigation into component and configurational processes 
underlying face perception. British Journal of Psychology, 75, 221-242. 
Sergent, J. (1986). Microgenesis in face perception. In H. D. Ellis, M. A. Jeeves, F. 
Newcombe, & A. Young (Eds.) Aspects of face processing (pp. 17-73). 
Boston, US: Martinus Injhoff Publishers. 
Shepard, R. N. (1958). Stimulus and response generalization: Tests of a model relating 
generalization to distance in psychological space. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 55(6), 509-523. 
Shepard, R. N. (1987). Toward a universal law of generalization for psychological 
science. Science, 237(4820), 1317-1323. 
Shiffrin, R. M., Huber, D. E., & Marinelli, K. (1995). Effects of category length and 
strength on familiarity in recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(2), 267-287. 
Smith, E. E., & Nielsen, G. D. (1970). Representations and retrieval processes in 
 311 
short-term memory: Recognition and recall of faces. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 85, 397-405. 
Solso, R. L., Heck, M., & Mearns, C. (1993). Prototype formation in very short-term 
memory. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 31(3), 185-188. 
Solso, R. L., & McCarthy, J. E. (1981). Prototype formation of faces: A case of 
pseudo-memory. British Journal of Psychology, 72(4), 499-503. 
Solso, R. L., & Raynis, S. A. (1979). Prototype formation from imaged, 
kinesthetically, and visually presented geometric figures. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 5(4), 701-712. 
Stevenage, S. V. (1998). Which twin are you? A demonstration of induced categorical 
perception of identical twin faces. British Journal of Psychology, 89, 39-57. 
Stevenage, S. V., Lee, E. A., & Donnelly, N. (2005). The role of familiarity in a face 
classification task using thatcherized faces. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 58(6), 1103-
1118. 
Steyvers, M., & Malmberg, K. J. (2003). The effect of normative context variability on 
recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 29(5), 760-766. 
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A, 225-245. 
Thompson, P. (1980). Margaret Thatcher: A new illusion. Perception, 9(4), 483-484. 
 312 
Tong, F., & . Nakayama, K. (1999). Robust representations for faces: Evidence from 
visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
Performance, 25, 1016-1035. 
Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist, 
40(4), 385-398. 
Valentine, T. (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion, and 
race in face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Experimental Psychology, 43(2), 161-204. 
Valentine, T. (2001). Face-space models of face recognition.  In M. J. Wenger & J. T. 
Townsend (Eds.), Computational, geometric, and process perspectives on 
facial cognition: Contexts and challenges (pp. 83-113). Mahwah, NJ, US: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Viviani, P., Binda, P., & Borsato, T. (2007). Categorical perception of newly learned 
faces. Visual Cognition, 15(4), 420-467. 
Vokey, J. R., & Read, J. D. (1992). Familiarity, memorability, and the effect of 
typicality on the recognition of faces. Memory & Cognition, 20(3), 291-302. 
Warrington, E. K., & James, M. (1967). An experimental investigation of facial 
recognition in patients with unilateral cerebral lesions. Cortex, 3(3), 317-326. 
Webster, M. A., & Maclin, O. H. (1999). Figural aftereffects in the perception of 
faces. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(4), 647-653. 
Whittlesea, B. W. (1987). Preservation of specific experiences in the representation of 
general knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
 313 
and Cognition, 13(1), 3-17. 
Winkielman, P., Halberstadt, J., Fazendeiro, T., & Catty, S. (2006). Prototypes are 
attractive because they are easy on the mind. Psychological Science, 17(9), 
799-806. 
Wolberg, G. (1990). Digital image warping. Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer 
Science Society Press. 
Yin, R. K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 81, 141-145. 
Young, A. W., Hay, D. C., McWeeny, K. H., Flude, B. M., & Ellis, A. W. (1985). 
Matching familiar and unfamiliar faces on internal and external features. 
Perception, 14, 737-746. 
Young, A. W., Hellawell, D., & Hay, D. C. (1987). Configurational information in 
face perception. Perception, 16(6), 747-759. 
Zaki, S. R., & Nosofsky, R. M. (2001). Exemplar accounts of blending and 
distinctiveness effects in perceptual old-new recognition. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(4), 1022-
1041. 
 
 
 
 314 
Appendix A 
 
Table A1.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests comparing mean confidence 
ratings among prototype, seen, and unseen exemplar types in Experiment 1. 
.57* .87 3.21 23 .012
.97* 1.02 4.68 23 .000
.40* .70 2.80 23 .031
Prototype - SeenPair 1
Prototype - UnseenPair 2
Seen - UnseenPair 3
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
 
 
 
Table A2. Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests comparing mean confidence 
ratings among prototype, seen, and unseen exemplar types in Experiment 2. 
.51* .64 3.92 23 .002
1.01* .88 5.62 23 .000
.49* .71 3.42 23 .007
Prototype - SeenPair 1
Prototype - UnseenPair 2
Seen - UnseenPair 3
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment f or multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
 
 
 
Table A3.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests comparing mean confidence 
ratings among conditions in the Distance x Exemplar interaction in Experiment 2. 
.67 1.05 3.10 23 .075
.20 .97 1.00 23 1.000
-.47 1.07 -2.15 23 .629
.36 .74 2.34 23 .424
1.81* 1.39 6.38 23 .000
1.46* 1.09 6.57 23 .000
Far Prototy pe - Far SeenPair 1
Far Prototy pe - Far UnseenPair 2
Far Seen - Far UnseenPair 3
Near Prototype - Near SeenPair 4
Near Prototype - Near UnseenPair 5
Near Seen - Near UnseenPair 6
Mean Std.  Deviation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif ference is signif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni (this adjustment was made based on all 16 possible
pairwise comparisons of  Distance x Exemplar Type although only  6 are included in the table).
a. 
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Table B1.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests comparing mean confidence 
ratings among prototype, local average, seen, and unseen exemplar types in 
Experiment 4. 
.43* .68 4.40 47 .000
.98* .97 6.99 47 .000
3.28* 1.21 18.85 47 .000
-.55* 1.03 -3.66 47 .004
2.85* 1.23 16.07 47 .000
2.30* 1.23 12.98 47 .000
Prototype - Local AveragePair 1
Prototype - Seen ExemplarPair 2
Prototype - UnseenPair 3
Seen Exemplar - Local AveragePair 4
Local Average - UnseenPair 5
Seen Exemplar - UnseenPair 6
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment f or multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
 
 
 
Table B2.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests comparing mean confidence 
ratings among faces presented with the same, different, or no context in Experiment 4. 
.34* .82 2.88 47 .020
.44* .72 4.20 47 .000
.10 .52 1.35 47 .565
Same - Dif f erentPair 1
Same - NonePair 2
Dif f erent - NonePair 3
Mean Std.  Deviation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif ference is signif icant at the .05 level.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
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Table B3.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests comparing mean confidence 
ratings among prototype, local average, and unseen exemplar types in Experiment 6. 
.20 .68 2.06 47 .136
2.69* 1.10 16.86 47 .000
2.49* 1.09 15.80 47 .000
Prototype - Local AveragePair 1
Prototype - Unseen
Exemplar
Pair 2
Local Average - Unseen
Exemplar
Pair 3
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
 
 
 
Table B4.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests comparing mean confidence 
ratings among prototype, local average, seen, and unseen exemplar types in 
Experiment 7. 
.70 1.62 2.46 31 .118
.02 1.14 .10 31 1.000
1.80* 1.53 6.64 31 .000
-.68* 1.31 -2.96 31 .035
1.10* 1.55 4.01 31 .002
1.78* 1.39 7.23 31 .000
Prototype - Local AveragePair 1
Prototype - Seen
Exemplar
Pair 2
Prototype - Unseen
Exemplar
Pair 3
Local Average - Seen
Exemplar
Pair 4
Local Average - Unseen
Exemplar
Pair 5
Seen Exemplar - Unseen
Exemplar
Pair 6
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
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Table C1.  Mean confidence ratings to targets and distractors on the first and third 
(final) presentation of an officer‟s face varying across image type in Experiment 8. 
4.95 1.10 5.55 .72
5.28 1.00 5.36 .90
5.30 .76 5.35 .86
2.56 .96 2.47 .97
2.41 .78 2.34 .96
2.44 .92 2.55 1.00
Image Ty pe
Morph
High
Low
Target
Morph
High
Low
Distractor*
Mean
Std.
Deviation
First
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Third
Presentat ion
Distractor f aces were only  presented once each; thus, distractor
summary  statistics are based on the f irst and third block of  trials.
*. 
 
 
 
Table C2.  Mean proportion of OLD responses to targets and distractors on the first 
and third (final) presentation of an officer‟s face varying across image type in 
Experiment 8. 
.79 .31 .94 .17
.88 .22 .90 .23
.89 .21 .90 .21
.24 .24 .20 .25
.22 .20 .17 .23
.20 .25 .22 .26
Image Ty pe
Morph
High
Low
Target
Morph
High
Low
Distractor*
Mean
Std.
Dev iation
First
Mean
Std.
Dev iation
Third
Presentat ion
Distractor f aces were only  presented once each; thus, distractor
summary  statistics are based on the f irst and third block of  trials.
*. 
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Table C3.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests of the Familiarity x Test Image 
interaction on the mean proportion of OLD responses in Experiment 9. 
.04 .21 1.38 47 1.000
.05 .21 1.73 47 1.000
.01 .23 .32 47 1.000
-.07* .14 -3.69 47 .009
-.01 .18 -.53 47 1.000
.06* .13 3.13 47 .000
Morph (Low Familarity ) -
High (Low Familiarity )
Pair
1
Morph (Low Familiarity ) -
Low (Low Familiarity )
Pair
2
High (Low Familiarity ) -
Low (Low Familiarity )
Pair
3
Morph (High Familiarity ) -
High (High Familiarity )
Pair
4
Morph (High Familiarity ) -
Low (High Familiarity )
Pair
5
High (High Familiarity ) -
Low (High Familiarity )
Pair
6
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment f or multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni (this adjustment was made based on all 16
possible pairwise comparisons of  Familiarity  x Test Image although only  6 are included in the
table).
a. 
 
 
 
Table C4.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests on the effect of the type of 
Image (Morph, High, and Low quality) on the proportion of OLD responses to 
distractor faces in Experiment 10. 
-.02 .18 -.69 47 1.000
-.11* .21 -3.69 47 .002
-.09* .21 -3.03 47 .012
Morph - HighPair 1
Morph - LowPair 2
High - LowPair 3
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment f or multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
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Table C5.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests on the main effect of test image 
(Morph, High, and Low quality) on d‟ scores in Experiment 10. 
.09 1.01 .63 47 1.000
.54* .96 3.94 47 .001
.45* 1.05 2.97 47 .014
Morph - HighPair 1
Morph - LowPair 2
High - LowPair 3
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment f or multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
 
 
 
Table C6.  Post hoc Bonferroni paired-samples t tests on the main effect of test image 
(Morph, High, and Low quality) on d‟ scores for the first presentation of an officer‟s 
face in Experiment 10. 
-.44 2.18 -1.38 47 .519
.35 2.00 1.23 47 .677
.79* 1.78 3.07 47 .011
Morph - HighPair 1
Morph - LowPair 2
High - LowPair 3
Mean Std.  Dev iation
Paired Dif f erences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
a
The mean dif f erence is signif icant at the .05 lev el.*. 
Adjustment f or multiple comparisons: Bonf erroni.a. 
 
 
